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members of
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Mr. Robinson.

ASSEMBLYMAN RICHARD ROBINSON:

How are you

It's wonderful to see
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
interested in the subject.

Larry Kapiloff
(Laughter)

ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF:

May I then

' t understand

you're

make just a few

remarks?
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF: We consider the Imbrecht bill to be the
major step forward in this area. We are real
not
to amend the
Imbrecht bill; we are trying to fine tune it.
One of the
finding is that there apparently, at least in some of the
in this state, is a great reluctance to go
with the major thrust
of the Imbrecht bill,
representing the col
wisdom f
Legislature.
We find too often a willingness
the thrust of that bill
because really what the Imbrecht bill was say
is "We favor jo
custody
in principle.
We favor joint custody, and we would therefore, in so many
words, recommend that judges look with favor upon joint cus
of children."
We're finding that's just not occurring
the
that we expected.
We're finding a great reluctance on the part
universal
but to a large degree, to accept that
the
Legislature, and we feel that that's wrong
what the
judiciary is doing is ignoring the mandates of
islature, as they
are wont to do on occasion.
That would be the
thrust of our testimony.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. Kapiloff, how much of that do you
think is due to the fact that the judicial form was not
after
the Imbrecht bill?
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF: Well, see that's one of the
You're dea
1
is a bureaucracy
and they have just refused to even amend their
in the law that we've mandated. We think that,bec
been changed, when you get down the l
recognize or even to sometimes know that
changed and it's there.
But that is a
trying to get at.

lems.
judiciary,
s

not

one respect?
Now, may I ask the indulgence of
Mrs. Jan Gleason, who represents the
Women in
to submit.
San Diego, has not had an opportunity to prepare
l take less
She is here today, and I'm informed that her tes
taken out
than two minutes and I'd consider it a favor if she could
of turn.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Welcome, Ms. Gleason.

Thank you, Mr.
loff, and I can do
MS. JANICE M. GLEASON:
this, I think, in 45 seconds.
I'm
the l,ocal
of the
po
I would
i
National Organization for Women.
to present for consideration.
The gist of my testimony is that
either parent from birth to age of reason,
western cultures is between six or seven
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to
to

the other provisions that the attorneys are deal
with among the
parties; (2) from the age of reason to puberty, from the age of seven to
twelve or fourteen, joint custody, all things being equal; (3) from puberty to the age of majority, joint or sole custody, the emphasis being
given on the preparation for adulthood, particularly the responsibility
of getting a job and getting started on one's career.
Thank you very much.
that?

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
(Laughter)

Thank you again, Larry.

Wow, that's a record!

Anybody want to beat

ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF: By the way, that wasn't-- Jan really
is a neutral witness because her organization is ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes, T underst.and.

MS. IRIS JEAN HICKS: My name is Iris Hicks, commonly referred
to in your li tera-fure as the proponent of AB 1706.
I need for you to
know that parenting for me is really a very private and a very personal
matter.
It's not comfortable to come before the public and have to reveal your private parenting issues. But when you have been confronted
with something like a custody battle and look at the laws and view the
legislation and you realize the trauma that battle is causing an individual family, if you are any type of a conscientious citizen, you cannot stand back and not make a statement about what needs to be changed.
So, the presentation that I will give you is legally researched, but it's
inspired from the heart.
First of all, the Legislature has been very terrific (I'll use
the word "terrific") in their public policy statement. Publ
policy
says that the Legislature finds and declares that it is the
lie policy
of this state to assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact
with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their
marriage and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities
of child rearing in order to effect this policy.
The policy sounds terrific, so why are we
problems?
First of all, we're having problems because of the concept called presumptions. Now presumptions aren't very sexy, but they're very important.
In the joint custody area, the presumption does not follow the policy.
In other words, the policy encourages continuing contact.
The burden of
proof currently is on the person who wants to have the continuing contact to prove why that is beneficial. We feel that the presumption should
be changed and be coordinated with the public policy of the state.
Secondly, historically presumptions concerning custody have
changed as society has changed.
There was a paternal presumption in
agrarian common law England, when children were considered to be the
property of the father.
Then we had the Industrial Revolution,when the
father was the absentee breadwinneri the mother was the stay-at-home
nurturer, and the mother became the presumptive custodian.
In California today, however, we don't live that way. Both
mothers and fathers are breadwinners and both mothers and fathers are
nurturers, so it would seem that joint custody would be a very logical
-3-
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because you happen to be a normal human being and sometimes as a parent in a crisis you don't get along with your spouse or ex-spouse.
Also, by saying that "if parents can't get along" you're encouraging disagreement on the part of those parents. You are in essence saying that at the time of the divorce you are angry with your
spouse.
The way you get that is refuse to agree to joint custody. You
create the whole cycle of arguments. The judges and people say, "You
can't get along." Therefore, we're back to sole custody.
It's a Catch-22
problem.
Also, many of the problems with the argument that "when the
parents can't get along" really are problems that children have in divorce, period.
It's not a joint custody problem.
It's a problem of
children in divorce, and we've accepted reasonable visitation forever.
Parents can't get along with reasonable visitation, and we've never
challenged a person's right to reasonable visitation because
they can't get along with their spouse.
It sounds good; it's not really
how it works.
I've listed some other "what ifs." I won't go into detail; other speakers will. What if there's a geographical distance?
What if the parents cannot share equal time? What if one parent is on
welfare? The last one I will touch on: What if one parent is not custodially competent? There's been some fear that a presumption of joint
custody will force children to be in the hands of battering parents,
perhaps drug addicts, alcoholics.
It sounds very scary. We're still
functioning from the test of what would be in the best interests of the
child, and we do have a code section that protects children in these
cases.
It's Civil Code Section 4509.
In essence it says that evidence
of misconduct shall be improper and inadmissible except where child
custody is an issue and such evidence is relevent to that issue. The
codes protect us from incompetent parents in joint custody situations.
The next reason we're still struggling is really the major
reason.
Larry already commented on it, and that has to do with professiona.
concerns about implementation. The petition forms for dissolution have
already been mentioned.
I think we're all aware of them. We also have
some problems sort of like the judicial guidelines for the domestic
relations cases.
Judge King in San Francisco in his guidelines to the
public states such things as "Joint custody, i.e., alternating periods
such as one month with each parent,will not be ordered." If you think
a parent is going to read that and have the nerve to ask for joint custody, you should give that a second thought. We also have judicial textbooks on family law such as the California Basic Practice Guide, where jn
comments to lawyers it says such things as "It seldom makes good sense
to award joint custody if one parent disagrees, because the order would
be unworkable." The legislative law does not say that.
It says you can
still consider sole custody or joint custody.
In fact, if one parent
disagrees, we do not have a choice of joint custody in the State of
California.
I'm talking about 1980-1981 publications, publications since
the law was enacted.
Another speaker will address the issue of statistics of
how we are still preferring mothers overwhelmingly in discretionary
judicial decisions. Also, you must know the impact of judicial decisions. A difficult sole custody decision then is related down to
attorneys who anticipate that judges still believe in sole custody.
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They

in turn advise helpless divorcing parents,
1, the j
will move on full custody. Let's cons
that from the
The trickle down effect of all of this when it reaches the average public is really overwhelming.
I think ...
Robinson

Excuse me one second

Hicks.

s a ques
MS. HICKS:

Mr.

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Ms. Hicks, I
but the opponents ask one question that I would
before your time runs out, and that's the issue
bill will focus litigation, child cus
1
the parents, and to that extent it's
domestic relations law in this state
appreciate it if you'd address that.

Mr

ff's bill,

, on the fitness of
in the growth of the
ten years.
I would

MS. HICKS: Okay. The fitness issue is a dif
t issue, and
I take the full responsibility that "fitness" is a poor choice of words.
The code addresses visitation in the terms of "the judge retains his
discretion to deny visitation if it
detr
to the child," and
we would request that your Committee
to the language "detrimental
to the child" as opposed to the issue of f
ss of the
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
MS. HICKS:

No, but what I'm say

I understand ...

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
••. is
loff measure's going to work, is the 1
the fitness of the parents rather than on

way the Kapibe focused on
ts of the child?

MS. HICKS:
The only evidence that l
should be
ible
on the fitness issue relates to the code section that I just
and that has to do with whether or not the
is custodial
to care for the child. That is the only
on the f
s issue
that is permitted.
In fact, when we have
now that says that if
the parents disagree they can go into a full battle -- cus
, you know,
battle over sole custody versus sole cus
two different parents -we get into many, many more fitness issues
sole cus
than
we do if you limit it to the evidence of the custodial
as it's
related to being able to care for the child when you start out with the
presumption that each parent has an
r
to joint cus
We
actually feel that ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
You're say
all these issues could
currently be brought up under the sole cus
law and of
condi
whether it's the living arrangements of either
be
roommates or what have you. All those issues can
up,and this in no way exacerbates t.
MS. HICKS: That's right, yes, and
joint custody you're narrowing the fitness
todial competence, which is where it shou
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tual y say
with
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This whole idea "if the parents can't agree" opens up a bailiwick
to more fitness problems than you can imagine, because ¥OU spend your
time trying to prove sole custody versus sole custody and ...
I do want to read just one quote as you look at the proponents
versus the opponents on this issue. You see,the proponents are primarily
parents who are divorced themselves, who have had personal experience
with the system that is very different than the professionals, and I
don't mean to degrade their expertise, but experience does give you a
different insight.
I'd like to read from Persia Wooley.
She said, "The difference
between the professional reaction to shared custody and that of the
people who are practicing some form of it is often amazing ... Not infrequently, I spend the day listening to learned arguments as to why such
arrangements can't possibly work, and then have dinner with people, who, no1
knowing that it was impossible,found it to be an eminently sensible way
of doing things." That has been exactly my personal experience.
On page seven, I talk and show graphically a chart on what I
call "What's in a Name --Attitudes and Status." If you look at the
incredible ways we consider custody versus visitation, it's awesome. We
have winner, loser, fit parents, unfit parents, custodian, noncustodian,
good parents, bad parents, sole parent, nonparent, primary right, secondary right, authoritarian, visitor as an entertainer. The custody
person has it all; the visitation person has nothing. We have better
parent, worse parent, nurturing parent, Disneyland Dad, psychological
parent, and we have the visitation person who's usually the victim of
"Mother, may I" games.
You can see why people don't want to be stuck with visitation.
It doesn't sound very nice; it doesn't look very good; it doesn t feel
very good.
In joint custody, you can see the difference in attitude.
It's described in terms of shared rights and responsibilities; it's
called no-fault custody.
The child has two fit parents.
They continue
as parents though they're divorced as spouses, and we have Mom's house,
Dad's house.
These words have come from an enormous amount of reading
where I have answered descriptions of how we view custody and visitations
and how we view joint custody.
The words make a difference, they really
do.
The incredible thing too is that in both of these cases, custody and visitation or joint custody, the child could actually be spendinq
the same amount of time in both cases. How we do it makes the difference as to how we feel about it.
Also, we like the idea of equality of joint custody. Everyone agrees that joint custody or that custody should be considered in
the best interests of the child. Proponents feel that really the child
is part of the total system which also includes parents and society and
that the goal is to best preserve stability, continuity and security,
both emotionally and environmentally, for all involved.
To conclude, I would like to refer to another quote from the
book, Divided Children, by Michael Wheeler. He says, "We must accept
less than perfection, but we most certainly can improve the way in which
-7-

custody issues are now decided. Even a modest reform is worth great
effort; multiplied by so many cases, the overall social benefits
would be immense."
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
of the Committee? Okay.

Are there any other questions from members

Thank you very much.
The next witness is Steven Belzer, an attorney at law and the
former counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Administration of
Justice at the California State Legislature. Mr. Belzer. How are you
doing, Steve? Good to see you. Mr. Belzer's a great
s.
He
)
went to the same law school as I did.
(
MR. STEVEN P. BELZER: Mr. Chairman, and members, I'm in
the happy position of representing nobody but myself today.
I believe
staff invited me here today because I was a s
f
son in the Senate
who was responsible for the Senate's version of jo
custody legislation, which was SB 477 by Senator Smith. Ultimately AB 1480, Mr. Imbrecht's bill, was enacted and became effective. Actually both bills were
enacted and became effective. They were substantially similar with the
exception of a few additions that were made to AB 1480 after SB 477
had been chaptered.
I am now employed by the Sacramento Superior Court as a supervisor with a research attorney, and I have a unique opportunity in that,
having drafted much of the language of AB 1480, I'm now in a position
of being asked by judges to help them interpret
and
1 them what
it means and how to apply it.
In this pos
I have an opportunity to listen to the concerns and complaints
attorneys and judges
alike although I don't have any contact with li
at all. And
from that standpoint,! can only tell you what
and judges
have told me about the law.
of both
I'd like to begin by say
AB 1480 and SB 477 was to assure the
contact with both parents after divorce.
vehicle
, and
seems to
this policy was to be carried out was joint
me that what we did was, basically, to create a legal fiction that
joint custody presumptively is in the best
s of the child under
to say, and probably
certain circumstances when what we
the best interests
should have said, was that when it
of the child, it's for that child or
tact with both parents after divorce, and that's
legislation should have said in the first place and stuck to
Joint custody as a vehicle has basica
swallowed up the
policy, and it's really the policy that's important here and not
necessarily the vehicle that we formulated to carry out that
icy.
I see this as having been treated as
a panacea and a pariah.
Many attorneys have told me that joint cus
and the way that the
law is written have become a sort of a Catch-22 s
. It's a
tactical problem for attorneys and clients who
't want jo
custody.
It's a tactical
em for
and cl
who do want
joint custody.
If you don't want joint
then the law says that
-8-

the court can consider that as a factor in making a sole custody award.
The problem is that if you say you don't want joint custody, then chances
are that you're going to end up in mediation where a mediator is going
to try and convince you that you do want joint custody. And the point
I'm trying to make is the law as it exists now more or less demands
that you have it both ways.
What I would suggest is that there are real
two basic
lems with the law. Number one, it's hypertechnical and it's too cumbersome, and number two, it doesn't adequately define joint custody.
From my standpoint, I would prefer to see a different approach taken
than existing law takes.
I think AB 1706 is not objectionable. I
think that if we're going to have preferences in custody awards and
we're going to give a first preference to joint custody~ that it should
be an all or nothing proposition.
I don't think we should be
tting
physical and legal joint custody.
Either we're going to be committed
to joint custody or we aren't.
The problem I see with AB 1706 is that
if we're going to stay with joint custody as the preferred form of
child custody, then we better define what we're talking about. And
that's been a major problem with the bill because no court has defined
what legal custody is and no court has defined what physical custody is
in the joint custody context. So if we're going to use the language
"joint custody," I think we should define in the bill what we're talking
about, and I think AB 2202 by Assemblyman Imbrecht does just that. One
of the really serious problems we faced in the drafting of AB 1480 and
SB 477 is that we could not come up with a workable definition of ioint
custody.
I think that AB 2202 goes a long way in that direction
ASSEMBLY~~N LARRY STIRLING:
AB 2202 a pending bill?

Excuse me, Mr. Belzer.

MR. BELZER:
Yes, that's Mr. Imbrccht's bil .
duced on April 27, 1981.
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:
Kapiloff's?

Is

It was intro-

So it's a competing bill with Mr.

MR. BELZER: Well, they really aren't in conflict. AB 2202
does basically the same thing that AB 1706 would do with the exception
that it defines the distinction between joint legal and joint physical
custody.
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:

Do you think the definitions are

fine?
MR. BELZER:
able and ...

I think the definitions are perfectly accept-

ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:
the bill.

ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF:
If I may •..

Larry, have you looked at it?

I haven't had an opportunity to read

MR. BELZER:
In my view, that's been a serious drawback in
existing legislation,that we don't know. When we talk about joint
custody, everybody has his own definition of what it is. Some people
-9-
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is to say, if we're going to say that jo
ence,
o
custody is first preference.
Let s
it,
let's do away with all the other stuff.
the planned parent 1
tion.
Let's do
bersome
that get in people's
these cases, and parent's know what
th
point in time, I don't see any reason
we
with a lot of other
ing that's

Be zer.

ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:
I'm
present law

MR. BELZER: No, I'm
is it's too
some.

away with
other cumto act in:
At
jo

present law

that the

ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:

Are you say-

6

How about 1706?

MR. BELZER:

I think in that
4600.5 with the one
jo
splits should not be
a good deal of section 4600.5 of the Civil
and not have much effect.

1
s

It seems
me that
could be

cour
a Judicial Council
doesn't include the alternat
f
in San
have the
the Irnbrecht bill, so it's not clear
t to
n

were

The
1480

I bel

that
sed.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

were?

Oh,

the tes

was ...
were

I

out.
It's
ished

8

modified, and
ike that.
Mr. Belzer
this
just close
one, s
i
most of Sec
l and joint
(g) of Section

reco
ther
-1 -

you summarize your testi-

to be in some fashion
cus
law that courts
of the bill.
That is, they should
carry out the
tody orders that assure both parents have contact with
contact with both parents.
that assure the
"sole custody," "joint
do
is to s
which kids can be
formulate some other
Do you have any ques

orders that

an
I have one.
I'm interested in
scussion
is incumbent in al o
t
sical cusWhen you talk
support have an
t
MR. BELZER:
when AB l
when the
sidered at the time.
although I
ze

Well, some problems were raised late in
debate
went through.
It was how to divide up the child
wasn't contransfer off, and that question real
I very frankly haven't given tha
much
that
's a problem.
I real
couldn't make ...
7

CHAIRPillN HARRIS:
I appreciate that.
It seems to me that one
of the issues
s
raised continually about
cus
s how
in fact we
for the economic well-being of the
ld. We talk
about his best interests, which sometimes of course is economic assessments that have to be looked at as well.
I think that can be
of
the
out process so I would have apprec
your
on
that, but I don't
any other questions of you, Mr. Belzer.
Do you?
COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

No.
Thank you, Mr. Belzer.
Judge in the
Court.

is
f

Mr. Chairman, members
the Cornmi tee,
I will
scuss
th AB 1706, which I s
s basical
a
jo
enactment and AB 2202, which is the Imbrecht
bill,
both joint physical-legal
ions.
I
will recommend aga
t the major thrust of AB
th some
hesita
, recommend in favor of AB 2202.
I d 1
f
t of all
the
lature and those persons
to propose
a very
statement o

those persons in
communities
us all

isconparents.
that amazes
we can
to
discuss
sue without
mention and certa
not an
on the children.
I would suggest that while we
discuss this
we should at all times bear in mind the children
and not the war that goes on between the adults.
I
a
icular
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interest in this kind of legislation because I am the product of probably one of the first joint custody
in this
My
mother and father were divorced when my s
and I were two years of
age and they knew, or they thought, at the time that
did not like
one another but they were sure that they loved my s
me very
much.
So they decided that my mother would have my sister and me for
two years and that my father would have us for two years,and we spent
our entire lives that way.
The first school that I went to for more
than two years was UCLA Law School.
I'm very
eased to have you know
that my mother and father apparently were so
sed with the results of their early decision that they
themselves that they
were really in love and they remarr
some years after my sister and
I had flown the coop.
(Laughter)
I would suggest that Sections 4600 and 4600.5 should be given
a chance to work and changed only where necessary.
Because AB 2202, the
Imbrecht bill, is an attempt at clarifica
to define some terms, . we
approve that.
But I am bound at this point to tell you that the Family
Law Committee of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, the Central District, were so threatened by the tinkering,
called
, and the
premature legislating upon this subject, that
f
that even AB 2202 be opposed.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Let me ask a question.
"premature." Why do you feel it's
?

You use the word

"Premature" basically because we, at least most
of the j
our court, are really just
familiar with the
ideas and the attitudes surrounding the whole
concept.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Are they having

ems

it?

I really do not believe they are.
I also have
some di
I am very disappointed at the number of people
who actually are asking for joint custody. We have a very small number
of people who ask for it.
I thought that we would at least get an increase of about maybe a 100 percent,br
the
number of people
who are asking for joint custody up to about 50
, but we are disappointed in that. We have not had the
in that range.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
Judge, I have a question.
a part
of that is the fact that the Judicial Council hasn't
the form.
The form was approved on January 1 of 1980, the same time the Imbrecht
bill was effective.
I think one of my real frustrations with the whole
subject matter is the failure of the Judicial Council to come
to grips, to change their forms to
with existing law.
think
're going to get a vote from joint
when the
tioners and certainly the parents,who fortunately
with this system rarely once in a 1
,
in certain areas of the state,don't know the
unless the form that they fill out and sign,
attorney signs, brings
that to their attention, I can see why there hasn't been
drastic occurring.
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JUDGE MILLS: Well, I don't believe that there would be too
much difficulty in getting the form changed. Obviously ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Well, when we had the first hearing,
raked the Judicial Council over the coals, and the form hasn't been
changed yet.

I

JUDGE MILLS: Well, let me tell you that I will assist in any
way I can to see that the form is changed.
I don't believe that even the
changing of a form, however, is going to affect what is the main suspicion
here.
The main suspicion is that you cannot trust judges to act in the
best interests of the children. That's why I think we are dealing so
strongly in the area of presumptions. The idea of a presumption is to
create a situation such that if nothing else happens you have a given
which will be the end result of whatever hearing you might have.
I would
suggest that before we do a great deal in terms of changing the basic law
of joint custody we ought to really wait until some of the several studies
are out which analyze what has happened in joint custody arrangements
which have already been allowed under our system,so that we can continue
our resolve that joint custody is a proper way to go and to reassure ourselves and, for the rest of us who might not have too much confidence in
it,to develop sorne faith in joint custody in terms of cooperative parenting. Now I want to really spend most of my time talking about why I opposed AB 1706.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
But on that point, Judge, aren't you
really arguing that you would rather see an evolution of case law in this
area rather than statutory changes by the Legislature? Isn't that the
effect of what you just said? I can agree and understand that presumptions, be they rebuttable or conclusive, show a lack of confidence on
the part of the Legislature in the ability of the judie
to recognize
changes in social structures and social needs.
That's true. That occurs
throughout the law, and it's occurring more and more in the Penal Code,
as a matter of fact.
Just look at the drunk driving bills that we've just
ended up passing. But the real effect is that we have a problem. We can
change the law. We change the policy of the state and we are the constitutional policy setters of the state, and we don't see a reaction in
the judiciary. You're arguing, I believe, and now you tell me if I'm
wrong, that you want to see an evolution of case law where the judges
tamper and experiment with the system and they come up with what is a
mean and then that will be the laws applied rather than what this Leg slature ...
JUDGE MILLS:

No, I'll ...

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

If you'll excuse me, is this suspicion

misplaced?
JUDGE MILLS: Well, first of all, the suspicion, I believe, is
misplaced. But, to answer your question, Mr. Robinson, I am convinced
that it is the responsibility of judges to not make the law.
It's your
responsibility, and I would not hope that we must depend upon the further
development of joint custody just on the basis of what judges decide
because that way we probably will not develop the kind of policy that I'm
sure the Legislature had in mind when it started out with joint custody
under the present legislation. About AB 1706 ...
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ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:
CHAIR~lliN

HARRIS:

Yes

I'm

Mr

sorr~

I have

ion.

Stirl

is that
a
contest them and you have a
custody in your court.
Is that
, that you won't ...
JUDGE MILLS: No, that is dec
much in favo o
cus
pos
be
ed upon parties. It is my humble
joint cus
upon people who have
to
with one another
the children in an
should not do that
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:

That s

JUDGE MILLS:

My position is that
have a
that can be antic
that cannot be
ted,
custody.

not apply
to
those
very much in

You ind
the number o
e
ied in
that your
statements had a ch 1
trickle down effect?
JUDGE MILLS:

I

don't know.
Of the

in

courts

we did
ied
many were
JUDGE MILLS:

I real

don

ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:
JUDGE MILLS:

Thank you.

Let me conclude
of that l

finds
is unfit exacerbate
anachronism in family law since no-fault of
turns to the considerations of unfitness.
hos l
and adversar
believe
the
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tell us

one where the
our child or
how to ra
and let us
our d
is the one
make up
should be, so I, the j
and here is what I mean by joint custody,"
an outl

I think also that 1706 elevates the des res
above the best interests of the child, and this is
case law of our state.
It is based upon a kind of
goes 1
this.
The judges can't be trusted to make an order in
needed to
the best interests of the child; therefore,a
dis trustee
assure
If the parties don't agree, the court must,
court, must find one of the parties is unfit. Now if that distrust s
, the court
well-placed, guess who's going to be found unf
the same
must order jo
custody, and the terms will be
suspect judge. Or ...

Judge Mills, excuse me
earlier from
was
these same fitness quest
are exacerbated by current law and that this bill is not go
in anyway reize the itness question as it relates to ...
Well, it has to reemphasize the fitness question
time in many years the words are
in
icourt now is going to have to make a find
o unfitness.
Well, in your court
hear fitness ques
the parents cannot agree
due
evidence and testimony that questions the f
ent? Does that occur on a cow~on ...
to this
t of all,
is extreme
"unfitness" is not used in our court. We do not
it is
t's an anachronism
hear thes
sues?
the best interes
Yes we do, but we are look
ious
of the ch
labelling of the parents which can
ted and can be very exacerbating of court
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Well, what term is used to desc ibe

find
JUDGE MILLS:
the child.
from

The terms that we use are "
best
ts of
current language that we find most satisfac

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Okay, if the term "unfitness" was stricken
bill,would that change your position on the bill?
JUDGE MILLS:

In terms of a finding of the lack of pa
-15-

capacity of one of the parents, I'm not even sure that I would be pleased
if that were a necessary finding. Let me wind up by say
that there is
no convincing evidence that joint custody can work without a plan regarding
those circumstances which can be foreseen by the
The ability of
a party to negotiate regarding those unexpected circumstances and occurrences which arise is absolutely imperative.
There is no convincing evidence that joint custody can work when imposed without
agreement of
the parties or that children are not serious
hurt in the
ting confusion, hostilities,and uncertainties. Final
, there is nothing in AB
1706 which in my opinion would favorably
ton any of the aforementioned considerations.
In concluding, on Mr. Harris' question regarding
support, I think that support in the question of custody is perhaps the
at least second most important consideration, if not,as far as many of
the parents are concerned, the primary consideration in custody, and I'm
not too sure over what.
People who insist upon having the time divided
50-50 between parents, are not they real
ing to avoid a support
responsibility, thereby not really emphas z
the best interests of the
children? So, I think, Mr. Harris, that your question regarding the importance of support and how it impinges on the question of custody and/or
visitation is extremely important.
Thank you very much.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
JUDGE MILLS:

Yes.

Mr. Robinson has another question.

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
Judge Mills, there's one issue that you
didn't cover, and I understand your suspicion of the Legislature forcing
presumptions on you.
The effect of presumptions in other areas of the
law has often forced negotiations and
settlements amongst the
parties. You only have to go to the Labor Code and worker's compensation,
where we put out first presumptions in the California law at the turn of
the century, to see that. You evidently do not believe that there's anyway that our
a presumption
the law in favor of joint custody
is going to force the parents, realiz
that that is the state of the law,
not depending upon the rumors of what your
disposi
apt to
be, and I mean you collectively -- any judge that would be hearing this
case -- but looking at the law, they see and their
see there is
a presumption.
Isn't it entirely possible that those
then will
get together
negotiate an amicable
involving joint custody,
absent any definitive definition of the
' t that a real possibility from the enactment of this bill?
ity, but I think
's real
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
That's been the precedent though as far
as
ns.
mean,
you take the
ion of 1.0 in
blood alcohol, that forces a lot of compromise,
most of the frustration
on the part of the public -- a lot of plea barga
to reckless or drunk
driving. Every presumption that I'm aware of in the existing law has
forced compromises and forced so
, and it seems to me that especially in the area of domestic relations law the
se to be
achieved absent confrontation in the courtroom
to the state's best
interest.
JUDGE MILLS:

Well, certa
-16-

I agree

your latter statement,

and we're do
we have to. In fact, we are do
conciliation court in Los Angeles, to make sure that the
have an
opportuni
to work out the problems regarding custody and support without
the necess ty of intervening courts. As a matter of fact, you cannot get
any business done in our court without going direc
to the court of concil tion first, even when there is a suggestion of a
But in
terms of the risk or the likelihood that a presumption
11 force an agreement between the
, my problem is not wanting to assume the risk of
a great deal of damage being done to children who are
in joint
custody arrangements where the parents do not have the abili
to deal
with the business of their children on a joint basis. The
that joint custody works in every situation except where there is evidence to the contrary is simply not a healthy
ion,
bearing in mind that people who come into our courts on these cases are
people who cannot agree on anything. They cannot agree on the d
ion of
the pots and pans. How then can we expect that
ll agree on the
arrangements of their children?
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

There's no

on pots and pans.

(Laughter)
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me ask one question in conclus
is your feeling about, on the issue of child support a s
for
support? There's a lot of inconsistency, for
Los Angeles and Sacramento county superior courts. There s
vergence in the amount of child support that one would pay
Is that inequitable? It seems to be.

~'¥hat

scale
J-

on

JUDGE MILLS: Well, I really think that
there
be
a requirement that there be schedules. And these schedules, incidental
are extremely helpful in affecting disposition of cases because
can anticipate what a judge might do in a given si
However, you
to allow some room for local areas to be able
their own
ines because a guideline that works in Los
ll not work
Butte County, for obvious reasons. So yes, gu
ines
they should be encouraged on a statewide basis, but there should be
the
abil
to make sure that the information
those
ines
is absolutely
nt and dependable. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Judge, I certa
want to thank
I don
think
you for coming down and being part of the hear
anybody has more impact on family law institutions
the State f California than you do as head of the family law department
the L. A.
Superior Court. Thank you.
JUDGE MILLS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I wanted to read the names of several of my
favorite people. Let's see if I can get around to it.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Is this an all inclusive list?

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, no.
(Laughter) The California Association of Marriage and Family Therapists, which is
of AB 1706.
The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers of Northern California, which
opposes AB 1706. The Office of Child Support Enforcement,
of
-17-

Health and Human Services, which expresses some concern over AB 1706.
The Department of Social Services, the State of California, which
addresses the effect of AB 1706 on AFDC el ibility and enforcement of
child support. The reason they are all my favor
people is they
submitted their testimony in writing so we can distribute it.
(Laughter)
[Appendix A through D]
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:
I ask Mrs. Hicks a question?
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Hr. Harris.

While your next witness is coming, may

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Mr. Kapiloff and Mrs. Hicks, the last
testimony raised the issue of who is ultimately responsible for what the
arrangements are for support and raises in my mind the issue of who ultimately has to give permission to a minor to do serious things
like join the military or get married and this sort of thing ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Play football.

ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:
•.. go into politics, any of those
serious kinds of issues.
Under a joint custody relationship, does it
have to be a committee agreement, or can either party vote no and kibosh
the decision? How do you anticipate that working?
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF:
Let me try and answer this.
I think you
would resolve it the same way that it is resolved when the parents are
still married.
If the parents are still married, it must be a joint decision, and I would imagine under those circumstances depending upon who
would be permitted, who could sign the papers, you know.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
Is that really true, Mr. Kapiloff?
think you can join the military on one signature ...
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF:
can't join ..•
military

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
up.

All right.
I

I

But, what I'm saying is you

think it's either signature or the

ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF:
That's right, but imagine the situation
where either the mother or father can sign and approve the child's joining the military if the parents are married. Why would it be any different? Why would we try to change the situation where the parents are now
separated but there's joint custody?
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:
Essential
they have to make the
decision in January rather than February,one way or the other. Okay.
MS. HICKS:
I have just one comment to make. We do have mandatory mediation and some of the difficult situations are written
into the joint custody agreement, so there is available
ic counseling
-18-

that can help in that situation. Also, some fami
of those major issues
will be responsible
school
, and the father military, and
s

separated which
the mother
oint cus

Okay. We have two witnesses now
fathers
Cus
Assoc
enting The
Gerald A. Silver,
Law Coalition.
The
the California Fami
presentation will
tape and
Gentlemen
would you like to come forward?
MR. JAMES A.
Committee members, I am James A. Cook.
I
appreciate
speak.
I do want to correct what may now
be a widespread opinion.
I am here on behalf of The Jo
Cus
Association,
represents some 600 members, over 15 of whom are
women, the bulk of whom are professionals concerned
th this
I come to th s issue because I was persona
legislative fforts to
joint cus
in 1976involved in the initiation of the present law in
throughout ' 9.
Furthermore, I have been deal
with the 2
judicial committees in 24 different states and have traveled to the other
states, helping them to implement a law patterned after the California
form.

Wha you have before you are several
to br
the test
of some
prominent and
who could not be here.
That is part of the tes
sentation concerns two items, that wh
is
the other
called "Implementation of Joint
statistical
of what has been occurring.
Let
and I
be
rather than cover

two years ago at the Bar Assoc
said from the podium.
One was
t year
the
slature was
f judicial 1
lation of that sess
Law Section of the Bar,from their pod
most s
ficant
of family law leg lation
no-fault divorce.
So what is wrong? Why are we
That's the crux of what I have to say.
two.
statute passed

1mfurthermore
that i
may
decade inc
soon afterward

First off, I m hesitant to hear
have the
before you to check
that it
not presume jo
custody in all cases.
a
A burden of proof is o fered to
for reason is provided.
Furthermore, best
are protected.
The wording rema
in the or
statute, and it is a portion of AB 1706.
tness" is a word that I want to careful
al
I
s Hicks is using fitness in a
that of the denial of parenting rights, which al
, we are all nevertheless (or at least Iri
)
we would be willing to
the
of the provocation that it seems to have
caution you, however, about is sometimes you wil
instead of fitness,
want to talk about criter
out to be an even more nebulous "fitness" and
-19-

It's

say.
We must relimited fashion
s
those I

turns
criteria, many of

which I consider unconstitutional and highly questionable.
One of which,
for instance, is it should be limited because of geography. Not only is
that unconstitutional, but it does inspire what we get r
now, a sole
custodian deliberately moving with the child so they can say that geo-graphically joint custody is inconvenient.
There are improvements that are needed in the
statute an unambiguous first step presumption for joint custody. Although the
Legislature would appear to have given that presumption and the policy
statement of the original bill, we are finding, unfortunately, parents
are having to go into court and debate the intention of the Legislature
rather than getting on with our present case. So, we need a clear cut,
unambiguous first step presumption. Also, the frequent and continuing
contact which is certainly physical contact has been subverted by diverting
these cases into joint legal custody.
Now, I mentioned that I'm dealing with the judiciary committees
in 24 other states on this topic.
In the State of Nevada we were successful in getting a bill through patterned exactly after the California one,
so we would have contiguous states for there's a lot of movement back
and forth. We have a similar bill with one exception.
They corrected
the joint legal custody problem, making
only available when the parents do agree.
In every other state where we are now
scussing this
issue, they all see the flaw and the diversion that has occurred in the
California system and are either not using the term ''joint legal" at all
or determining ways to proscribe it.
There is a problem of more equitability of time together~
I've
been unable to address that because of time here, but you have a statement
before you by Dr. Frank Williams in child psychiatry at Cedars-Sinai
Hospital and the former president of the American Association of Adolescent
Psychiatry, who attempts to tell you one of the
reasons for more
equitability of time to help overcome the competi
s of achieving
equitability.
[Appendix E]
I'm obviously racing because I do want to
the statistics.

on to some of

Joint custody should be considered from the outset, from the
first temporary order rather than delay, that long delay, till trial date
much later on wherein then the opponents come in and say, "Well, the child
is already well-established in the sole custody situation." The statute
t the present time allows and encourages joint custody from the initiating
orders, but it is not being given at the initial
rary orders.
The reasons for denial. Three times in the statute a judge is
asked to give the reasons for denial of joint custody if it is denied.
Almost invariably reasons are not being given, which causes two problems.
First, the parent seeking joint physical custody has no standard or
barometer whereby to correct their situation to be qualified for it in
the eyes of the law.
And the second and most
ff
t
is they
don't have a focus that will make for an efficient, less costly appeal of
this matter.
Let me just say something about reasons ...
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CHAI~~N HARRIS:
Okay, we're going to have to ask you to summarize. We really are going to try to limit everybody to five minutes.
You are approaching that limit.

MR. COOK:

All right, I then better not cover reasons.

Since much of my statistical coverage is on those parents who
are asking for joint custody, who are they by and large? Who is going in?
We are finding that 76 percent of the individual parents especially interested in joint custody did not in fact initiate nor seek divorce. Of
that 76 percent, 72 percent of those parents pre
to preserve the
family and sought either reconciliation or conciliation of some sort. The
parents interested in joint custody tend not to be the initiator of divorce.
What was the impetus for this survey? I'm going to say something very provocative, and people in the audience might want to jump
on it. Why did we find that survey was necessary? Well, reputedly, and
I say this with great caution because I was not personally present, on
December 8, 1979, after the bill had passed and before it was implemented
on January 1st, there was an ad hoc meeting of a few judges and commissioners in Los Angeles, discussing this bill. Now, I'm
rumor, and
anybody can say anything they want to. The proof has to be in what
happened to the cases subsequently. The rumor out f that was: "You can
circumvent the actual, equitable physical contact
diverting it into
joint legal custody, and as for reasons, ask our own conciliation court
people for reasons why they would not give joint custody." Well, all
right,whether that meet
did or did not take place,it
up a
problem: "My God, we've got to follow through and find out what
to the implementation."
So, what we have surveyed was the decrees
85 j
in 20
different courtrooms in 19 different Cal1'forn1'a
Now, f rom t h e
standpoint of how are the children faring in this,
nk that if the
opportunity for joint custody for children hinges on the present pattern
of implementation, overwhelmingly, children are not going to get it.
Furthermore, if the opportunity for children to enjoy joint physical custody requ
both their parents to agree first before going into the
f~rmal courtroom, the children are not going to get it.
We surveyed 176
d~fferent
~rom. 109 divorcing families, whose average age at
d1vorce b~ the way 1s .e1ght years, and that is what
is runninq now.
Only 44 ot the 176 ch1ldren achieved joint physical and legal custody
in 25 out of 109 cases. You must remember, I'm ta
about parents'
who want to and are not getting to.
What about those situations wherein at least one parent has expressed an inter~st
joint custody and put in a desire and a commitment
to cooperate, wh1ch many people consider a good criteria? What happens
to them? Thus far only one-third of the parents requesting joint physical
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and legal custody were decreed joint physical and
1 custody. Now,
that's a survey of some 69 cases; 69 of them are in that category. Onethird were decreed it. Less than a third were given mere
joint legal
custody with physical custody to one parent,and over the remaining third
got no participation in any joint custody whatsoever despite their commitment and cooperation. What happened to those who only wanted joint legal
custody? Only half of them got it, and the
were, and really there
were very few but ... In two-thirds of the cases, at least one parent
asked for
in some form and didn't get it. How many parents are agreeing? What is the percentage of those who are going
when both parents
agree? Only nine of the 109 did both agree and received
, but there were
cases where they both agreed and didn't get it. Incidental , it happens
to evenly split between those who both ask for
and didn't get it. Onehalf, the mother got sole custody; the other half,the
happened to
get sole custody.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. You're go
to have to summarize it.
I don't mean to be rude.
I sound that way, but that's not my intent.~
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: That's the first time you've ever admitted that ... (Laughter) We'll have to have a transcript of
afterwards.
MR. COOK:
Then I'd have to take one
sue although I certainly
have a number of applicable issues. The one issue to focus on: What is
the problem with requiring an agreement? It's rather emphasized to me
again and again as it was while sitting in the waiting room of the Los
Angeles Conciliation Court, not more than about f
weeks ago, and nobody
knew who I was, and I sat down next to a lawyer for his cl
, waiting
for the client to go into the conciliation court. The lawyer was saying,
''Now listen, you don't have to agree to a
You're
thereto listen.
're in there to find out what they give away. Now don't you worry.
We're not offering joint legal custody, but you'll get sole
ical cus" And she said, "But I don't know what joint
custody is."
And he said, "It doesn't matter. Neither does
else. You're
to have the control because you'll have sole
ical." The
sian
iven as long as the judges say, "We must have
before we'll
ider it." The other side of the coin is: "
don't agree. You've
got a lot more leverage." Therefore, this is one o the enormous impetuses,
so let's have a presumption and a burden of proof on the
sole custody.
I'll close it by saying we are certa
surmise: Why
does an individual like this have an interest in
? I see many
f you because I happen to be a paid lobbyist for other matters, and so
I'm
and around Sacramento a great deal. However, on
topic I give
my time free, as most of the people in
audience do, but it hasn't
been a free trip.
The attorneys' fees, in my
case, are now over
$67,000.
I have not initiated a single item of action,and all I have
is joint custody, which has not been ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

$67,000?

Where have

been?

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
I told the Chairman we
ture the whole system and go back to the
courts,
them to meet the current needs.
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to restrucwe can def

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Thank you very much.

Yes,sir.

MR. GERALD A. SILVER: Yes, good morning.
I'm Gerald A.
Silver.
I'm going to be speaking on behalf of the California Fami
r.,nv
Coalition
Thi is an association of the principal fathers' and me11's
r
groups across the state that are unified in the position that I
will cover today.
I'll be speaking on behalf of the many second wives,
grandparents, and children that are directly affected by this.
Let me first, and not counting my five minutes, please, give
you a bit of
background.
I happen to be a college professor, a doctorate at UCLA, an author of some fifteen college textbooks and also,
, an author of a book, co-authored by my ex ... by my present wife,
called Weekend Fathers,and we've done a great deal of research and
analysis on this.
Incidentally, my first wife was a co-author of about
six or seven of my books, and my present wife is co-authoring some of
the new books that we're working on, and I now have a prenuptial aqreement, I should add.
(Laughter)
I have four children.
I have gone through the California
divorce courts, lost everything at the trial level, went through the
appellate court, and lost at the appellate level.
It took three and a
half years and my tab is $22,000, so Jim has some one-upmanship on me
in that regard.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

You share a list of attorneys with

him.
MR. SILVER:
Right.
I consider myself a law-abiding citizen.
Probably the worse offense I'd ever encountered prior to my encountering
court was simply the parking ticket. Since, the divorce courts,
found in contempt of court. A judge has evicted me from my
48 hours.
I was dispossessed of the home which ultimately
was sold against or over my signature and finally have been found in conand was sentenced to five days in Los Angeles County jail and was
put on probation by a California judge since I was able to post five and
a half thousand dollars in advance of that.
I've been frankly
d
as a human being and as a father, and frankly, I'm upset.
I
am very, very mad and very hostile. Now, putting all that aside, let me
go to my ...
(Laughter)
(UNKNOWN):

Now we'll talk about the merits!

(Laughter)

MR. SILVER:
I won't bore you by taking the time to review
literature on the subject.
It's all sitting over there along the side.
There are dozens of studies, and you know,as well as I do,that frequent
and continuing contact, close contact with both parents is absolu
essential for well-balanced children.
You also know that,almost without
exception, judges have ordered custody of minor children to ex-wives and
it created a generation of weekend fathers.
You also are quite aware of the winner take all situation
that we presently have.
You may not be aware, at this point, of some
interesting facts that will be presented a little later by Commissioner
Alexander and Dr. Ilfeld with respect to unconsented joint custody situations, and that's going to be important to take a close look at when
they come up.
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Finally, let me say that -- well, not finally.
over what I consider ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Let me now go

But close to next to last, right?

MR. SILVER:
Right, next to last.
The five big myths, the misstatements,
you ike, of the 1980's with respect to
law. Here
they are, and they are absolutely untrue:
Statement number one - "If the couple can't agree when they're
married, how can you expect them to agree on such key issues of children,
as raising the children after divorce?" That's usually the first sentenet~ I hear from the judge or a commissioner when we discuss the topic.
l suggest that's a myth because if you talk to joint custody parents,
they will tell you that things got better after the divorce. They used
to fight and bicker because of the close proximity,and often the children
were the dumping ground for that hostility. After the divorce they were
able to agree, and things got better.
Second myth - "Joint custody children are shuffled back and
forth, usually like ping-pong balls, suitcase in hand between both parents." Another absolutely untrue statement.
In a joint custody situation, a viable situation, there are two loving, caring parents, two
households, two sets of toys if they're young children, yes, two blankets
in both households.
Third, another myth - "Men financially abandon their children
after divorce and it requires a diligent effort of district attorneys
and the use of the federal locator system to track down these runaway
fathers." That's a myth, and I suggest that you take a look at your
current statistics from the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census.
It will show that almost three-quarters of the women who should receive
ch ld support regularly do receive that and that only 28
of
sc women don't receive child support as ordered. And I would suggest ...
fa i

s

Excuse me, don't you think that that is a
rate?

MR. SILVER: Oh, absolutely, but what amazes me is the large
percentage of men who continue to pay child support to post office
boxes, who never get to see their kids.
It's the pos
side that's
amaz
to me.
(Applause)
Finally, the fourth myth - "Men don't want to see their children
after divorce, and they don't avail themselves of the visitation rights
they're now afforded." We hear that all the time.
That's not true.
suggest that men want to see their children.
There's nothing emotionlly any different between men and women with respect to children.
Jt is a violent system that systematical
excludes men and distances
them from their children, and that's the reason they aren't close to
ir kids.
It's not. that
don't want to, but
cunnot b(' closl:.
And the fifth myth is what I'll call "The laws, courtroom
procedures, and the efforts of judges and district attorneys and attorneys are aimed at the best interests of the child." Now that "best interests of the child" is a catchall phrase that means absolutely nothing
-24-

because it cannot be clearly defined.
It has never been clearly defined,
and we see some of the greatest injustices that separate fathers from
their children and one sibling from another all under the banner of the
"best interests of the child."
Now, I've touched upon a number of the problems and myths,
and now let me touch upon some specific changes that must be made in
California law ..•
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. SILVER:

Say again.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. SILVER:

How long is your list of specifics?

How long is your list of specifics?

They're very brief.

There are about a dozen

items.
Let me just touch on the key points that I made.
Number one - legislative change that must be made. The
present law is unclear and confusing. We must have a rebuttable presump~ion that simply says that the norm will be joint physical and legal
custody and only, and I'm going to say this very dogmatically, if one
parent is unfit then there should not be joint physical and legal custody. The coalition believes that you've got to come to grips and bite
the bullet on this issue.
If the parents are both fit, they must be
given,as a matter of course,joint physical and legal custody.
Next point, the present system,is as you've heard,now allows
the uncooperative parent to be the winner. That's got to be discouraged.
Another point is that we must now deal with the issue of
children being taken out of the jurisdiction. We have fathers who are
paying child support to post office boxes.
They would be happy to
be weekend fathers.
They can't be, and that has to be addressed.
The next point is that we think that there must be some mechanism for systematically informing parents about the viable option of
joint custody at the time they go in for their divorce because an information exchange must be provided.
The law must do something about
actually providing that option. Certainly the "1281" form not only
doesn't provide the option;
it literally discourages it or forecloses
it from consideration.
Next, there must be an equal division of community property.
We talk about the domino theory, where the ex-wife gets the house, the
furniture, the kids, the pets, the magazine subscriptions. That's unfair because the weekend father cannot be a full time father or a real
father if he doesn't have a fair and equal division of community property.
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Next, you must strengthen the conciliation people, the concilition court.
'rc going to be testifying against this bill, and with
due respect to Hugh Mcisaac and the other conciliation people, I feel
very strongly about this even though they are opposing the bill (they
have a right to disagree with me). I don't agree with their position,
but I s
11 say those kinds of people, the mediators, the conciliators
of this world, need more money, more physical facilities along the line
of SB 961.
Next, this horrible situation of the attorneys fees,
to be addressed ...
CHAI~~N

HARRIS:

MR. SILVER:

it has

Okay, you've got 60 seconds .

... the legal cost.

Finally, I want to also talk about the OSC' s., the men who
are excluded from their houses on short notice.
There is an abuse of that.
There are, finally, abuses of contempt orders that we regularly see.
All of these things are summarized in my remarks.
If you're asking for
a specific definition, the yellow paper that I've given you in the· record
gives a definition of joint physical and legal custody that my wife and
have gleaned after having talked to many legislators across the counT suggest that it's much more than simple, frequent and continucontact.
[Appendix F]
Let me close by saying this.
I was very, very upset yesterI ve been here for a couple of days on this.
I was very upset
when I sat in with the California Judges Association meeting. Judge
ls was present and several others. Thirteen hundred California judges
a budget of $240,000, spending tens of thousands of dollars
legislation, and I think that this is a serious problem.
have been charged with a sacred responsibility of passing the
lavls of
state.
The judges have a sacred responsibility of carrying
their judicial function.
I think it's a disgrace, and our coalition
that the Legislature must take clear and definitive action to
the judges from interfering with the writing of the law.
If you
do that, I think they have to be completely kept out of this
Thank you.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. SILVER:

Thank you, Mr. Silver.

I'll answer any questions.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Silver, do you have any other remarks
not lncluded in your paper?
We'll keep the record open long
include them. We will need to have a transcript of this
MR. SILVER: Well, after hearing from Mike Barber, the district
, I'll be glad to respond.
video
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MR. COOK:

Yes, I do

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

, would

ike to turn it on very

quickly.
MR. COOK:
Yes
I'l
you
br ef por ion of Jt ond
Ln it
lc
uoi
ere.
Some~ of you may have aJ
seen this, but ... All of the
lie tel
sion network stations
California did a show called "Two Parents, Two Homes."
It was all done within the last seven months.
I'm not go
show all of it.
I'm starting
it toward the close where there are
of judges.
(Video tape)
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. COOK:

Thank you.

Thank you very much.

Thank you for your time.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right, we now have a number of jurists who
have to leave shortly.
We'd like to call them all up at once if we might.
Judge Michael Greer of the Superior Court of San Diego County,representing
the aforementioned California Judges Association and their $250,000.
(Laughter)
insulted,

ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:
Mr. Chairman, just so that nobody is
tments downtown.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes, and you'll be leaving shortly.

I believe Judge Todd is also here ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I'm go
to call everybody up.
Hold on.
All
t. Judge William Todd of the
ior Court of San Diego County, and,
if we can get two more seats, also
J. E. T. Rutter of the
ior
County and
Garrett,the Director of the Conciliation
Gentlemen
f
d all come forward, we're
Thank you.
Yes.
JUDGE WILLIAM L. TODD: Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I am Judge
Todd of
ior Court,and I come to you with
ence first as a lawyer and then as a member of the superior court bench
in the domestic relations field as well as the juvenile court fielrl.
About four years,ago our court recognized that the problem of
child custody was not being addressed in the best way, at least in our
court.
We recognized that the most vicious, demeaning trials conducted
in our courthouse were those where child custody was being litigated in
the open courtroom. We studied programs in Fresno County, Sacramento
County, Maricopa County in Arizona and carne to the conclusion that mediation was the tool that should be addressed in the area of contested
child custody.
We strengthened our conciliation court.
I really honestly believe that Civil Code Section 4607,requiring mandatory mediation
in custody disputes,was at least
part an outgrowth of the effort we
made here in San Diego County.
Let me tell you what
experience has been as a result.
We
now through the mediation process, without formal courtroom advocacy,
-27-

are able
settle 65
every year.
I m not go
of court time and
percent of all cus
process.

filed in our court
that does in the way
, but we have eliminated
liation court medi-

not come to
those families where
in the
ess and who go
the
reports that the conciliation court does for the court
to trial, we find that the majo
of those cases are
the actual trial of the custody dispute
that, of those that
inally brought to us
,are now being heard in
trials, and we've el
over 90 percent of all custody
this mediation process.

the
d

We are obta
contact is

s

, which means that
parents in over 90
ior Court in San Diego
conf
far the
t way to resolve this kind of probcontact with both parents
that continu
of
ld, and the best way to
that in San Diego
are
of both

i
is
wholehear
in the best
agree.
So

this field, as a judge
further as a judge who
fami
life can be
preink if we
most
go
what it is,
, I can't
ine a
leg up or gives
issue.
in this mediation
ts of the children.
4607 the
of

As a former
cases

' t prevent any
cannot be reached.
if the
is
the vicious,

these cases back
that come in that

s your read
of the
the television a minute
exis
law notwithreading of the existing
I

jo

i

clearly stated for

That's contradictory.
I mean I can
angle you do if you read the statute that
was just on the boob tube over there
, that there is no preference in that ...

your
way, but one of your col
saying that that's not
JUDGE TODD:
because I

Well he should have come here and question sat,
it that way.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
JUDGE TODD:
CHAI~ffiN

Good.

Thank you very much.

HARRIS:

Thank you very much.

ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:
I'm confused!
If your position is
"con' t change
as
; leave us the law," and I can
understand the position, but that there is a presumption presently, as
you answered Mr. Robinson, doesn't that indicate that all
these successes are based on the legislative policy that savs start
out ...
JUDGE TODD:
I think the policy of the law as now stated indicates a preference for joint custody. And I think that that is in our
mediation process. But I think when you make it a redundant presumption
it signals to counsel and to litigants that they can now go into the
courtroom forcing the other side to litigate fitness, and that's something we've worked so hard to eliminate from these terrible courtroom
battles.
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Well, I understand.
I think the quesion would
se
1 think the judge who read the th
in the disjunctive is absolutely cor
s that the point of confusion?
Is the dispute then over the word
tself or over as practiced? The
itself is pretty clear.
It's in the disjunctive,and if one
j
ets it to say that that's the
ion, that it's not
then rebuttable, but that's the way their operating and that's great depend
on the energy and the fairness of the judges in that process, but
in other courts where it's all
that
are not fair, that there's
a
the j
that we're not go
to do this, the people
here are seeking some resolution to that.
Then the question arises: Can
we resolve their
without upsett
your local success rate?
other
effect and ...

I don't think so because I think when you add
~hat's what it is), t shifts the burden in

ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: The judge was correct.
It's stated
in the disjunctive, and it should be stated that the purpose of the
Legislature is continuing contact among both parents and the child. So
is it the problem here that one court under your supervision interprets
it correctly and another court under another judge's supervision interprets it adversely? Can we solve that problem without upsetting your
apple• cart? That's the question, or do I just misperceive the issue?
I've been struggling ...

s

tate?

st reasonable
where you're
been more often
dissolution acafter
you've
amend r.1r.
believes that
then should

auesser,of

I should note to you that 4600.5 of the Civil Code provides
that if joint custody is denied the court must, under existing
California law, state its reasons for denylng that award subject to
appeal.
That is the existing California law.
And, now the point is this.
Five years ago when I took the
bench in this county, as a new judge I was presented a family custody
fight.
It amounted to a two to three day bloodletting,
in which children were crying and parents were screaming.
That's the last one I
handled in that way.
Today we have the situation where we keep these
matters out of the courtroom.
They don't belong in a courtroom!
They
don't belong in a court of law.
They don't belong in litigation.
The
Legislature has sought to separate the custody battle from the rest of
the battle. Make them try it and deal with it separately. You don't
even get into a courtroom until you've met with a mediator, and the
mediators are very successful and getting more successful as we train
them. We must keep these children out of the courtroom because they're
scarred when they begin.
They're scarred by the breakup of the family,
and if we don't soothe those scars, if we don't heal these problems at
the outset, these problems turn into the juvenile problems that turn
into the adult criminal problems in our court.
They're the basis of
what's going on in our society, the breakdown of the family.
Now, if
we don't solve these problems intelligently, if we don't deal with this
serious difficulty, not from the viewpoint of mommy or daddy, but from
the viewpoint of the child,who didn't ask to be born to those parents,
we're in serious trouble.
I think that, just from the overall viewpoint, in San Diego
we have had the opportunity to look at this for three years. We dbn't
have the time to present them now, but our statistics are very impressive and we've kept them. Mr. Bloom, when he addresses you later on, may
have the opportunity to give them. But give the rest of the state the
opportunity that they've only had for less than a year to catch up to
where we are in San Diego, to learn the tools and to get the right attitude.
And let this legislation stay in
and see what's happening.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Judge Greer, has the California Judqes
Association done any review as to the consistent application of the law?
JUDGE GREER:
No, not that I know of.
county by county and court by court.

They're doing it

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
There seems to be one problem dealing with
the interpretation we saw on television with one judge, for example.
It should disturb most of us as to whether or not we passed a law that
is misunderstood or misinterpreted or certainly not consistent.
JUDGE GREER:
I can answer that by saying that when we looked
at Fresno, when we looked at Sacramento, or a court in Arizona that had
been applying the same kind of reasoning that exists in and sits in
place in California, the success has been outstanding, but you have to
have the attitudes of the lawyers changed and many of you who are
lawyers know you don't like change.
The judges have those ...
Those ol us who arc nonlawyers know
they don'
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'
HowIt
in the
cause

in

t

I have

1

and Mr. Oliver were in front of us.
October.
The form has not been
contempt.
JUDGE GREER:
with you.

We're till sitt
here in mid, and I think it's a serious

I can't
out one

you.
I'm 100 percent
that, right now ...

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
I
the Chief Justice, in copy to the
please.

that you address that concern to
ttee, a copy of your letter,

JUDGE GREER:
It will be done. Let me make one point before
Mr. Stirling moves from this point. Right now we're seeing 160 default divorces a month, and in a great many of those divorces there are
children as part of the marriage. Put this presumption in,and those
default divorces will beconle litigated divorces. Do that,and you'll
pay for six new judges in this county just to carry the load.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

You could not deal with the language?

JUDGE GREER: Oh, we could deal with the language.
ing about 1706 as it sits there now.

I'm talk-

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
It could be amended so as to deal with that
problem. You could create a presumption and still allow for the situation where there are defaults where the people don't want to contest it.
JUDGE GREER: As soon as you create a presumption,you put the
burden on the attorney to carry that.
JUDGE TODD:
sented then.
JUDGE GREER:

There'd have to be a hearing and evidence preAs soon as you do that,you set up a trial.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Mr. Stirl
Yes,

sorry. I apol
ze to you
commitment. Mr. Imbrecht
Associa
whether they had any comments
writ
on his definitions in his bill.
a

a~

asked me to ask
that they could

JUDGE GREER: Their position s
have no objections to
the definitions set forth in his bill and they think it clarifies.
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:
JUDGE GREER:
JUDGE TODD:

So it does clarify it.

That's correct.
I agree.

ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you.
Judge Rutter. I'd also like (Mr.
Garrett,if you'd move over) to call up Commissioner John Alexander of
the Superior Court of L. A. County. Yes, Judge Rutter, if you'd like
to open.
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JUDGE
A
back we had a converwas a conversa
with
about the difference in
and the proposed
creates a
view it as the di
between an invitation to agree
to do battle
Now that
I think, what
Todd
frankly am puzzled by the
statements that the
judie
is reluctant to
i of the joint custody
11 because I have not experienced
luctance. Now, there are
those, of course, who do not get what
That's always true.
But, we are pursuing agreements whenever we can
them and joint
custody to the extent that
's feasible, however it may be defined.
For example ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON
Excuse me,
of the law
s
policy there s
tody? Is that your reading of the exist

it your reading
for joint cus-

I read it that there is a policy of preference
for joint cus
,
that means. And that's one of the problems
with the law, the definit
of what it means. Frequent and continuing
definition in AB 2202,
contact I understand.
I approve of the
but I'm not in favor of the other
In our court, if you
come
an order to show cause (
iminary hearing) and
there s a question of vis
trial if there's going to
be one, no testimony is taken.
down to the mediator. You
arrangement, it
talk about it then. And if we
has an experimental
worked out
f
the parties
ever do. We don't
to your attention
contested cus
this is a law
be
at trial.
and you don t need
1 out the law.
repeaters that have
, never

etter, I can understand

ASSEMBLYMAN ROB

letter so I have to

Staff wil

share it with you.
letter.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
a copy

JUDGE RUTTER: There is a r
stance to declaring joint custs of the child.
or
rdless f the best
with an alle9ed parental
And, if there's anybody who is more
whether it's in the child's
propr
right to possession of
tes it, then I'm not
best interests or not, and even f
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Mr.
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The current law is be
emented without substantial difficulty, but we must bear in mind that the problems did not arise out of
the pronouncement or non-pronouncement f
words like "joint custody,'
but from helping each fami
decide where the child is going to spend his
or her time and under what circumstances. Originally there were some
who were confused by the phrase, and they took it to mean they
had a right, "my right," to shared time.
Fifty-fifty.
The child s
went down the drain.
Now, that number is diminishing.
The problem with the contested cases is that
are generally cases in which the
parents have lost the ability to analyze what is in the best interests of
the child, and they come to the worse place in the world to get it done.
And, that's an adversary trial in the courtroom.
We can't help that.
That's the only system we've got. Most of the time, those parties are
in there to get more or to win or to show that the other party is a bad
person.
The mediation process has substantial
taken care of this.
Joint legal cus
,
have to say, is a concept that I can
well do without.
Usually, when that problem comes along, I ask, or the
mediator or counselor asks the party, "What is it that you want?" And
they write down a list of medical reports, consultation on school matters,
health, welfare of the child.
And the other party says, "That's okay,"
and that's the end of the
custody problem.
Now, if they are at
odds with each other on absolutely everything, you cannot have joint
legal custody, when the ques
is:
"Does the child go to PS-10 or
attend Harbor Lutheran?" He can't be
both places at once.
You can't
have a veto power in one place, as to whether or not the child shall have
an
n, unless you want a j
to decide it in court, and I think
we could do without that all
thcr.
t really doesn't help us a great
dL:a 1.

Now, as I indicated, the one problem with the law is that just
saying that joint custody is desirable and it's our policy and defining
the shar
of the physical custody in such a way as to assure
and continued contact with both
actually, in a contested
action, of very little help to the j
The child is fifteen and the
parties live 95 miles apart.
The
can only go to one school.
The
ques
is:
"Where is the
ld go
to be and when?" The breakup
made
child so dependent on one
that a conpetent psychiatrist
says that he's got to be "home" most of the time until he gets over it.
The phrase doesn't help us at all.
The parents have agreed to alternate
weeks and they live close to each other, but the child can't take it.
I've heard of one judge who got a call from a fifteen year old child,
who was spending two weeks here and two weeks there.
The child was
calling the judge to help him out because he couldn't stand the strain
At least he couldn't stand it right then, maybe later.
So, I just
to say that there are problems that we have to work with and catch
phrases and buzz words just don't
us a bit.
Let's shorten up a little bit here. As a matter of fact,
there are sometimes, I'm sure you would agree, where the child is so
psychologically devasted by the breakup that he can tolerate only
minimal contact with one parent, even though that parent is a loving,
caring, nurturing parent and perfectly fit, and that brings me to the
something that everybody else has mentioned.
There's no substitute for
the word "fit." We worked for years to get rid of the unfit parent
doctrine in our courts, and here it comes back again, with a specification that we should have to find somebody is unfit and then deliver
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eal
the ch
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and we haven't
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that were
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

That would be

to hear it.
a definition of
fine.
The uns in a child's
fatal flaw in this
s, which would work
can
just take out
and then insert a set of
be done, in any case,
child, and that's a
It requires con1
t
the
cannot
judges, but we

Honor, o
individual?
1

me

Your
as to an
says "I don't
you." There s no
ividual's being
icial
scretion
or not there should

be some
of consis
between one child support order and
another.
There
to be some way that we can look at it and say,
"That makes sense.
There's something rational.
There's some logic
that flows through all of this."
JUDGE RUTTER:
You're th
an order is made.
It's much too
to
1 either, so what do
do?
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

of the case where
spouse can't afford

Right.

JUDGE RUTTER:
(Pause)
... Well some minimums wouldn't exactly
solve that problem.
Some maximums might ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Some kind of a standard so that one can look
at that standard and say, "Wow, I'm paying twice what is looked upon as
being appropriate or the average or the mean for child support!"
JUDGE RUTTER:
Perhaps, but then on the other hand, of course,
the judge s requ
explain his decision anyhow, so if required to
do so,
f he made an order that simply wasn't sustainable by the facts,
he'd ha
a rather difficult time do
It might cause him to change
his mind on that.
I recognize the
em.
There are people who are
receiving too little, and there are
e who are paying too much, and
I'm not sure that a schedule that says, "If the gross is this, and the
net is that, then the order shall be in the range of A to B, unless the
judge
ins otherwise," is going to solve the problem.
But, as a
guideline it might not be too bad if we required, for example, each
county to adopt some guidelines by a certain date and publish them.
Most counties do have guidelines.
The last question is:
What
in the law are needed to
collect past-due support more expeditiously or provide an incentive for
My answer is:
None.
We've done everything we can, up
ex parte, without
, assignment of wages, and
there are those who think that we have al
stepped pretty far over
the constitutional line al
with that. Beyond that,collecting
s j
awful
nut to crack.
Thank you.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Thank you.

Mr. Garrett.

MR. GARY W.
Most
what I have prepared to sav wou]o
be a re tera
~'~-~~~has al
been said, so the Committee
t
up three
with my presentation because I will eliminate that.
[Appendix G]
The mediation staff in Orange County has given vigorous support
to joint custody in cases when it's not the child's expense.
The greatest injustice we can do to children of any age is to mandate that they
be subjected to the same battlefield that the divorce was supposed to
have eliminated.
Out of the last 3800 cases that my staff has mediated,
the joint custody agreement, and I'm specifically referring to joint
physical custody, has been reached in about 304 cases, which represents
eight percent.
The truth of the matter is that most parents do not want
joint custody. A law mandating joint cus
would benefit less than one
and a half percent of the divorcing population, and let me give you a sta-37-
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visitation is not an issue. So
of the contested cusis leaves 15 percent as
se cases for trial,
many of those are not
talk
about? Starts that less
leg

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. Garrett
to take issue with
that, not
what you re do
in my own county, because if there's such a letter, or such a pol
Judge King's thing
San Francisco, that would readi
in
you could come up with
a
of one percent.
I mean whether
formalized in a letter
or whether it's just informal
stood in
corridors of the courthouse that you're just not go
join cus
if either parent
has reservations about joint custody, then you're going to be very successful in your mediation effort, because both
s are going to advise
the clients, "Well, your ex is not go
a
with this.
It's a nonissue, and the
isposition of the court is to do this, this or this."
So
ll go off and you'll be
e to mediate the remaining problems.
If you were c
those
San Francisco, for example,
fter my
e
and if I had an issue
before his court, and in
at all the costs
that would be involved, I gua.rantee
would compromise very
readi
on
t,notwithstand
f the Imbrecht bill.
MR. GARRETT:
counsel are
' t know ..

s letter, and I also
upon their first
that?

If
was a
because
that was
on television,
was advis
t you re not go
firm belief that, based
individual who is
et in those meout of it .
. GARRETT:

I agree.

f one San
sition on these issues
t,
just like
like
ch superior
in my own c
in the
s, and I don't
cour j
are go
to be the
practice law, never been before one of them, and don't ever

intend to be before one of them.
I know which ones are going to be
tough, and I know which ones are qoing to be more lenient. Okay,
and I'm not down in thal cou.rt.nous c~Vt'-::l
,
su i know the p.raclJ..lloners
know, and I think the same is true in the domestic relations court, and
the same is true in the probate court, and the same is true in the juvenile court.
Those facts skew the results of any 15,000 cases, or any
60,000 cases in Los Angeles.
MR. GARRETT:
I agree with your proposition. Let me tell you
the way we handle it, and it's unanimous among my staff. As the parties
come in, we first discuss the matter with both counsel. Counseling, we
see both parties together.
We normally start by saying, "You have two
choices.
You can relegate your responsibility as parents to the judge
and let the court make the decisions affecting you and the lives of your
children, or the two of you can get on about the business of being parents, and here's where we start." And, we discuss the possibility of
joint physical custody with every single one of our litigants.
The
choice then becomes theirs, as to whether they can handle this kind of
an arrangement.
So, I know of no such type of a proposition •..
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
Well, I wasn't accusing you of it. What
I wanted to do was I wanted the record to reflect that type of informal
dialogue very definitely affects the result, looking at the past year,
for your operation or for any other court. And, there's no other dialogue,
you never advise the litigates what the predisposition ...
MR. GARRETT: After thirty years in this business, I've learned
to not guess what a judge is going to do.
I suppose it might even make
a difference on what side of the bed he got up that morning. But, I'm
not going to make a guess what the judge is going to do because I'm
probably going to be wrong. We're merely telling people, "Here's
your opportunity to get on about the business of being parents. Here's
your opportunity to believe in the concept that parents are forever.
Here is your opportunity to make the kinds of choices and the decisions
that the two of you can live with, and it would be in the best interests
of the children."
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
MR. GARRETT:

As I've stated, we're successful in ...

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
parents

Okay.

Is it possible then ...

MR. GARRETT:
... about 85 percent of the cases, in helping the
an agreement that they can live with.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Okay, assuming that state of facts,
would it be possible to amend the Kapiloff bill then to allow either
one of the litigants to waive joint custody so that the presumption would
not exist where one of them waived it? I mean to restate that policy.
Mr. Kapiloff, I'm going to the fear that we're going to cause litigation.
I mean given the Orange County situation as it's been described, there's
evidently not a real desire on a lot of these litigants to partake in
joint custody, so why should we make the court address the issue through
the vehicle of presumption? When in fact one parent just wants to waive
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fellows,
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fact,
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live human bei

the proof of it
, 1980. The
the interest of time.
there at the end
Here
didn't hear every one of
were out there.
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shows 414 total.
Exclusive custody awards, 276. Flare-ups of later controversy, 31.5 percent.
Same period joint awards, 138 only, 15.9 percent.
In round numbers, 32 percent exclusive, 16 percent joint.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
SSIONER
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

This is all

ical custody?

That's legal custody .•.
Oh,

i t ' s loq<ll

custody . . .

COMMISSIONER ALEXANDER:
Physical custody arrangements range
from all kinds of variation, Mr. Robinson.
If you read ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Well, I appreciate Judge Rutter's statement that we might as well just throw legal custody out, and I think he's
absol
right.
COMMISSIONER ALEXANDER:
No, sir, I don't agree with that.
I
think you need -- I'm getting away from my text, but I suggest very
strongly to you-- you need to overhaul Section 4600.5(b), and put in a
good set of definitions.
You can get custody itself from Burge v City
and County of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d, in my detailed statement.-.-.-ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
Okay, rather than get you off, you're
saying 15 percent is legal custody.
COMMISSIONER ALEXANDER:
No, these are failure rates of permanent awards of joint legal custody that flared up in court later on.
And, I'm go
to give you an example in a minute.
Now, the key to it,
, is: What about the ones where one parent didn't consent? You
haven't heard much about that.
Eighteen out of 138 were done without
the consent and most of them over the objection of one parent, including
one I'm going to tell you about.
Only six out of the eighteen flared
up.
That's a 33.3 failure rate,only 1.8 above the failure rate for all
of the exclusive cases.
Here is the high risks sub~sample.
This is in
Table 4, ladies and gentlemen, in my detailed statement of October 6,
and,Mr. Robinson,if you don't have a copy of it, I'd appreciate the
chance ..
gave it to a recyc
(

I've got so much paper up here.
If we
could pay off the state's deficit.

)

COMMISSIONER
Well, please don't do that.
Please
don't do
) Now here is one out of it. This
is case J-21.
Now let me summarize it qu
Stipulated interloc,
exclus
custody of two girls to the mother, visitation to the father.
Home to the mother to be sold later, when both girls reach 18 or die and,
here is the kicker, or if mother no longer had custody of at least one
of the daughters.
Now, in the fall of '78, in the early stage of this
study, father brought an OSC to change exclusive custody to him, which
would have triggered the sale about eight years before the youngest
reached 18. Why? Mother, he said, drank to excess and didn't supervise
the
s properly.
Mother said, "Oh no, he wants really the forced
premature sale." Now, skip the evidence.
It actually sustained both.
The girls were better off with the father and the new stepmother, who
-42-

s

father
house
19 3
father d
sed his
I call it the case
I bel
tatement, becan't tell you
when
are
is

for the Superior Court for Frank Zolin, and for the Family Service
Council of California.
I have distributed some written testimony that's
available to you, and I'd like to call attention to a paragraph that's
from an excellent study of joint custody called Fathers Without
Partners by Rosenthal & Keshet and, in a far more elegant way than I
trates some of the concerns about joint custody. [Appendix H.}
First of all, I'd like to say that after working through
1500 joint cus
arrangements, many of those personally
negotiated by myself, that there really is a point of agreement here, and
that is that joint custody for parents who agree is a marvelous way to
continue the parenting relationship.
I think that for parents to cooperate and work together obviously is in the children's best interests
as well as their best
ts.
I think the present law permits that
to take
It allows
to select from a range of options a
that is best suited to the
ldren's needs. For this reason, I
would like to speak in support of AB 2202, which adds to the law some
rather clear definitions about joint legal custody and joint physical
custody, and I would like to speak in opposition to AB 1706 for the
following reasons.
The first is that it clearly elevates parental rights
over children's needs.
There is a group here that has really been relative
unrepresented, and unspoken about, and those are the children who
have to 1
day by day with the conflicts and concerns of their parents.
And where parents don't agree, you're sentenc
those kids to an existence
of conflict and confusion that is certainly not in their best interests.
The second is that ...
Excuse me, that can also be the case where
have
who are bicker
or fighting, et cetera.
you move the child from that home as well?
I

reso
or in some way ending that

some way, e
conflict.
I'm
re

MR. MciSSAC:
state is s
child and
r
as

I

then in that situby getting a divorce

get involved in is how much
between parents and their

don't think the state should be.
Well, if you have joint custody though, the
there are two parents of the
have
some responsibility but some
that child.

MR. MciSAAC:
But I
that if the state presumes that it is
infue best interests of the child, then the state is really taking on a
function that I'm not so
that we ought to do.
I think this is the
responsibili
of the individual parent to real
make that decision.
I think the second unintended result of this law will be that
will cause or encourage families who are really not capable of having
joint cus
to assume this responsibility.
And having been an advocate
for the or
1 legislation, bel
in joint custody, I think that
would be the worst thing that could happen. We could be convening in
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. MciSAAC:
But I think it would be a great mistake to make
that decis
all famil s, as it may not apply. Finally, I
I would agree with what
Silver said. What we really need is
educa
We need to
at the po
of entry into the divorce process as they trans
s experience to learn how to be parents,
and not to mandate
s but to really he
them and give them educaes that will he
them
that objective.
So, in
summary
to just make the following
The present j
cus
islat
should be given the
chance to work. More efforts should be devoted to education, helping
lies trans
this exper
e, and research into the effect upon the
present law
the lives of
ldren before new laws are adopted. The
law should not establish a preference for any arrangement, except the
that are in the best interests of children. Since each
child are so
, establ
a preference for the preway of rais
children raises far more questions than it gives
answers. Thank you.
your experience
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the forum as a
' rights f
We see ourselves as
the protectors of the rights of the chi
We see that the studies
that are now coming in, that are very new, show the many benefits for
children in jo
custody. We stress this pol
, and we reinforce it
to the
, but this isn't an argument here today about whether joint
or not.
We
this a hundred percent.
I ask of you,
ical custody?

you mean
MR. BLOOM:

I mean shared physical and legal responsibility.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. BLOOM:

joint custody, do

You don't differentiate between the two?

No,I don't.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
There are no
that you've noticed
one as oppos
to the other, that you can ignore one or
size one leq.:tlly in terms or leqislation and that the other ...

in

I don't want to appear naive or oversimplify this,
but I
most of the cases that we see in our court develop
some sort of a shared cus
situation.
There is no definition. AlI support Assembly Bill 2202 in terms of giving some sort of a
definition to physical and legal custody, it still doesn't say exactly
if
should be 50 percent of the time, 22 percent of the time, or whatJo
custody, phys ally, may be any kind of a cooperative
I feel of the parents whereby frequent and continuing contact is
ed.
current law allows the court to evaluate the
and to assist the
in developing
shared custody
are consistent with the
of the
Pr
Best
ts of the
it into a parents' r
argument rather than the
children evaluation, I feel that we'll increase court
to prove a
as unfit to share custody.
This new
islation, I feel would promote battles to disprove benefits of joint
cus
, and we've been work
so hard to build joint custody kinds of
situations.
I think with this
ion
one has to prove another
unfit if
don't want joint cus
you'll just enhance all
the negative
ever brought about regarding custody or sharthese
so feel our courts work very dil
encouraging
share the custodial responsibi ities
children. Many
recommendations we make where there's a di
over custody of the
children are generally based upon the willingness of the parent more
l
to be willing rather to share custody and the judges I think are
sensitive to this. But I don't
legislation can necessarbehavior of
I think it happens in the
The current law
courts the authority
to order
of child custody
consistent with the
best
the children.
I

cus

di

My last remark is basically that I feel an important point in
is that there be a quick resolution of the dispute.
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stated. At this juncture we have
a situation where
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is be
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s what
fathers are concerned about because it is
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method
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Just this month, I've
a three year longitudinal research project, which is go
be conducted jointly with Dr. Judith
Wallerstein, at the Center
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in Transition, in Corte
Madera California.
I
research has been entered into evidence here.
Several of our
j
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develop data that bear
directly on these questions - first of all, more specific data about
children, what kinds of children do well in what kinds of arrangements;
to compare joint custody in famil
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ted in do
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mean, you can't make the
At least I didn't
that from
now your testimony, then I
we need to
the bas
us
DR. STEINMAN: Well, I'm also
that the ch
not only in
ro e adjustment,
varied
terms
ability to master the specific tasks involved in the jo
situation, and ...
forma
ASSEMBLYMAN
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

All

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
tris
my statements
my co-research
tes
ied earlier

You

ust can't jump to conclusions.

Dr. Ilfeld.
Ilfeld, and I'm a
California.
and

experience as a
John Alexander,

s

F
t of all,
says that we don't have
and
at the
She has not seen the
summer and fall.
My
Alexand

th

you
study came
just this
study, which measures d
upon children.
These

seen.

But even d
s, there is
deal that we al
What we do
that
sole cus
is very harmful for
has
testified as to the desirabili
contact
s
of the child with both
bill, and I looked at the defini
that's essentially what it says.
So, the data, and I'm
merate the data, the data speak to
I'm not an
call it "presumption," if you want to call it "
"
there is
attorney, I don't know what these
- but, clear
a first order of preference or a des
for joint cus
that
is being
upon here
in the data.
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Now first of
to the Alexander data, which
my wife and I are publ
jo
with him.
Essentially, in capsule
form, and if you wish I can elaborate upon it, we look at relitigation.
Over a two year period the rel
rates for sole custody are
e as high than those for
in joint custody. Mind you, this
is on a
of over 400.
Furthermore where
did not agree,
at least whether or not to have joint cus
may agree after
the decis
made,
cour
on those 18 cases (which is not a
sample, but it's the
t that
has so far) only 6
have come back for relitigation.
That's essentially the same, literally
one
point. Essentially the same, one percentage point away,
essentially the same as relitigation rate for sole custody.
In other
words, even where parents don't agree as to joint custody, even in the
mil
f the adversary system where
're
to fight- because f
fight for sole cus
and don't agree for joint custody,
you'll
sole cus
-even then, joint custody does no
worse than sole
Now, why is rel
tion important? First, of all it's obviously important because it means lower work for the courts, and I'm
bothered that the judges aren't here to hear
because I think they'd
be
ed that there'd be less work for
if there were more joint
cus
But, rel
is indicative of parental conflict,
and
lict researchers agree relates directly to child adjustment.
So, this is why our study showing that joint custody is half
the rel
ion of sole custody is something that has to be taken very
serious
There is a clear argument in favor of the desirability
preference (however you want to word it) of joint custody over sole
for most, not all famil
The
I read Assemblyman Kapibil it does not say "all
ie ."
't that a little skewed
in existence
se at the
took
was a commitment.
with you if we'd
dealing with cases where
the court had ordered jo
cus
notwithstanding the objection of one
But if you're just s
o
cus
arrangements, it
me that on a norm you would have less relitigation because,
the norm,the Imbrecht bill, accord
to
so far, is not
adhered to.
At leas the intent of Mr. Imbrecht is not being
this state.
So you have a skewed sample is what
DR. ILFELD:

I'm

what way?

sure.

There was essentially an agreement
of
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
There were more
DR.

ILF:t:JD:

No.

Let's

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
you're go

There was
or compromising.
They were not a ...
thn>w out

Where vou have sole custody, oftenwho- is very displeased with the
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result of his or her litigation, and that in itself is apt to generate
more litigation in the future.
As ...
DR. ILFELD:

Well,

I pointed ...

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
... the parent with custody takes on
another relationship with another human being, or any kinds of other
issues, drinking or what have you, could cause increased litigation.
DR. ILFELD: Well, first of all, for whatever the reasons, the
fact that there's less relitigation, for whatever the reason, is good
for the child.
I don't care what the reasons are ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
I understand that, but you're missing
my point. My point is that if you're going to compare apples to apples,
you should only be talking about joint custody where it's been ordered
by the court over the objection of a parent.
That compared to sole
custody arrangements, would be ...
DR. ILFELD:
have that compar son.

That's why I'm comparing.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
that are compromised?

Oh!

I'm doing that.

I

These are not joint custodies

DR. ILFELD:
Now, wait a minute, please. Now, when I'm talking about joint custody, when I say it has half the rate of relitigation of sole custody, I am talking about- Let's turn to table ...
Please, this might help out.
I only have one table.
Turn to table
number one.
(Laughter)
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
You might only have one table, but I
have 56 briefs up here!
(Laughter)
DR. ILFELD:
Well, okay.
I can even simplify it beyond that.
When I refer to "joint custody," I mean those ordered by the court,
whether or not consented or unconsented by both parents.
Now, it turns
out that a very small -and I don't have my calculator with me, I can
guess here ... hold on- there were 138 awards of joint custody.
Only
22 of those were contested but came out joint custody. So, in other
words, most of the joint custody I'm talking about is where it was
agreed upon by the parents.
That's a relitigation rate of 16 percent.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

No, I understand that.

DR. ILFELD:
There were 18 cases in which the parents did
not agree to have joint custody.
This figure 22 refers to those cases
coming back out of all the 138 unconsented joint custody cases appeared
for relitigation, which is 33 percent,which is essentially the same as
the percentage of relitigation for sole custody.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
your testimony on that plane.
DR. ILFELD:

And all I was trying to do was to keep

Oh, okay.
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Because on

ASSEMBLYMAN ROB
difference.
DR. ILFELD:

That

, there's no

t

r

ASSEMBLYMAN
you re
's better
conclusion.
court enforced jo

on the other
rate and then
believe
is
As long

where
from
te or
re talk-

another thing. Mr. Robinson,
stipulated. These

those

pointed out with the other
around here r
DR. ILFELD:

, now you made another point, as long ...

and
DR.

as you have reasonable parents.
I
it's
that there are many more reasonin Santa Monica than there are
San Francisco for innow, Commissioner Alexander tells me that the joint cusare
about 50
in Santa Monica.
So, I maini
not just whether or not
are agreeable or cooperintain that it s a system ult
the law, and secondthat determines the amount
oint custody.
but it's
to

more like

s

's

San Francisco,
has a different attith the same law.
We
a
maintain it's the law bewith
liation counselors, the present law
f
, to not agree.
I other words if you don't
, if you want to have so
cus
, you're going to
have to do is not
the
. ILFELD:

That has been

think is be
conication of the law.
ng too.

I 's varied
of the law, and
s a
notwiths
some of the other
that are being made.
It's the fact that you can go to San
Francisco and
a different ustice from what you get in Santa Monica,
for
, on basical
the same fact pattern.
be

Mr. Harris, I would
j
dif

intain that one of the
in different constituencies

is because the law is not clear.
It says, "Preference for," and then
it says, "Joint custody or to either
" Now that doesn't show a
preference. So the law is ambiguous.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
The next
tructs
the judge that if he does not find joint custody, he must state his
reasons.
DR. ILFELD:

True.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
... so that clearly puts a preference in
state policy, and,not being a lawyer and just being a simple accountant,
it seems to me that you have to take that whole section together.
You
can't just take a sentence because it's convenient and decide that you're
going to agree with that sentence.
It's that whole section of the law
that's being applied differently in San Francisco than it is in Santa
Monica and then, according to the witnesses we have from Orange County,
in Orange County, too.
That concerns me. While I'm sympathetic towards
what Mr. Kapiloff's trying to do, that also concerns me very seriously
because we're supposed to be establishing a policy that's uniform in
all 58 counties of the state.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
mony, please?

Dr. Ilfeld,could you summarize your tes

DR. ILFELD: Okay.
If I could just continue ... I was saying
how our data shows joint custody to be superior to sole custody, without
going into the details, which I just did.
You're going to hear Dr.
Pojman in a moment,and I recommend that you listen very,very closely.
I'm going to mention several things that I think need emphasiz
, I
have reviewed his very detailed s
First of all, he has a relatively small sample, larger than many around here, but it's 20
in each group, and there are four groups. Now, and this is
because it seems like "Gee, his
es are small," when you
tistically siqnificant diff('rcnccs, with small
s, it's more powerful for your in
tion.
In other words, his findings are more
potent. Yes, they're more potent. No.
I see heads shaking; but, no,
they really are more potent. He can show you the data. Because in
larger numbers, you can fudge statistical
The differences don't
have to be that great. With larger numbers they become "statistical "
significant. So with small numbers when you have statistical differences, that means there are big differences, and indeed that's something to pay attention to.
The other thing that is not underlined, I
, in his
study that should be is that in his assessment of the children from
multiple viewpoints, sole custody does extraordinarily poorly, does as
badly as unhappy marriages, and he had to search throughout the city
of Los Angeles "for unhappy marriages" but he couldn't find them just
in his one school district. My point being, it's not just that joint
custody does well, but that sole custody, sole custody is doing very
very poorly, and his is not the only study that shows this. Again, I
think a point in support of preference, very strong preference, for
joint custody.
Now, I'd like to rebut

brief
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a letter ...

, I have
can give
a
record open.

from
writ

how briefly is it go
because I'm
away
econd summary,or give
in
letter
you I
rebut.

t

't

a

rebut

it in wr
I have rebutted
wri
cri
of Wallerste

. ILFELD:

And

. Harris

It's my second
letter ... "
[Appendix K]

7th .

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

her own work
contact wi

the bill where
No one claims
that there are
and failures.
You'll
succcs
That's because they
that is not the
sc.
her letter.
She talks about young children
, her own concluln
young children also need
Kel
does not
s letter
And

also like
. Harr

issue that you raised

CHAI&'.ffiN HARRIS
wasn't
from a Waller
in sole custody arranges than half the fathers
maintain that
evidence,
support payments,
joint custody decrees,
it was
Orange County)
Now as to the
t counselors see the
after the
can t agree to have a
battl
forevermore,
Thank you.

Dr. Pojman

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
ease.

Thank you.

Thank you very much, Dr. Ilfeld.

Hello, my name is Everett
Pojman.
m a
ist, have been for 13 years.
I was a
Commissioner for the Marriage and Fami
Counselors Examination.
I
received my Ph.D. in clinical
Basically, I passed out a s
for this explaining the results of joint custody when compared to sole custody.
I've read time
and time again how a study like this has never been done.
I can see
why it's never been done.
Try and go to the county courthouse and find
records on joint custody.
It's incredibly difficult.
Not many have
been awarded.
I had to search throughout L. A. County, and also for
mothers, trying to find subjects.
I believe I even called Dr. Steinman
at one time trying to find subjects.
I did find 20 subjects who had
boys.
I restricted it to boys in joint custody.
I then went through randomly selected children from two
different school districts to find matched groups with sole custody.
I
put in variables such as matching length of time since divorce and separation as well.
They were divorced anywhere from one year to seven
years time.
These were boys I was studying between the ages of five
and thirteen.
I also compared and contrasted these children to boys
of intact, happily married homes and intact, unhappily married homes.
These boys were examined on three different types of standardized
psychological instruments, psychological tests which are the norm and
have very high reliability.
What I basically found was that boys of joint cus
were
far superior to boys of sole cus
in almost every psycho
ical test
that I had given, at the significant
t 01 and .05 level.
Joint custody boys also did much better, which was interesting to see, than the
unhappily married group, whereas sole custody boys did not do any better
than the unhappily married group.
When boys of joint custody were compared to boys of the happi
married group, there were no total test
significant differences, but there were some significant differences
in a few sub test scores on the California test of personalities, which
means that boys o
joint custody, at least in my sample, did almost as
well as boys in happ
married families and did signific
much
better than boys of sole custody and
ily married families.
As a school p
ist and also through my research, I have
been working with the
as well. As Dr. Ilfeld said in his
study about the noncustodial
, the children initially formed
many contacts with their parent or some contact with their parent, but
within two or three years the contact is less and less, and it's encouraged by the custodial parent.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Excuse me.
The consultant raised an
esting question that I'd like to know the answer to.
How do you define
"unhappily" as opposed to "happily" married?
(Laughter)
DR. POJMAN:
If you ask that question to four different
psychologis
come up with four different answers. But I did
-65-

it
a standard set tests.
It was standardized.
It was a
marital adjustment i
I took those who had the most spousal comthose who had the least
1 complaints on this
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

All r

DR. POJMAN:
I came
a
and "unhappy" marital
situatlon. As a psychologist and a marr
family counselor, and also
with my study, I find that these boys and
ls easily lose contact
the noncustodial parent and generally they have hostility after
a while for their noncustodial parent, which is a direct reaction from
the hurt that they feel.
They go on to have authority problems later
in life and become very embittered.
This is fueled, of course, by the
custodial parent at times.
I feel in joint custody we don't see this
situation because the two parents are forced to so some communication
with each other.
I found that one of the biggest things that opened
my eyes was that some of these parents hated their ex-spouse but they
said they'd communicate because they both loved their children, and
that was something that was really agreed upon by both groups.
I
real
feel strongly that the parents love their children and they're
not go
to do anything consciously to hurt them.
One more thing I wanted to say is that we talk about fitness,
about what is fit and how the person will react to being unfit.
I
wonder how the child reacts to being unfit.
I think when a child
can't see his parents, his other parent on a continual basis,
t's absurd.
Table 3,
the back, which was not in the handout but I
a
f you have, gives you a comparison of boys' joint
the other three groups.
The "plus" means that there is a s
cant difference at the .05 level to the
level to the
variable in the same column.
The "n.s." means it's nonsignificant.
As you see with this, many tests were not s
ificant, but for the total
tests which were the Inferred Self
Scale and the Louisville
Checklist (which is the securi
level for the compilation of
all the scores), there are signif
differences again on joint cusand so forth.
I have another table which I wish I would have given to you,
when I compared happi
married to all the three groups, and I have it
in.my
sertation. You're free to write me and get a copy if you send
me a few dollars for reproduc
(
)
It demonstrates that
the
married group did by far superior to every group except
again the joint custody.
It shows it very definitely, clearly. So
we do know that joint custody boys are doing, as a matter of fact,
well.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Very good.

DR. DIJ\NE TROMDE'rTl\:
Ilc~llo
my
1s Dr. Diane Trombetta.
you ,1 sm<J
pclC C' , lhv !'t'd d!Hl wh i
one·.
The red and whi tc
is an drticlc th<1t I' !J n•fcr t.o Llh'l~ that 1 just had published.
ix
The front page of what l 'vc given you is my resume, which
I'm not going to dwell on, but if I could just say that I am a family
q i Vc'n
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of order
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to be a parent and it's
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me from going
any chance that I can
n cases where a parent
sole custody does
that's already been said,
is like g
ires cooperation, and
terms, like labor and
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that
feel a releads one
from a
be
who

me
even when a
Think of all the
it
after
in place for implement
as individuals want to
to or not. You
rewrite one basic
a successful

it work also.
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We

anyone in

DR. TROMBETTA:
sys

No, my chi dren were never interviewed by
, at all.

ASSEMBLYMAN
DR. TROMBETTA:

Not in or outside the courtroom?
No

not at all.
So the determination of best interests
a witness.

was
DR. TROMBETTA:

That's right.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
. Trombetta, T want to thank you for your
your ex~erience is ins htful.
The fact that
th prof ssional knowl
and a factual experience should
much in unders
the
We have a number f witnesses
I now wish we had the judges on last.

who are members of the bar.

Yes, so do I.

Maybe we could have

a no
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes.
We could issue subpoenas duces tecum
r cases ... (
)
ierson? Ms. Gassner?
I'll have three more
you like to begin?
to elimi.nate
as you can. We have, I
in the issue, and
to have summaries
Po

f

, over here.

ASSEMBLYMAN
re?
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

s.

Would the chair entertain a motion
o
Will the chair accept the motion to
the three major benches (SanD
, Los
les, and San Francisco
) to summarize the d
of the cases and present that
to the chairman?
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I think that wou d probably be appropriate.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Second.
-70-

We do
tand
how ser
?

and San

t's f

AS

state ..

1 worry

'

is

think

When
how much
doesn't
out.

, we just want to see what we can

All r
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:

Do you ace

that motion, or do

we ...
I don't
any oppos
I just articulate briefly two
irst of all, we have, I think,
both sides of
issue as to the merits and
So it
that we have polarized
we don't have the data
ion is that we do have,
is true, that's what's
carrying out the will of
s intolerable to me, or we have inconsistencies
in
law,which is unconstitutional in my judgment. And,
if
data supports my suspicions, and they're only suspicions, then
we have a number of issues to confront the
slature as a branch of
which
to be dealt
, I would ask that you
those three benches, as
Cll~>lO(ly.

I will do that, and it is four
and San Francisco.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
come up

Ye , four.
work
you, Mr. S
11 Slrvey them.

some ques

ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:

Certa

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

firs .

Ladies

Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee,
my name
l'~Tt:~~;:;::::-:;::-;:rr~;---T 'm an
I have practiced in California for
years.
I was invited to testify
,among other th
I'
former chairperson of
on Fami
and Children, on the Commission of Law and Menf the State Bar
ssions. For a
I've worked los
with
number of people who've been
invo
and concerned with children of divorce, and among
Wallerstein, John Suarez,
Calof, and others.
I also
on the
established
Mills to help write
Co-Parenting," on what we
les County understand as AB 1480,
Civil Code Sec
4600 and 4600.5.
I
am here, in fact
my
own expense, because
for the past
been the welfare and
11-be
families.
I have a
minutes.
I would like
participants here.
to ask two or
One is ...
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ask them separa
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

She

ask them rhetor
understand that
questions.

CHAIR'fJI..AN HARRIS:
to come

're not

MS. SWERDLOW:
Then
would
the Committee to consider.
To Dr.
said that approximate
one-third of the children
who were involved in a oint custodial arrangement, and these were with
families who had the best of intentions and were cooperative, that those
children did not appear to be
well.
Was there a follow-up of
those children? How have
been
along subsequent to the
change in the
ical
1 arrangement? That's one question.
And the other
Dr. Ilfeld ...
I understood from his testimony that much of his
bas
on the information supplied by
Commissioner Alexander, and I wondered whether he in fact interviewed
those families.
And if he
the families, did he interview
the children, and did he do it on more than one occasion? I would like
the Committee to know that my concern here and my orientation is what
is in the best
s
f the child. What is in the best interests of
the child or children? And, by the way, when we do, or when this Committee does,hopefully secure the information from the three large
counties - divorce informa
, that
11 not give you the next bit
of information that you real
need. And that is: How have the children
been doing under the various kinds of
or under the various custodial
?
ilof
The
least, is fundamental
of choice mus be
fam
Through the wo
gists over the past thir
stress
also know tha not
to the child which

ze that which, to me at
ng, that the custodial
ular child in a specific
sionals
and soc
have known that divorce is
ticular
the young child. We
results in emotional damage
During the decade of the
on the impact of divorce on
not solely, by Judy Wallerin Cal fornia - we learned that one of the ways
t of the stress experienced by children of
divorce was to have both
remain in contact, remain involved
and concerned with the child.
way, Kel
and Wallerstein also
found that where the child had control of the access to both parents,
that was another factor
the stress. And, I wonder
when Dr. Trombetta was
she said that her children live
three
What access have they had to her?
Because, through my point
and from working with Judy Wallerstein, the emphasis is not on a 1
custodial plan, but rather a fact.
How much access does the child have to both parents? The child needs
to feel that nei
one of the
has abandoned that child.
It's
the child's feel
and the child's needs, and not the parental rights
or parental
feel
,that we have to be concerned with here.
The work of, as I said primari
Wallerstein and Kelly, is
that, barring
or diff
lt geographical separation,
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and freiams' name was mentioned
, he told that when it
fc wanted to move to New
be any joint cus
todial
of choice
int custody,
lar child of
e.
considered in consider
the custodial
the best
ts of a
child,are the age of
the child and who has been the child s pr
psychological parent, and
I haven't heard
that term. Who's been the parent with
whom that child has
the time from birth on? In those
been
with both par
, and in talk
divorce situation
but

said, "Who's
"that ine.
logical parent
parent.
t

The

ity as opposed
st have to tell you.
I

SEMBLYMAN
I

don't think it

)

time with my
l
him so ..

than

he s not your

s

nt ...
ical
most time.
most time.
izes the sens
f
We're ta
terms
means the sense of
child during the first
s if you're a nursing

MS. SWERDLOltl:
neys I know are,

f you are a nursing mother, as some attor(LAUGHTER)

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:! even know one or two legislators!
LAUGHTER)
MS. SWERDLOW:

... and

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

ust nurse the child then ..
Some are males!

(LAUGHTER)

... and put the child down and turn the child
MS. SWERDLOW:
over to someone
se,
doubt that that child is going to have a very
icular person later on.
We're talking about
strong sense of that
ime involvement
ion to quali
involvement.
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Here's the problem I have with this
1
of tes
m sure it's all relevant to the individual
decision, the individual case, I'm not sure how it's relevant to Mr.
Kapiloff's legislation or the existing law.
lc9islation would mandate that
'I'he Kap lo f
is the custodial plan of
that joint cus

there is a
choice.

ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Okay, as I understand the motivaa fair field going in, so that there
ion against joint cus

n, the
is not a

MS . .SWERDLOW:

I think ...

... and that·now that the reason that
Mr.
traducing the bills is to
1
overcome the inertia of the exis
two decade presumption, in practice, which is the child is a
ven to the mother unless there is
some reason no to.
I'
t sure how your testimony squares with what
we're
to decide here.
MS. SWERDLOW:
the ind

What f'm say
n the indiv dual

1

is that we've got to look at
family ...

ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:
... So as you go in, you have a
mother,
a
a
or more, and the presumption should
be that we should do what's best for the child in the long run.
We've
introduced sc
ific evidence that indicates that positive contact
with both a male
and a female
balance, or reasonable balance, and is
But we have to look at lega~ rights, that both
want to have at least the or
1 same right of access to the
child,and from that po
on somebody, probably a judge, evaluates all
these factors and makes a dec ion on some custodial plan ...
MS. SWERDLOW:

That's correct.
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We're talking about ...

agree
Now, I m
says every case is
the facts of each one,
child
like the
been
child has

sure
t such
contact with both
share in the r
ioners
that order
ch

a strong intrue when we're
years and under. The
0 sets forth in clear
the State of Cali
divorce has two
s:
will have frequent and
, and second, to encourage both
and responsib ities of parenting.
child
orders must be
relevant factors in the
the policy ..•
the tes

is thus
, it's been
not heard you
now

lls

court

some

not go far
same j
for the last
years.
are two
to address
who testias to what the
parties ask for

joint custody,then there is a presumption.
custody is a custodial plan of choice.

In that instance,

joint

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Is there any other area of the law
where the Legislature has required the judge to set out the reason
that he didn't grant something if the
islature didn't want him to
grant it to begin with?
MS. SWERDLOW:

I ...

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: We don't deliberately put burdens on
judges. We told that judge, that if you don't give joint custody
then you must lay out in public your reasons for not doing so. We
set the policy.
The judge doesn't set the policy.
He's supposed to
apply the law as we draft it, given the circumstances of a particular
case that's before him.
We certainly can't structure a statute that's
going to take care of the whole proliferation of cases that emerge,
domestic law or any other section of the law.
MS. SWERDLOW:

What I fail ...

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

We're going to have to move along.

MS. SWERDLOW:
Excuse me.
I fail to understand your point.
The law as it exists now requires that a judge, where those parties
wish to have joint custody and the judge does not order that joint
custody, must set forth the reason why he did not grant joint custody.
We have that now in the law.
That's a matter of education.
That's a
matter of rapping them on the knuckles from the ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
The way I read it, any party can want
joint custody and he has to spell out his reasons for not granting it.
It doesn't take both of them.
That's the way I read it.
I'm just a
layman.
MS. SWERDLOW:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Okay. Now, wait a minute.
(Knock, Knock).
I want to reassume control of this.
(Laughter)
Wait a minute.
Hold
on.
Would you like to summarize this?
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

He always treats me like this, and

I ...

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Would you like to summarize?
to be rude, but I am going to move on.

I don't want

MS. SWERDLOW:
Yes, I would.
Not only does the Kapiloff
bill fail to take into account that each custody situation is unique,
in that we are considering a specific child in a specific family, but
I believe that it will encourage a bitter and ugly adversarial, judicial proceeding that would be completely destructive of the development of harmony down the line between the two parents.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Thank you very much. Sorry, for the interruptions.
In normal court you wouldn't see it. We like to debate,
not only with the witnesses but with each other.
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to then say "I'm
If he doesn 1 t
have to al

loff's bill

MS. PIERSON:
My reading of Mr. Kapiloff's bill is that he
would have to declare one of the parents unfit.
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
MS. PIERSON:

That's his only alternative?

What I think Mr. Kapiloff is s

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF: First of all, if that is the case ...
Let it be known, one of the problems I have with people who start out
in an oppose position and have no intention at all of ever moving
from it is that they'll never contact you ~nd talk with you about
what your intentions are in an effort to try and make you feel better.
And that's too bad, but the Family Law Section never did.
Now, frankly
it was never my intention to preclude a judge from following the dictates of the request of the parents.
If the parents do not want joint
custody, they should be given that right. Moreover, I agree on your
question, that the choice of fitness is a poor choice of language and
we want and we are going to have to find some more sophisticated
criteria, certainly.
If they're just objecting to the fact that we're
establishing a presumption, that can't be because at least some people
believe the presumption is established by the Imbrecht law. The question is the weight of that presumption.
MS. PIERSON:

I would ...

ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF:
... And really that's what we're talking about.
I have no intentions, and I will assure this committee I
intend to amend the bill to cover this point.
I have no intention of
precluding a judge from ordering other than joint custody
where
he finds somebody unfit.
That would be ridiculous, and I will amend
the bill, and I will show you all the amended bill.
All I want is some good faith on your part and not just to
say,"No, no, no, no, it can't work.
It never can work."
I've heard
that argument since the old civil rights days when everybody said,
"Civil rights won't work.
It's just a matter of education.
It's
just a question of changing people's minds.
You can't legislate these
things.
They just have to come about by social change." That's nonsense, just absolute nonsense.
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING
So you're committing to amend that?
It's either joint custody or a finding of unfitness, Mr. Kapiloff.
He'll fix it so that ... Do you suppose we could give Mr. Imbrecht
and you joint custody of this issue?
(Laughter)
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

The effect then ...

ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF:

I'll give him the whole ball of wax!

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
You're operating from the assumption
that in the existing law there is the presumption in favor of sole
custody.
Is that not correct? And you want to reverse that? The end
result of the bill that we are going to see before us in January for
a vote is going to reverse the existing practice which is sole custody.
-81-
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be enforced by court order, and it can be used to forward the best
interests of the child. We would urge the adoption of that bill.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Thank you.
Very quickly, next set of
witnesses, please come forward.
Do you want to ask a question?
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:
I'm
to figure out whether
there's a sub rosa agenda going on here.
Is there a collateral or
simultaneous battle over where the assets go, since the assets follow
the child, and who has to pay them? From your experience?
MS. GASSNER:

In my experience, that's not the case.

ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:

So what we see is what we're

debating?
MS. GASSNER:

That's my

MS. PIERSON:
I'd like to point out to you that I believe
it's 4600.5 of the Civil Code requires that custody issues and property issues be bifurcated.
I think this makes a difference.
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:
I understand that.
to see if the real battle here is economic.

I just wanted

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Thank you very much. Mr. Barber, Mr.
Martin Shucart, Marcia Nolan, and Laura Glickman. Mr. Barber, if
you'd like to go first.
MR. MICHAEL BARBER:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
out of order.
I have a plane to catch at 4:40 ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

me

Good luck.

MR. BARBER:
I hope.
I represent the District Attorneys
Association and the Family Support Council of the District Attorneys
Association.
I'm a deputy distr
a
in Sacramento.
In viewing this legislation from our point of view, we have
simply looked at both bills, because we were invited to testify on
both bills, as a step towards a cleanup surrounding the issues of
joint custody and issues that are peripheral to it. At this time,
frankly we have no position per se to take on the issue one way or
the other; however, there are peripheral issues that are created by
this that I don't think the Legislature's begun to address. We're
concerned, for instance, in the child stealing legislation that has
been quite successful in terms of it's implementation at least in our
county, San Bernardino County, and several others throuqh the state, thAt
because of the use of the word "custody" in there, we're going to
see situations where people who have the child 49.5 percent of the
time will think they should have the full 50 percent and will be in
asking for felony warrants, using the axe to kill cannons.
I am concerned, for instance, with the parents in juvenile
courts unless there's an expressed statement in the legislation referring the priority of juvenile placement or any custody order in
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AFDC, notwithstanding financial aid,because they will not meet minimum time limits in the home under federal law.
This is not something
that can be dealt with here at the state level.
It would have to require a change in federal legislation.
Thus, in terms of definitions
you may wish to look at that.
As a general rule, in these cases, I think that the most
important step forward I've seen, because we are in visitation/custody
cases now in the D.A. 's office, is in the area of pro per access to
courts in terms of counseling. Under 4600, we've installed this in
Sacramento courts, and where there have been visitation problems the
individuals who are having this conflict over visitation are in fact
taking advantage of it.
It may bother some people here for me to say
this, but in all candor I think what we're doing is a cosmetic
change of the word "visitation" and calling it "custody" because that
makes people feel better.
If that is in fact the case,then the problems that now occur in terms of sorting out visitation and visitation
rights will be transferred to the bailiwick of custody, but they will
nonetheless not go away.
We heard complaints and comments here about the courts. The
problem as I see it is access to the courts, access and mediation. And
all too often in divorce cases,while I think rightfully they're before
the superior court because of the long-range effects on people, a lot
of little issues have come up, really involving the context of what
might be called small claims actions or we would envision a small
claims action.
Thus, in terms of subsequent litigation, custody disputes and mediation, I would hope that whatever is created out of this
legislation would simplify subsequent access to the courts so that these
matters may be resolved promptly, that whatever mediation service,
counseling service, conciliation service, or superior court judge hears
the matter, maybe the individual can be placed in contact without having to go through the expense of a lawyer and without having to go
through a range of formal procedures.
This brings me to the second point of my testimony that Ms.
Young requested me to talk to, and that is the problem of child support.
You have heard testimony here that child support is not a problem.
From our point of view,it is a dramatic problem.
The 1975 census figures
show that 75 percent of the population was otherwise eligible for
support in the country and was not receiving it in 1975. In fact, I
have the 1975 pamphlet here.
In 1978 this was dissipated to some
But out of 7.1 million sinqle-parcnt families in the country in 1978,
only 1.7 million received sup~lrt in full so the problem is not going
away although it is becoming dissipated.
Right now ...
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:
MR. BARBER:

That was nationwide?

That was nationwide.

ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:

We don't have the data for Cali-

fornia?
MR. BARBER:
I have some data, Mr. Stirling. I did not come
down with data on the percentage of paying cases, and it does vary all
-85-
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today representing the Family Law Section of the Los Angeles County
Bar Association.
I also happen to be the co-chairperson of the Family
Law Colloquium, that's coming up the first week in November in Los
Angeles.
The Family Law Section of the Los Angeles County Bar Assoc
ation opposes Assemblyman Kapiloff's bill and supports Assemblyman
Imbrecht's bill with some minor changes in terms of definition. We
oppose Assemblyman Kapiloff's bill for the reasons that have been previously stated. Number one, the presumption we do not believe,
and of course it's up to this Committee to make a final decision, has
been supported by the behaviorial science studies that have been done
to this point. We've seen no particular evidence that the best interests of the child are involved in every instance by way of a presumption with the joint custody situation. We further oppose AB 1706,
and apparently Assemblyman Kapiloff has agreed to change this standard
of proof, hopefully, to the best interests of the child and away from
unfitness on the part of either parent.
Speaking as an attorney and
speaking as one who does a great deal of family law work, if unfitness
was left as a standard, you would find many, many more child custody
litigations than you find today.
You would find that they would be
bloodier. You would find that there would be a great deal of employment for private detectives, which appears to be going out of style
in the area of even the child custody disputes that we now have. We
would really be laying open a very, very serious area in terms of
litigation and,of course, its resulting impact on both the parents as
well as the children themselves.
Now, we support Assemblyman Imbrecht's bill for a very important reason, that reason being even as a certified family law specialist, and by the way I represent probably just as many fathers as I do
mothers, when a client of mine asks me what joint custody means or what
joint legal custody means, I must tell them in all candor, and perhaps
my professional responsibility carrier requires me to tell them, that
I don't know what joint custody means in terms of the statute. What
Assemblyman Imbrecht's bill does is to at long last give us a definition for those terms that have been moving around in the area of custody not just since 1980 but for many, many years.
I've often said that what people wanted to happen in the
original bill in 1980 was for joint custody to go from a placebo to
a panacea.
Unfortunately, that's not what's happened. What's really
happened is,even in the last year and a half or two years,that the
concept of joint custody in most instances has gone back to the placebo
that you hand generally the father when he starts to say anything at
all about the custody of the children.
In response to something that
Mr. Stirling said- I notice he's walking out of the room ...
(Assemblyman L. Stirling returned to room.)

(Laughter)

MR. SHUCART:
Yes, there are some sub rosa aspects in my
opinion,and the op1nion of many of my colleagues,to the area of joint
custody and sole custody, and they do involve the issue of child
support. Many, many a parent who seeks joint custody will subsequently
seek and, sometimes not very subsequent to his or her initial seeking
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of joint custody, a reduction in what he or she would normally pay as
child support as based upon the fact that that person now has joint
custody.
Therefore, it costs them more money, even though the physical
amount of time or the amount of time that the child is in that person's physical custody is no different than it would have been under
a sole custody order.
I would also harken to something that my predecessor speaker,
Mr. Barber, said.
It is not clear at all that with respect to the issue of joint custody that a parent who has joint legal custody can be
prosecuted under either the child stealing or the violation of visitation statutes, Penal Code Sections 278 and 278.5.
District attorneys
around the state differ in those two areas.
I would just urge that
this Judiciary Committee help us out in the area of practicing law by
giving us better definitions of those terms that are used every day in
the courts,and the way you can do that is to support Assemblyman Imbrecht's bill and to oppose Assemblyman Kapiloff's bill.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Thank you very much.

Thank you.

MS. MARCIA L. NOLAN:
Thank you very much.
I'm Marcia Nolan,
and I'm representing the San Diego County Bar Family Law Section and
also the legislation sub-committee on family law.
I'm also here individually.
The comment I want to make for the section is we did not
have the Imbrecht bill before us in order to allow me to testify on
behalf of the section in that matter.
Very briefly, the section and
the County Bar Board of Directors' position was that,as written,the
Kapiloff bill is inappropriate for all of the reasons that have been
stated here today, which I will not enumerate in particular.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
by reference.
(Laughter)

You will incorporate all those comments

MS. NOLAN:
That's right. Mr. Kapiloff has already agreed
to correct one of the major problems.
I do see it involves, in our
section we have agreed, a substantial problem as it is written. Mr.
Kapiloff's bill does allow any unhappy parent who has 49 percent of the
time with the child to go into court and to litigate in court the fact
that they have not had exactly 50 percent.
As written, I think that's
what Mr. Kapiloff's bill says.
I'm sure that there can be amendments
to it, wherein he can say that it does not mean that all parents are
entitled to 50 percent of the tjme.
I would like to try to add something to what's gone on here
today rather than to just repeat it. What I had prepared took me
several hours.
I am going to deviate from it and make some comments,
if I can, as to what's gone on.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

We have your written testimony though?

MS. NOLAN:
No, you do not.
in writing until Thursday.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
like to submit it.

I did not know this was to be

Well, we'll keep the record open if you'd

MS. NOLAN:
I would.
I was a delegate to the State Bar,
and I've been very busy, and I'm sorry to ...
-89-

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

We understand.

MS. NOLAN:
I agree with Mrs. Hicks that the terminology
used substantially dictates the way we feel about an issue.
I think
that needs to be very much considered by you people when you write
any kind of legislation,especially in the family law area.
I think
a resolution which is also often offered by mental health professionals, experienced courts, and practitioners is to get child litigation
out of the courts and into mediation and arbitration, and I,for one,
personally do not feel that there should be any child custody litigation in the courtroom.
I think that we need to think about that.
Regarding child support, it's a legal fiction that custody
and support are not tied together.
It's unrealistic, and it's a fantasy, in spite of the fact that that is the position of the family support division of the district attorney's office for as long as I have practiced law.
It's plain bull.
It is tied together, and don't tell any
or any mother whose ever not had their child that they should
go out and support the child when they're not around the time that the
child is in need. We need to change the laws in that area.
I disagree with Judge Mills when he says that you can't order
joint custody if people don't want it.
I think you can under the
proper circumstances, given an environment for those people to be ahlP
to work through their own animosities, to ventilate, to get out of the
angry posture, and to get into a mediation process.
I think we need to talk about the Hennepin County Experiment.
not heard it brought up here. Most of the people in conciliaare aware that they use three to six months with parents in a mediation setting, allowing the parents to try to mediate
and
They have full time counselors who facilitate these
parents in working out their own custodial arrangements. That's not
been talked about.
I don't happen to have a copy of it, but I think
it should be looked into.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

All right.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

What was the name?

MS. NOLAN:
The Hennepin County Experiment, which in fact
was one of the forerunners of our whole concept of using the conciliation court counselors as it stands today.
That was one of the things
we looked at.
Parents don't have to like each other to continue the parenthood program.
A comment made by Mr. Silver, I would respond to. Men not
wanting to see their children is a reality. Many times that reality ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
is a reality.

And women not wanting to see their children

MS. NOLAN:
I'm sure it is, and maybe I should say noncustodial parents, but I hate the word "custody" and I hate the word
"non" so much that I try not to use it.
One of the reasons why is
-90-

because i t s painful
your children on Sunday afternoon,to take
them to the
and hear that
have a different set of values.
to hear what's going on in the other home.
husband is a noncuitodial parent. My husband has been in tears when he has sent his
daughters home on weekends because o what he has heard is going on
the other home.
The
ldren don't want to leave, and he has come
to me in tears and said, Marcia, I'm not going to see those
anymore.
It hurts too much and it hurts
too much." So, when you
have these parents who aren't visiting, who aren't seeing their children,
you might want to ask the question why.
Or, do you assume it's because
they don't love or care about their kids?
Noncustodial
, as I think I've covered, do
angry about pay
when
're not allowed some shared
time with
children.
I want to point out that I personally, and
I've never had a
built into every one of the court orders I
have written in the last five years that the parents must seek the
services of the family court counseling services or some other agency
before resorting to litigation subsequent to any trial.
I think that
needs to be done.
I want to comment about Don K
I know the man.
He is
not what you think he is, Mr. Robinson.
In fact, Donald King probably
is one of the foremost initiators in the conciliation court processes
that. ..
ASSEMBLYMAN
to his

My criticism of Judge King only goes
change in policies adopted by the State
b

MS. NOLAN:
I
tand t.
tell you that
it
,
Don
's mind,as in mine, means divid
s
two homes.
It does not mean that he is against shared
think you need to clear that with Judge
, but I
think that that s what s
it custody means.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

He can clear it while he's answering
send him.
(Laughter)

MS. NOLAN:
to Mr. Stirl
's comments (he is not
here), just
terms of his question, yes, economics often do play
a role, at least in my experiences s an attorney.
In some requests
for joint cus
cr represent
y 80 percent men, and I must
that I have found that some of them who are suddenly saying,
"I want joint cus
," don't want to
the kids the bath; they
don't want to wash the clothes;
don t want to feed them and do
the dishes and wipe their noses, but
do want a reduction in
support.) , it
an economic event.
I don't think it is in terms of
phi
, and I don't think your Committee should change its philosophy, and I think we need to encourage
s to share in their
parentinq.
Mr. Barber said ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
how far your

Would you like to summarize?
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I don't know

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Of course, but she's not the last witness.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
court.

I'm enjoying this testimony •..

I'm aware of that.

If you can summarize, I'd appreciate it.

MS. NOLAN:
It can't work because it's going to clog the
I haven't gotten to what I've prepared!
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

That's what I figured!

(Laughter)

MS. NOLAN:
Everybody else has been saying this too.
me make one more comment.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MS. NOLAN:

Let

Okay.

I'm trying to do that.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Your testimony is very good. Please understand that I'm rushing you only because of the limitations of time.
MS. NOLAN:

I understand.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. Chairman, I want to point out that
it seems that witnesses coming from San Diego tend to - both sides
of this bill - be considerably more responsive to one, acknowledging that there is in fact a problem out there, and two, it appears
that they're working a lot better together than any other section of
the state, and that was the only reason I wanted to ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes, I understand.

MS. NOLAN:
I will reduce this to writing if the Committee
wishes that, but I'd like, as much for the audience here, and I wish
the judges were here, to propose to you a plan, what I've not heard
anybody do since they've been testifyin0.
Number one, Mr. Imbrecht's bill, I think, is a better bill
because it defines joint custody.
It defines legal custody and so
forth. I have given a handout.
I think it should go further.
I think
it should define split custody.
I think you need to define divided
custody, only because it's a smaller area.
It's more precise. You've
got all four forms of custody that a court can use, the attorney can
use, and the clients can use to know what in hell they're talking
about when you say, "We're going to get you joint custody." I would
suggest all four that I have proposed or some similar wording.
Number two, you the legislators, Mr. Imbrecht and all the
rest of you, have made a dichotomy in the way the bills regarding custody are written.
It's a small thinq.
It's trivial, but you keep
"awarding" custody to people, and the word is "grant" if you've got
to have the judiciary involved at all.
I can't tell you, and people
tell me it's trivial, but I can't tell you how many clients have come
up to me and said, "How come she got awarded the car and I get awarded
visitation?" If we're going to be clear, if we're going to be con-92-

sistent, it's a very simple thing. You've got a whole resolution before you that I've presented to the convention which by the way was
withdrawn because of some other problems. While you're rewriting it
would you please take all the "awards" out? Put the word "grant" in.
We all would just feel better. I think we have to be consistent in
our philosophy.
I said we have to expand our definitions.
I also think that
one other point
that has not been made at all today is that 4600 and
4600.5 both speak very definitively
to the court may order a plan of the
parties to be implemented.
I personally feel that they should order it
in all cases.
I don't care whether it's the parties' plan on their
own, with the help of the conciliation court, or court order because
nobody can agree. But the
an must be implemented; otherwise you're
right back .•.
I don't care if i~Kapiloff's bill, or whoever it is.
Nobody knows what you're talking about.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I think that's very good.

Point well taken.

MS. NOLAN:
Plans should be submitted. All I'm suggesting
is you change your egislation to "must" instead of in the court's
discretion.
There's another problem also. Within our own county, Judge
Joseph, who's a marvelous man and one of the most caring judges I have
known, and Judge Malkus, who's extremely bright (he's been a family
law practitioner for years), totally disagree on what 4600 means when
it says, "The parties may and the court shall." Believe it or not,
there is a real dissension even in this county as to whether or not
the courts on their own motion can order joint custody, regardless
of which kind.
ASSEMBLYMAN
loff was ...
its own mo
changed.

Yes

I think that's exactly what Mr.

That has to be clear that the court can do it on
s of whose bill you endorse that has to be
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

That goes to the problem of Judge

King.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
that if one
ec
rests with the court.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Would you like to wrap it up?
But t goes to those judges who think
ir jurisdiction, that option no longer
Yes, she's clear on that.

MS. NOLAN: No, in our courts there is a concern that if
purties don
ink ubout it the court can't even suggest it.
You need
that, I think.
One other point is we might consider some way in which we
could do a double blind if we have to have a custody trial where it's
-93-

"Parent A" and "Parent B" rather than "the mother" and "the father."
If we
could find a way to work in that situation, it would probably take care
of the whole problem, at least in terms of the sexual issues.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
One of my main concerns is that there be
some degree of consistency.
I don't want to see a situation,obviously,
where you have a list of criteria, and you just do it mechanically.
You send it into a computer and let the computer decide who gets the
child and do a Solomon number where you split the child in two and let
each parent have part of the body.
But, I'm really interested more
specifically in people being able to understand that there is some
rationale, that it's not on the whim of the judge, that he didn't get
up one day and say, "Gee, you know, my wife was mean to me last night;
no woman should have legal custody of any child."
MS. NOLAN:
You might note that I also handed out,and which
was a part of the packages out there, part of the resolutions.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
it's a husband.
(Laughter)
sexist.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
(Laughter)

It might have been a female judge if

Well, either way, either way.

I'm not

MS. NOLAN:
The San Diego delegation, I admit I'm the author
of it, did in fact provide some criteria which we think should be
included in 4600.5.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Mr. Kapiloff, I'm sure you'll review that.

won't you?
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF:

I certainly will.

MS. NOLAN:
I think it might take care of some of your problems in terms o varying counties.
I don't know that the courts should
be required, but if the guidelines are there at least all judges and
all lawyers know what criteria you're looking at.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MS. NOLAN:

Thank you.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Okay, Ms. Glickman.

Mr. Kapiloff, if you've got anymore good ideas like this,
keep them to yourself.
(Laughter)
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF:
work a full day!
(Laughter)

Just want to make sure that you guys

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
his own bills!
(Laughter)

Mr. Kapiloff has the capacity to kill

combined!

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
(Laughter)

He does a better job than all the opposition
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MR. SHUCART: While Judge Mills does of course speak for the
Los Angeles County Superior Court in the family law area, in the Central
Division, Judge Mills is a calendar judge and as well establishes policy, but the real decisions as to whether or not there is a presumption
are made at the trial court level by the fifty or so judicial officers
who handle matters of child custody. As far as my experience goes in
the Los Angeles County Superior Courts, there is no presumption one
way or the other unless the parties agree, in which instance there is
a presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of the child.
Both parties go in. They may make whatever request they wish, and they
are treated equally, whether they are requesting joint custody or they're
requesting sole custody.
The courts in Los Angeles County make a decision based upon the facts, with neither particular custody arrangement being given any presumption in the law.
If 1706 is to pass, there
will be such a presumption for ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

That's the exact reason that ...

Okay, let me turn the mike back to Ms.

Glickman.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
That's the exact reason that we're
going to subpoena records from those four courts, to show the
Committee staff and Committee members and themselves whether in
fact the practice is that there is a presumption where one individual
objects then joint custody is removed from consideration.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Shucart, do you know how many judges
in L. A. County Superior Court deal with family law? Do you know?
MR. SHUCART:

Thirty-three, I believe.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I see, plus 50 commissioners?

MR. SHUCART: No, judges and commissioners.
I believe, there
are 33 judicial officers in Los Angeles County to deal with family law.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
many are commissioners?

You don't know how many are judges and how

MR. SHUCART: Probably about 15 commissioners
and the rest are judges. Those are basically sitting family law judges.
In the branch courts, many times contested custody cases are not handled
by the commissioner and are sent out to normal regular sitting civil
judges.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MS. GLICKMAN:

Okay, I understand.

Ms. Glickman.

I'm trying to recall where I was and ...

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: With Richard Robinson here
be where you were again.
(Laughter)

ijOU

will never

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: We've all agreed on unfit. You'd
just finished unfit. You were talking about the presumption.
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MS. GLICKMAN:
I can appreciate that, and I think that certainly is the function of the Legislature of this state. The reason
that I make mention of this cautionary note is that it is very difficult sometimes to gain a perspective from individual stories as to
what has happened to individual people in their own divorce case.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Okay, I understand.

MS. GLICKMAN:
I'm not suggesting that I know it all because
I'm an attorney, far from it.
I would suggest to you that I have at
least a different perspective as an attorney representing a variety
of clients with a variety of custodial desires and arrangements, and
I would just want you to be aware you cannot always create harmony and
create that which we all wish were the case by a legislative enactment.
With regard to
yers' Association of Los
amended in one respect.
custody - joint physical
would be very helpful, I

AB 2202, let me indicate that the Women LawAngeles would support that measure if it were
The notion that these terms "joint legal
custody" need to be defined is very true and
think.

I would, on behalf of our organization, suggest that you
ought not to strike the language which states that a court may award
joint legal custody without an award of joint physical custody. There
are instances in which joint legal custody ought to be ordered. That
does not mean that in every one of those instances joint physical custody ought also to be awarded.
And without articulating each and every possible fact situation for you, I think you have the imagination to realize that not
every family situation lends itself to joint physical custody, but
many of them do lend themselves to joint legal custody as essentially
defined in AB 2202.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Thank you, Ms. Glickman.
MS. GLICKMAN:

I understand.

Your point is well taken.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
to come up with Mr. Aros?

All right.

Mr. Hausey, would you like

ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING:
I was wondering if the Family Law
Section could put together a model code or something for the Legislature
to consider, or is the Imbrecht bill or the Kapiloff bill the model
code?
MR. SHUCART:
The L. A. County Bar has put together one as
I believe the State Bar Family Law Section has put together one.
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Has that been proffered?
anybody know if somebody is carrying those bills?

Does

MR. SHUCART:
I believe that we've been in contact with
Assemblyman Imbrecht, and he has a copy of the proposed changes by
the Los Angeles County Bar Association and also from the State Bar
Family Law Section.
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for the forms that are being used in family law matters would be exceedingly helpful so that these people can in fact go back in and get a
modification when it is necessary.
To go on into the proposal that there be some sort of schedule
for support obligations, I've gotten kind of mixed reactions
from the programs that I represent.
Some of the programs think that
those schedules would be adverse to our clients' interest because they
don't actually reflect their economic circumstances.
Those schedules
almost always reflect what would be considered to be normal circumstances and our clients, I think by definition, are not in the normal
circumstances.
They exist below the poverty line, for the most part.
But, on the other hand, some of our programs are saying, "We need those
schedules." We need support schedules, and the reason we need those
support schedules is because quite often what happens is that people
are being brought into the district attorney's office and being asked
to make support payments on children and those district attorneys will
not even follow the existing support schedules that are prevalent in
their county.
They will ask for more then the support schedule will
ask for from our clients because our clients, being unsophisticated,
not having access to attorneys and feeling intimidated by the system
that's being utilized to collect the support payments payments through
the district attorney's office,will agree without seeking assistance
or advice from counsel.
So we think that maybe there is justification
for using support schedules that might be advantageous to our clients,
but I think that it is absolutely essential that these support schedules
have included within them some consideration for the obligations that
that person has to all of his or her children, not just to the children
that they're having to support under this support order.
I think it's
essential that that schedule also take into consideration disposable
income and I think that as a minimum you ought to have federal poverty
guidelines as the amount that you deduct from their income to determine
what is disposable so that those persons who don't have at least what
the
government determines as the poverty guideline would not
have to make a substantial support payment.
The problem that's created there is oftentimes you have people who are in that situation who
have to make support payments and arc remarried.
What you do is you
te <:1 burden on that second fumily so that the spouse of that person
ends up subsidizing his previous spouse bece1usc she hils to make up the
difference of what her current family needs because his income can't
do that.
Finally, with respect to the issue of making enforcement
eas
, we agreed that enforcement should be easy.
It should not be
difficult to enforce a support order. We also think, however, that
there's a real problem with respect to arrearages.
Our clients, when
they come to us,quite often have been previously employed and have a
substantial support order that they are obligated to make payments
under.
They lose their job or for some reason aren't getting the same
sort of income.
They cannot at that point afford to go hire an attorney
for a modification.
There exists a substantial period of time between
which they regain employment or have an ability to pay. That arrearage
accumulates during that period of time. We think that there ought to
be some mechanism so that either you tie the enforcement of the payment
of an arrearage to that person's ability to pay during the period of
that arrearage,or you allow for some retroactive modification,or you
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MR. HAUSEY:

Not at this point.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
If the
be opposed.
(Laughter)

deficit gets any worse, you'll
Mr. Chairman?

CHAI~~N

HARRIS:

Yes, Mr. Stirl

ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Just before everybody leaves, I'd
like to compliment the Chair and the testimony that we've had here
The State of California has been well served by the quality of
e and the quality of the testimony that they brought forward.
I'm appreciative of this, and I know others on the Committee are.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Stirling, I appreciate your questioning.
You put more legalese into this hearing than any hearing I've been at
so far.
(Laughter) We have two other witnesses, and I'd like to ask
them to come forward if they'd like. One, Mr. Sherwin Harris.
Is
Mr. Harris here? Mr. Harris is not here. Mr. Guzzetta? Are you still
here? Would you like to testify very briefly on anything that you
have heard during the course of this hearing.
MR. LAWRENCE GUZZETTA: Mr. Chairman, I actually am volunteerto be a witness.
I thought it'd be appropriate since we had professional opinions being put forth, from judges and from lawyers. Someth
from professionals in the field of my qualifications might in fact
be of interest to the Committee since I am an expert.
I'm a loving parent.
I'm a loving parent who, a year and a half ago, saw his family
leave his residence.
I'm a loving parent who has tried to obtain joint
ical custody as I perceive it to be the best for the children and
for the
, and in fact I might answer any questions from your
Corr~ittee as to what it entails
because I've just recently
been turned down on joint physical cus
On what bas s have you been turned down,
Mr. Guzz
MR. GUZZETTA:
In my
, it was predicated on my spouse's
e custody, however, with a winger, and that is
that two of the children also expressed that desire.
I see, how many children are there alto?

MR. GUZZETTA:

There are three children.
So you
, perhaps ,that the court looked
ests of the child?

at the so-ca
I

MR. GUZZETTA:
Yes, and I have difficulty with that because
that the children were coerced into their ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

eleven,

MR. GUZZETTA:
teen.

How old a.rc the children?

When the proceed
-102-

started, they were nine,

to your

was your ex(in fact,
done on
legal

MR. GUZZETTA: Well, if the judge doesn't go along with the
order and does not give you a written reason why,so that it interferes
with my field processes I understand it ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
MR. GUZZETTA:

And this case was tried in which county?

Orange County.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: You asked for joint custody,and the
case was tried before a judge after the enactment of Mr. Imbrecht's
bill which changed the statutes as it relates to joint custody.
MR.

ZZETTA:

That is correct.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
MR. GUZZETTA:

January 1, 1980.

The final came down August 19th.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

When did the judge first make a

decision?
MR. GUZZETTA:

August 19th of this year.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. GUZZETTA:

Are you in Mr. Robinson's district?

Who's Mr. Robinson?

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Do you live in his district?

Is he your

as
MR. GUZZETTA:

No.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Oh, scc,hc'd give you a free legal opinion
if you were
t!
(
)
MR. GUZZETTA: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to share an opinion,
and it's one that's just developing.
Two years ago I didn't have any
op
In fact,
lis
to the testimony, I kept hearing over
and over again the good intention of the participants, which in my mind,
hold little or no water because they have never been there.
If they have,
then I want to hear their opinion.
That doesn't mean I'm saying that
someone can't comment, but it's kind of like the priest who used to give
sexual advice.
I'd like to know how did he do it if he hadn't experienced it.
I'm very serious in that regard.
I could not begin to snare
you the frustrations of
ing through 14 months of seeing my
children bounced around and
expenditure of $24,000.
To Mr. Stirling
I would say that I'm of the opinion that my spouse and others, (I'm a
middle upper income level, according to numbers) are very definitely
against joint physical custody because she recognizes in her opinion
that without sole custody she loses child support because, in fact, our
incomes are comparable, that if we go to a joint physical custody then
her position for spousal or child support is nonexistent. We both have
homes to maintain so I think economics is very definitely something
that puts her in the ...
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We want to make sure

this record is complete so that Mr. Kapiloff and other members of the
Legislature will have the benefit of the testimony we heard today and
be able to review the record in writing and to make subsequent changes
as appropriate to this legislation or other legislation on the subject
of custody of children or their support.
I'd like to conclude the
hearing this afternoon.
I thank all of you for your indulgence and
patience. Thank you.

# # # # # #
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APPENDIX A

California Association

Marriage and Family Therapists

13 October 1981

The Honorable Lawrence Kapiloff
State Assembly
Room 5128, State Capital
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Assemblyman Kapiloff:
The California Association of Marriage and Family Therapists supports
your bill, AB 1706, regarding the awarding of joint child custody, in
marital separation and/or dissolution cases. The major tenet of your
bill is that "frequent and continuing contact with both parents" and
sharing "the rights and responsibilities of child rea ng" enhances the
child's development. This measure would mandate that joint custody
be the first "order of preference according to the best interests
of the child", thus soundly applying the major tenet upon which the
State's public policy is based.
We urge passage of this measure in light of the important role both parents play in the child-rearing process. Al it, mandation alone does
not guarantee that both parents will
equally, fully and willingly
involved in the continuing ild-rearing process. It does, however,
compel the parents to mediate
r differences vis a vis their offspring and develop a
e an
their bei
raised. Likewise,
it moves toward remov ng the child from the "negotiating table" as a
by-product of the ma tal di
cul es.
Our over 4,500 member practitioners throughout the State work daily
with couples and families in distress. The continuing role of the
parents in a child's life is as essential after the break-up of the
marriage as it is durin9 the marriage. We believe AB 1706 will bring
families just one step closer to achieving more compatible dissolution
relationships, in the same manner as they once worked toward building
positive marital and family relationships.

21ill:) Cumin" dd liio South. Suit(' 20H, San Diq.;o, CA \J2l0t-; • (714) 2!17-7121
D. Stc·n·n Alt'xandn II. M. A
CXI"rutitr Dirf'clor
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M Jacob'. \I.A
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Donald K. Brown
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Lf'gi.,fatitc A(/t-ocal•·

Legal Cotm.l('/

Page Two
The Honorable Lawrence Kapiloff
13 October 1981

Again, we support this measure and look forward to its mely passage.
If I or our membership can be of further assistance,
ease call on me.
Sincerely,
~~'

{L-)
:

'-j .~\i.

D. Steven Alexander II
Executive Director
DSA II:acm
cc:

Donald K. BrOwn
Advocation, Inc.
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APPENDIX B
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9, 1981

The
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October 9, 1981
Page 2

More importantly, AB 1706 is a g
in that it focuses custody 1
on
instead
of the best interests of the children.
circumstances,
children inevitably become the pawns in
ir
's struggle
to prove that the other is unfit. ca ifor i
is as it should
be:
Issues of custody and visita
should
decided on
the basis of the best interests of the children.
We respectfully request that this letter be read into
and added to the record of your
scheduled for
October 14, 1981. Thank you.
Respectful

yours,

Richard F. Barry
President- lect 198 -82
Northern California Chapter
American
of
imonial
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APPENDIX C
Office of Child
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DEPARTMENT

Region IX
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9th Floor
San Francisco CA 94102
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State
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to the idea of
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Therefore, we
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program
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Support
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Please do not

·~erely,
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any
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~
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RiChard W. Lewis
Regional
cc:
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to support our position.

APPENDIX D
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or placed in a foster home. The major difficulty with joint physical custody
will be determining which parent (if either) is the caretaker relative -i.e.,
with whom does the child live?
Federal. law and regulation assume that a child has but one caretaker relative.
The child "lives with 11 the relative who actua.l.ly assumes responsibility for
day-to-day care and control of the child, regardless of the nature of any existing custody decree.
In cases of joint physical custody, the determination of which parent is the
caretaker relative will depend on the facts of each case. When it can be determined that the child 11lives with 11 one parent, the 11visits 11 to the other parent
are temporary absences and do not interrupt eligibility regardless of the
regularity of such 11visits 11 • When the child lives with each parent for a substantial period of time, the most reasonable approach is to consider that the
child's "home" (and the caretaker relative) changes with the move. Where the
child rotates from one parent to the other on an equal basis for short periods
of time, it is not possible to designate one parent as the caretaker relative.
The child would not be "visiting" one parent, but would be living with each
parent. Consequently, it is doubtful that deprivation due to absence could be
established.
Under current federal law and regulation, a child in a short-term equal sharing
situation may be considered:
l.

not "living with" a caretaker relative, or

2.

living with" each parent for the period of time pbysical.ly present
in each parent's home, or

3.

11

11

living vith 11 both parents

Under situation one, there is no eligibility for the child.
Under situation two, the county would be administratively unable to pay a correct
monthly grant or issue the warrant to the correct payee where the "home" with each
parent was for a period less than one month. Also, this situation ignores the
issue of which parent should be included in the assistance payment. Even if each
parent provided the home for a full month, the AFDC grant could not continue to a
needy parent during the month the child is with the other parent. It is questionable
if the needy parent could maintain the home without the AFDC grant.
Situation three requires a very broad interpretation of the child's 11home 11 and the
persons living in that "home". :Both parents would be included in the assistance
unit with the income and resources of all family members considered. This is a
viable alternative only where both parents are needy and only if deprivation can
be based on unemployment or incapacity. If the child were considered to "live with"
both parents (both parents would be considered the person who has physical custody)
then the residence of the child is the residence of both parents. If the parents
live in different counties or one parent lives out of state, the determination of
how much of the AFDC grant goes to each parent is difficult if not impossible.
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I am president of Fathers' Rights of
California Family Law Coalition, and an
Congress for Men. These are my quali
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with specific recommendations.
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REVI,EW OF LITERATURE AND RESEARCH ON CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT
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ical research. I believe few judges and
fornia legislators, have taken the
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levant research on the topics of child
fathering.
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Another major and
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who are allowed to remain close to
willingly
take an
the
ir
ldren.
Research
have been
excluded as custodial
who sometimes
to count·
clerks or post office boxes, soon distance themse
their children.
In a word, the
presumption of a
father creates the self-fulfilling prophecy and spawns a
weekend fathers. It should
come as no
se
fathers
close to
children after
divorce will take an active role
nurturing
of their children.
SOME POPULAR MYTHS REGARDING FAMILY LAW
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MYTH 4.: Most men don't want to see the
divorce
and don't avail themselves of the visitation
afforded them.
FACT: Most men have a great need to be c
to the
children after
divorce and feel that they are not
see their children
as often as they like. Further, their weekend father status, granting them visitation rights, often defined by the ex-wife, creates an
emotionally difficult situation for many men.
would like to see
their children more often and in a more normal day-to-day setting.
The role of weekend father simply does not
the normal
parenting routine and thus works against establi
a relationship
with the child.
MYTH 5.: The laws, courtroom procedures, and the efforts of judges
and attorneys are aimed at the "best interests of the child".
FACT: The legal adversary system as it is presently implemented in
California works against the best interests of the children. Fathers
are systematically excluded from the
of
children after
divorce, the laws focus upon child support col
while overlooking
enforcement of visitation rights, and do not deal
the whole child
or whole parent. Some of the greatest
perpetrated on children and fathers alike by our family law courts are done under the
banner of "the best interests of the
PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING LAW AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION WHICH SHOULD BE ADDRESSED
IN FUTURE LEGISLATION
1. The present joint custody law (cc 4600) is unclear and confusing.
While Section 4600.5 states that there is a pre
that joint custody
is in the best interests of a minor
where
have
, the
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8. Visitation rights must be
legal force as the collection
there should be less reliance
parenting, but where visitation awards have been
that the district attorneys and courts
with child support matters.
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Testimony of Hugh Mcisaac, Director
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,

INTERIM HEARINGS ON FAMILY LAW ISSUES
The answers to the question raised in your request for testimony are perhaps best expressed in a short passage from Fathers
Without Partners by Rosenthal and Keshet, which reports an extensive
review of joint custody arrangements and favors joint custody.
Joint Custody - is it for everyone?
In our research we have become impressed by the
positive consequences of joint custody arrangementsthe personal growth of the father, and the possibility
of having two parents and two homes for the child, thus
providing him or her with extra support and care. In
fact, the publicity attending joint custody cases and
the popularity of such arrangements have been on the rise.
There need to be some special circumstances, however,
which make joint custody workable, and it is important
that these be considered.
A small number . . . "in the legal and mental health
professions have been recommending joint custody as a
means of undoing the blanket lack of consideration for
the rights of fathers often evidenced by the courts. This
has made joint custody into a pseudo-political issue, and
a rallying point for many angry and frustrated fathers who
had been unable, for whatever reason, to arrive at a satisfactory solution to their marital conflict either legally
or informally.
While we are in sympathy with the rights and needs of
disenfranchised fathers, we feel strongl~ that the halftime arrangements which we have described require special
considerations. There may be other ways of ensuring the
involvement of each parent, whether or not they have legal
custody, which do not entail an actual division of the
child's residency. Forcing a child to spend half-time
with a parent (mother or father) who is ill suited for
daily child'care can obviously be as detrimental to the
child's well-being as having no contact at all.
One of the major preconditions of a satisfactory jointcustody arrangement is the possibility of developing and
maintaining a cooperative relationship between the exspouses. As is clear from our narratives of marital
breakup, there is usually a great deal of mutual antagonism.
No matter how civilized a couple wishes t& behave, how
reasonable they are about their separation arrangements,
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The experience of conciliation courts and family law courts
throughout the stat; where joint custody is ordered against the
wishes of one parent is that these orders do not work and the
parents continue to fight.

Continued fighting is certainly not in

the best interest of the child.

In addition, AB 1706 is unduly

restrictive of the Court 1 s latitude in making a decision where
parents are in conflict over the care and control of their children,
and elevates parental rights over children's needs.
this legislation would burden both the con

In our view,

liation and investigation

units and would shift the emphasis on cooperation that now prevails
under the present statute, to the old fault process of competition.
The extreme standard of finding a parent unfit will introduce all
the vitriolic and negative litigation, bringing out the worst in
families, rather than the best, as each attempts to show the other
party is unfit.
Rather than making joint custody presumptive, another approach
might be to provide educational opportunities for families to understand the responsibilitiesinvolved in making a cooperative, or joint
custody arrangement work.

The attached pamphlet is an attempt to

achieve this objective, and might be useful for all families with
young children going through the process of divorce.

In addition,

our Conciliation Court has sponsored seminars for families going
through the process of divorce. Our last seminar was attended by
over 450 persons.• An educational approach seems to make a great
deal of sense, and will help families develop the strength and
skills required to make a joint custodial arrangement.

It will

also help them move beyond the negative intimacy that so often perIf

vades the early stages of the divorce process, to a more fruitful
- 3 -127-

and productive,emotional state that promotes cooperation and is
truly in the best

i~terest

of children.

The definitions contained in AB 2202 are very helpful and
should be added to the law.
In summary, the present joint custody legislation should be
given a chance to work.

More effort should be devoted to educa-

tion, helping families transit this experience, and research into
the effects

upo~

the present law on the lives of children before

new laws. are adopted.

The law should not establish a preference

for any arrangement except the arrangement in the best interest of
children.

Since each family and child is so unique establishing

a preference for the "preferred" way raises many more questions
than answers.

,

- 4 -
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COOPERATIVE PARENTING
FOLLOWING DISSOLUTION:

MARRiAGE AND FAMILY COUNSELING SERVICES
5UPERl0t't COURT COUNTY 01" lOS AN<,Fl
1H NORTH HILl STRrET_ ROOM
LOS A.N<>El~S
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Dear Parent:
Thi; pamphlet is desirJned to help you under·
stand California's law regarding the needs of
your children before, during, and after ciissolution. We hope this information is helpful to
you.
Wh<'H' cllild1"n aw 1nvolv<~d. drv<liC<' <'> nol

!lw '"'d oi your lamliy,

Much will be gained

II

IS

I<~<H'Jdlll/diiOII

your working toqether

as parents to help your children become caring,
responsible adu Its.
This pamphlet was prepared by a committee
of
judges,
mental
health
professionals,
attorneys, and parents with years of experience
in working with parents goinq thmuqh the
process of divorce. The task of ail parents,
whether or not, their marriage continues, is a
responsible one. if you have a good relationship
with your children and they feel your love and
acceptance, they will thrive and grow.

YOUR CHILD NEEDS BOTH OF YOU

Sincerely,

Judge
Family Law Departrnent
& Conciliation Court
Prepared by the Los Angeles Committee
to Implement California's
Joint Custody Statute
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COOPERATIVE PARENTING
PAMPHlET

a nutshell, are the
of child-rearing.
guidelines the
You may have read,
heard about, "joint
custody," and are wondering whether it will
work for
are many different
kinds of
arrangements, which
involves
the children, and
sharing
equal
of
time may
arrangement for your
family depending
needs and capacities
of your children.
custody plan
may allow for the
to spend more time
with one parent, although both parents
continue to share the major decision-making
responsibility
the children. If the
judge decides to award custody to one parent,
among other factors, the judge will consider
which parent is more likely to allow the
children frequent and continued contact with
the other parent.
Whether your custody plan is joint custody,
or sole custody to one parent and visitation to
the other parent, both parents are entitled to
equal access to children's medical, dental,
school and other records.
Remember that it is in your child's best
Jnterest that each parent has frequent and
continuing contact with your child. This is
what we mean by the term, "cooperative
describes how parents
regardless of the
The main
best for your

Divorce is not the end of a family. It is a
reorganization. Children benefit enormously
when the parents cooperate. Children can be
injured when the parents do not cooperate.
This pamphlet will make it easier to cooperate
by briefly explaining the law and giving you
some guidelines to make it work for your
family.
Trained and experienced family counselors
are in the community and in the Court who
may give you as much help as you need to
make a custody arrangement for your family.

WHAT IS THE lAW?
The law gives you the opportunity to make
your own custody plan, or if the two of you
cannot agree, either of you can suggest your
plan to the Court. If the two of you make a
custody plan which follows the guidelines in
the law, the Judge will accept your plan. If you
cannot agree to a plan which follows the guide·
lines after conferences with a Conciliation
Court counselor, the Judge will make the
decision.
The basic rule in child custody is that the
plan must be in the best interest of the child,
including consideration of the child's individual
abilities and needs. Although the parents are
divorced, the declared public policy of the state
is to assure children frequent and continuing
contact with both parents and to encourage
parents to share the rights and responsibilities

evaluated
children's needs.
The

2
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may be found in
of the Civil Code.
have this volume.

WHAT ARE THE NEEDS OF
PARENTS IN THE DISSOLUTION
PROCESS?
The process of divorce from the painful
moment parents decide to end their marriage to
the actual physical separation of family
members - and afterward - is emotionally and
financially stressful on everyone in the family:
mother, father, and children.
Parents are often angry, hostile toward each
other, and unhappy during the dissoulution and
each may think that his or her suffering is
deeper and more longlasting than that of the
other. Each parent may be .experiencing a
sudden wrenching apart and loss of a lifestyle
that had been built over a period of years and
that had served as an anchor to his, or her, life.
Both parents are likely to feel abandoned and
frightened about the future. The physical
separation may leave both unsure of themselves
and concerned over what the divorce may mean
for their children.
Parents often face a new position as single
parents in their community and the necessity
of trying to build a new life, frequently with
no one to turn to for support. Women who
have not maintained a job outside the home in
addition to that of being a homemaker and
parents are faced with the task of building a
new career, a new identity, and providing for
their own support. When the mother has the
entire task of raising the children, she may
feel this responsibility is an awesome burden.
Sometimes, having to cope with all these tasks
at the same time becomes so overwhelming that
some parents stay angry and depressed. Many
may even find it very difficult to begin the task
of rebuilding their lives.

3
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The trauma fathers often experience can be
equally painful. Earnings which may have been
enough for one household, especially a oneincome family, may not be enough for two
homes. Fathers may find ·this increased
financial burden very difficult. In addition,
most parents look to their family for the
closeness, warmth, and nurturing in their lives.
It is difficult and depressing for parents who
leave the household after divorce to be
suddenly alone in a strange place after having
been surrounded for years by the warmth of
the home and children. For parents whose
former spouse moves out of the house and who
may be unaccustomed to household and day-today parenting duties, adjusting to this
unfamiliar lifestyle can be overwhelming and
bewildering. On the other hand, parents
fathers, or mothers, and especially those who
have been involved in day-to-day care and
nurturing of their children, find that separation
from their children can be particularly painful
for both the absent parent and their children.
Since each parent feels lonely, depressed and
abandoned, they cling to the children and have
trouble sharing them with each other. Each
parent feels that contact with the children is a
protection against the terrible loneliness and
isolation while they are adjusting to their new
lives. This is normal and understandable. The
problem is that it is not the best thing for the
children since it creates in them the feeling that
they are desperately needed by each parent and
the children feel a conflict because of loyalty to
both parents.
Although it may be very difficult at a time
when both parents are feeling hurt and angry,
both parents need to try to stop blaming each
other for what went wrong with the marriage,

4

mourn its loss, and begin to work cooperatively
toward a new and more successful relationship
as parents of their children. Family counseling
can be of help to divorcing parents in terms of
understanding and coping with the stress which
all members of the family feel at the time of
the dissolution.
Some parents are afraid of "losing the child"
in a joint custody arrangement. On the
contrary,
cooperative
parenting
should
encourage mutual support and continuing
contact with the children and does not mean
"losing the child." In fact,
custody may
even make the job of
less stressful
because it is shared.

5

trouble sleeping or eating for a brief time, or
seem withdrawn after being with one parent
and the shifting to the othl!r. This stress and
unhappiness shown by the child does not
necessarily mean one or both parents are not
doing a good job of taking care of their
children It means that this is a particularly
important time when children need the comfort
and support of both parents working together
to ease the strain on everybody while all
members of the family go through the process
of reorganizing their lives. It takes patience,
open communication -and time -for children
as well as adults, to adjust to such significant
changes.
Parents can greatly help their children by
trying to understand each child's individual
needs and abilities at a particular age. Children
need to be as free as possible from the
bitterness and resentments that may continue
to exist between fathers and mothers who are
divorcing. The best way to do this is for parents
to keep from making negative remarks about
the other parent in front of the children, or
blaming the other for the divorce. Working
together cooperatively as parents - which is
what is truly meant by "joint custody" -may
lessen the danger of long-term harm to your
children from your divorce, and may help speed
up the process for both parents and their
children to feel good about themselves again.

7
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DEVELOPING A COOPERATIVE
PARENTING PLAN
Finding new ways to resolve disagreements
over child custody issues takes time, it takes a
commitment from both mother and father and
it may take help from others who understand
the difficulties in learning to cooperate as
parents when couples cease to be spouses.
Agencies such as the Conciliation Court, family
counseling agencies, divorce family clinics or
parenting workshops are to help parents develop
a cooperative parenting arrangement.
Suggested steps for developing a cooperative
parenting plan:
1. Sit down and identify the needs of your
children, which are different from your
needs.
2. Think of your role as parents, not as
spouses, and try to separate feelings of anger
and hurt to keep them from interfering with
making decisions as parents. Seek help if you
cannot.
3. Review what you have done together as
parents that worked.
4. Develop an arrangement that continues this
plan where it was successful and provides
continuous, ongoing contact with both
parents. Put it in writing.
5. Think in units of time - work, school,
vacation, and where possible, share the
responsibility for your children's care
around these natural transitions, as well as
other responsibilities, such as dental, medical
appointments, etc.
6. Establish a pattern that works and follow it,
but be flexible if situations change without
insisting on a "fifty-fifty" division.
7. Communicate regarding important events in

8

your child's life, or in you own life that may
affect
talk over problems
Develop
other parent without
Be sure
share
parent may not have seen.
9. Anticipate change and plan for it. Your
will require you to do so.
plan to your child's
Work to adapt
needs.
10. Problems are bound to arise; when things go
focus
"what is wrong" not
"who is wrong."
11. Bury the past, and deal primarily with today
and tomorrow. Try to consider everyone's
needs, but make your decisions in what
interest of
children.

INFORMATION
Contact your attorney, the Los Angeles
Conciliation Court, 974-5524, or any
counseling services listed in
FO Directory.

Persia Wooley
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APPENDIX I
1600 Scott Street
San Francisco, California 94115
(415) 567-8860

October 14, 1981
Elihu M. Harris, Chairman
Assembly Committee on Judiciary
Room 820
11th and L Building
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Mr. Harris:
As director of the Joint Custody Study Project of Jewish Family & Children's
Services in San Francisco, I would like to share with The Assembly Committee
on the Judiciary certain findings pertinent to your consideration of AB 1706,
as I believe passage of this legislation would be extremely premature at this
time. The Joint Custody Study Project was funded from 1978-1980 by The San
Francisco Foundation to explore how joint custody was actually working for
parents and children.
We studied 24 families with 32 children ranging in age from 4! to 15 years.
We examined the psychological experience of these children living in dualhome joint custody arrangements over a number of years. These were families
in which the parents had mutually agreed to joint custody prior to California's
joint custody law (AB 1480), and who were strongly committed to the arrangement. Their decision was congruent not only with their values, their psychological needs and their reliltionships with their children, but also with their
life and work styles. 1\mong the chilracteristics most important to maintaining this cooperative relationship were: 1) trust and mutual respect between
parents; 2) a track record of cooperative parenting during the marriage;
3) congruency of child-rearing values; 4) the capacity to control their
anger; and, 5) a strong value placed on the child having two involved parents. These parents were generally satisfied with the joint custody and
had been successful in maintaining a cooperative, smooth-running arrangement
over a number of years.
The children's experience of their joint custody situation was more mixed
than that of their parents. The beneficial dimensions of joint custody for
these children across the board were: 1) the message that both parents
loved and wanted them, and went to a great deal of effort to jointly care
for them; 2) the cessation of conflict between their parents; 3) access to
both purents.

Constituent Member of the Jewish Welfare Federation and the United Way of the Bay Area
Affiliated with Child Welfare League of America and California Association of Services to Children
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with
that
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AB 1480 is still quite new. I believe we should allow time for more parents
to make use of the
, and to study the effects of
arrangements on different children and families so that social
be based on more
data,
can be
dispassionately. We have a responsibility to the children of divorcing
parents in California to
assess the effects of this
before presuming it is in their best interest.
I would be very glad to
further information to the Comrrtittee in considering the issue of joint custody.

Susan Steinman, DSW
Director Joint
SB
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BY FREDERIC W.
JR., M.D., HOLLY ZINGALE ILFELD,
AND JOHN
ALEXANDER, J.D.

Joint
with both divorced parents sharing childrearing
is a recent and controversial
phenomenon. To the authors' knowledge there have been
no published
outcome studies establishing its
efficacy. The authors present data on 414 consecutive
custody cases in a Los Angeles court over a 2-year period,
rates (indicative of post divorce
parental
and joint custody. ln those
cases which were returns to court, the proportion of
relitigation
was one-half that q(
exclusive
suggesting that joint custody is
arrangement in terms of reduced

oint
has been
for the deleterious
Jnumber
of divorces

a partial solution
on children of the
others have felt
that effective child
joint
there are critical flaws in shared
A great deal of controversy exists on
agree on
data about the effects
which to base their arguments. The
need for information is
acute because social
issue in many states; although
a small percentage of
arrangement is being considnumber of state
u;,.. n,rP in California is
decided
new law of 1980 with its consideration
the best interests of a minor
the
Code· and
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parent only and advocated that the custodial parent,
not court~ or the noncustodial
, should retain
the right to determine when and if visitation will occur.
Benedek and Benedek
have
!here
be some benefits to joint
any evidence they cautioned about several presumed
risks of joint parenting.
Several longitudinal clinical studies have looked at
children of divorce and arrived at conclusions
ive of joint custody. In a
of 60 families
with 130 children in Marin County (California), Wallerstein and Kelly
found that divorce might be
beneficial for the adults but not for the children. The
psychological relationship between the child and each
of his original parents did not diminish in emotional
importance to the child over the
study,
less of the degree of visitation of the noncustodial
parent. Their findings pointed to the
of the
child's continuing relationship with both parents during the postdivorce years whereby each parent would
be responsible for and genuinely concerned with the
child's well-being. They felt that the
hazard
which divorce posed to the psychological health of the
children was in the disruptive or diminished parenting
that might be consolidated within the postdivorce
family arrangements, such as a functional absence of
one parent and an overburdening of responsibility on
the custodial parent. Thus the postdivorce arrangements of continuing contact between the children and
both parents seemed to be most important for the longterm outcome of the children. Both Wallerstein and
Kelly (8) and Heatherington and associates (9) have
further acknowledged the economic, social, and psychological vulnerability of the typical family in which
divorce has occurred, i.e., a family with one custodial
parent and one noncustodial parent.
Another source
has been case histories of
those pioneering families who have
joint
custody. These
have done this
against
familial and legal opposition and were few in number
before the California law of 1980. Several authors(!,
3, 10-12) have taken an in-depth look at the arrangements these families have made and the effects O[l the
children. Ofthese studies Steinman's ( 12) is the most
extensive. She examined the
and
of
living in a joint custody
for children aml
parents of 24 San Francisco
area families. On the
basis of two clinical semistructured interviews with
each family member, she explored issues of parental
relationships, time-sharing, finances, loyalty to each
parent, confusion of the children, problems of geographical distance, and school and
She
concluded that these children had access to both
parents and felt that both parents loved and wanted
them. However, about one-third of the children felt
overburdened by the demands and requirement~ of
two homes and the need to maintain a
presence
in both homes. A major drawback to Steinman's study
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sive custody families.
of success of
exclusive
studies included
parents did not agree
arrangement, so the
question of
for unconsented joint custody
remains unanswered.
Within the past few months
able his data
the
in emotionover boys in
exclusive custody (E.
doctoral
dissertation, 1981, California Graduate Institute, 1100
Glendon Ave., Los
Calif. 90024). His quasifour groups of 20 boys
each (age range, 5-13
in the following
situations:
and exclusive
arrangements
and intact families with
and unhappy marriages.
Throe different tools were used to assess the hoys: the
Louisville Behavior Checklist (parent's rating), the
Inferred Self-Concept Scale (teacher's rating), and the
California Test of Personality (child's rating). Boys of
were
better emotionally
adjusted than boys of exclusive
and of the
unhappily married group on the
scale of the
Louisville Behavior Checklist
and on the
, one-way analysis
Inferred
Scale
of variance). Joint
boys had higher personal
adjustment scores on the California Test of Personality
than did exclusive
but the difference
between the two groups
short
at the
of exclusive
in intact
families with
found no
differences on any of the fhree tests.
Comparing the outcomes of several different types
of
will be the task of this paper, for we have
collected data on parental conamong both joint and
We assume that relitigaare in conflict with
conflict strong enough to
one another and !hal
bring them to the courts has adverse effects on the
children. in -,horL
conflict imtrouhle for !he children. While we realize that
one indicator of whether custody
works well tor the children. it does seem to be an
objective measure
parental conflicts.
our
show a clear superiority of
In this
joint custody over exclusive custody. A subset of our
sample ( 18 cases) is a rather controversial group-those familie~ who have been awarded joint custody
withoU! the consent of both parents. Although small in
number, this
1s an
group, for it
speaks to the
of whether joint custody can
work even when one of the
has this form of
custody forced on him or her by court mandate. Even
in this subsample we found the amount of post divorce
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conflict to be no

than that in the exclusive
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suggesting (tentatively, due to the small sample size)
that unconsentedjoint custody is no more disruptive in
terms of parental conflict than exclusive
Furthermore, of the 6 relitigations, 2 were settled out
of court by agreement of the parties involved.

DISCUSSION

!;;: ....

Over a period of 2 years the West District Department J of the Los Angeles County Superior Court had
414 consecutive custody cases, two-thirds inv.elving
exclusive custody and one-third joint custody. ln
those cases which were returns to court, the proportion of relitigation for joint custody families was onehalf that of exclusive custody families. From our
preliminary study (including a small subsample in
which joint custody was decreed without the consent
of one of the parents), we conclude that the custody
arrangement most beneficial in terms of lack of subsequent parental conflict is joint custody. !Of wur~e.
time-sharing and other specific arrangements will vary
according to the circumstances of each family.!
An alternative interpretation of our finding'> is that
the courts awarded joint custody to those parents who
appeared more able to cooperate without court supervision, thus predisposing to a lower relitigation rate for
joint custody. Since the precise basis of the court's
decision is not known, we cannot directly test this
interpretation. However, our data, which show that a
higher proportion of exclusive custody awards were
based on parental agreement than was the case for
joint custody awards (91% versus 86%), do not support this interpretation.
We make two assumptions in drawing conclusion'>
from these data. First, following evidence from Wallerstein and Kelly (8), we assume that problems with
children's adjustment atler divorce are due more to the
postdivorce arrangement and amount of conflict than
to the divorce itself. Second, we assume that relitigation over a custody issue represents moderate to
severe parental conflict that adversely all'ech the
children. Given these assumptions, our findings and
those of Pojman carry suggestions for future re"carch
and perhaps for social policy and family law. Considering that the best interests of the children are foremost, all professionals should recognize a strong.
positive indication for joint custody. Unless future
data persuasively contradict our and Pojman · s findings, the burden of proof that joint custody would not
be in a child's best interests should be on the parent
requesting sole custody.
In addition to our relatively short follow-up period,
other limitations of the data point the way for future
investigations. To begin with, we have not examined
the children firsthand. Furthermore, we have no information on how each family put the custody order into
practice. For instance, how did joint custody familie'
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allocate
between the two homes'! How
much visitation with the noncustodial parent occurred
in the exclusive
families? Were both parents
decision
more in joint custoinvolved in
dy than exclusive
arrangements? To what
extent was a written
formulated and made a part
of the court mandate? Such information would be
important in determining the components of joint
custody that make it more workable than exclusive
custody.
Beyond the
made by each
family, other factors, such as level of income: race or
ethnicity: age<.;, sex. and number of children; and
may well inRugeographic proximity of the
ence the success of a particular custody arrangement.
In future studies such factors as these need to be taken
into account in assessing outcome. In addition. any
future study should extend at least 2 years beyond the
initial custody decision to ensure adequate time for
follow-up. We plan to continue monitoring the present
sample of eu~tody cases if they reappear in the Santa
Monica court to sec whether the trends reported
herein continue to hold, and we hope to have a future
report on such long-term, follow-up data. We hope
that other investigators will collect comparative data
on different custody arrangements and that future
social policy and family law will be based on such
factual information rather !han on historical precehypothetical speculation. or the
dent, social
adversarial milieu of the
system.
Further research needs to document the eltects of
custody on
and on the children. As for which factors of
cu-;tody arrangement
lead to a successful outcqme, we have our
own hypothe'>es based on others' and our own clinical
experience, which
be tested in future studies.
First, we
that the more
the timebetween the parents. the better the chance for
successful outcome
the children. Second. we antica mandated written plan covering the
ipate that
common is~uc;; fa..:ed in
decision making. -.uch as
that suggc;,tcd
(I), should prove more
beneficial than
such guidelines unstated. A
part of ~uch a plan
include, for example, defined
actions
such li~ted
as cohabitation, remarriage, or one parent's move from the
area. Third, the children ~hould do better the closer
the parents live to one another, especially if they are in
the same school district. Last, we hypothesize that
those joint cu~tody familie~ should do better who have
agreed to (or had mandated
the court) a process of
mediation and arbitration specified for m<~ior decisions
when family consensus cannot be reached. This last
point sugge..,ts a changing role for mental health professionals in custody decisions and deserves further
comment.
Until now mental health professionals have participated in the custody process a~ expert consllitanh
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(13). In the adversarial arena of the legal system we
have had to assess the family and recommend a choice
between the two parents. With no-fault decisions. in
which custody is retained fum.:tiona!ly hy both father
and mother, we may lose this role of court consultant
and evaluator. (An important exception occurs when
one or both parents may be abusive to the child.)
However, we may gain several new functions. First,
we can help the separating family to develop a joint
custody arrangement that meets that family's needs.
Outside of the win/lose atmosphere of the courh. a
divorcing couple should lind it easier to work through
the details of a custody plan when assisted by the
skilled coilahoration of counselors and lawyers. Several multidisciplinary clinics oriented to this primary
prevention function of counseling for divorce and
custody have already started in California. A second
potential function for mental health professionals is
that of mediator and arbitrator when the parents and
children in a joint custody arrangement cannot agree
on major decisions. Whether an arbitration clause is
agreed to by both parents and/or mandated by court
judgment, this measure will provide a partial way to
resolve parental conflict without returning to the court
system, which drains economic resources and fo'iters
more contlict. New role-; such a" these need to he
explored and developed as mental health profe.,sionals
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Comm~Uee

I. STUD1ES AVVRESSING THE ISSUE THAT JOINT CUSTODY IS PRESUMABLY IN THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CH1LV ANV THAT THE BURDEN OF PROUF THAT JOINT CUSTOVY WOULV NOT BE IN
CHILD'S BEST 1 NTEREST SHALL BE UPON Tfi[ PARENT REQULSTING SOL[ CUSTODY;.

A

a.nd Kelly - ..Lo :the. ma.jo'L f>:tudy o6 c.IW.dflen ufl dJ.voflc.e - 131 chJ-i'dflen; 5 rr'l ~.;
eondudv., :th.a:t '':the. JLe.l£LtioMiup and pbyehoiogic.a.J: Jmpotltanc.e between .the. c.luJ'd rwd
both o!Uginai pMen:t..6 did not dJ.mA.n..L6h in emo:tuma.f i.mpoJt..ta.nc.e to thl.' ctuf.d
ove.JL 5 ye.aJLf>."
"Taken a.f> a whoie ou!t t)Jnd.i.ng6 poi.nt to Uw.
.i.flabi.tdy
o6 :the. chJ!d' .& co~nu.Lng netatioMhA_p w..Lth both pMe.n..t~ duJU.ng :the. po.:,;t:-d;votzce
yeaJLf> in an a!L!Langement wh.Lc.h e.nabie;., each pMe.n..t -to be Jte-OpoMJ.bie 6otr. and
ge.nuineiy c.onc.e.Jtned with the. we.U-bun.g o6 the chJ.e.dtr.en.. 11

Waile.JL~.>:te~t.

o 6 Will ellA .tun' .& .e etteJt .to E.U.hu H~ o t\ May 7 • 198 1-.otate-6 that .the.Jte. i.6 no -'!.Me.a!tc.h bhow-i.ng tha.t joA..nt c.u.!J.tody .i.J.J a beA';te/L evurangement
6oJL ail ch.Lidne.n in dA.vohcing 6a.m..L£i.e/6. Th.i.6 {6 a m.{J.>..Cvde!rp.'letat.i.on o{J A.B. 1106
.t>incethe. bill .opec~M.e.}.. o:the/1 uptiml6 be..6{deo Joint r!l6tody ohou.fd they be {n
-the chJld' .6 be-O.t A.rdeJLM:t.
d'aJ.m.o the/I.e Me no .otudJ.eJ.J o6 ju.int cuHodu Ju>cutzd<Hn <~uccclde& and {Jai.fuflr.6. Siuce
heA May ietteJ!. :the. U6eld/Afexande!r and the PoJman &tud<.e_.o have been p!tCI.le.nteJ
.thax do indeed a.f>Je.M .ouccV->.6 and 6a..Ltuhe o 6 j oA.n..t
Ste..inman' 0
.t>.tudy i.6 not the. oniy one. o6 a.Me.Mme.nt o6 :the c.h.LidJum (.oee Po
c.iairn.& young c.hld'Le.n may be .thoubted bu thr_ c.han9e ..Cn envi.Jronment,
hen own
concl.u.t>~OM empha.f>.ize. the ~ac.t young clt.ifdtten af6o m'ed eon.t{nlli¥19 runtact wit/1
bo-th pMe.n.U .
he.JL c.o-au.thoJL, Joan Ke.U.y, fuagfl.eeJ.J w.Uh hell about both pMenU lwvJng to agJt.ee.
that the.Jte be. joint cu6tody 6oft j oA.nt C£M:tody to ac.tua.Uy woJtk,
note .that the W/K .o:tudy .t>how.& :the h.<gh amoun..t o6 damage to c.hJ.id'Le.n o6 dJ.voJtce.
ail ofi whom wette. in ~oie c.!l6tody MMngeme.n..t-6.

~que.

Steinman - a good e.xamina:Uon o6 :the expefl..Le.nce and J.mpa.c.t o6 R.iv.i_ng in a jo~n-t c.!l6tudy
.oUua.tion 6o!t patr.en:t.6 and chJid!!e.n.
P!tabiem.t>: 1) dov., not have a c.ompa!lMon gJtoup o6 Mie c!l6:tody 6a.miUM to compMe
outc.ome..6 6oJt join..t v.o . .oote eu~.~:tody.
2) JLe.ac.he-O c.on.d!l6JoM thax a.lt e umlJMJLented by hM data
.oueh a.f> the. (.,ac.t
.tha.t ma.,Ut:ta...ln..Lng a l.l.thong p!LMenc.e. in both homeJ.J .La a phobiem -in
joint c!l6:tody. Might not :tiU.o i.o.oue o6 l!..oya.J:-ty and con6!!6ion be
ovpn g!te.a.te.JL A_n .oote cul.tod!f a!L!LW19eme.nt.6 than -in
nt e!l6todu?
Ta.kel> :the. attitude. :tha.t j .c. ne.ed.o mo!te ~.;,;tudy be601te we. 11 embJta.c.e ..Lt a.f>
a b!!oadiy applicable policy." TIU.o concl.u.o~on doe..o not a;t aU t)oH.ow
6JLom heJt. data. lndeed, ~.>he. eahUVl ac.lmowiedge..o -the phove.n 6auf.U,
a6 .t>oie eu6:tody {fuJtupUon o6 !te£a.U.on6hip wdh 6atheJL) and thevt
demo~thiL:te..o with heh da;ta. the. g e.rH?Aaily po~d~ve outcome. o 6 j u..int
c.w.dody J.n :tha-t "the c.hud'Len weAe. a.,Uached and had b:{·}wng R.oyaf! ttr
to bo:th (pM e.n:t 6 l . "
NOH THAT NO DATA OR FACTS ARE PRESlNHV LW OPPONENTS OF A.B. 1706 IN THEIR LETTERS
TO ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOfr.~
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Number Two

19

214
an order aw,mrdinll
both parents and
the parents in such a way as to assure the child or
shared
children of frequent and
contact with both parents;
provided,
that such order may award
legal custody without awarding joint physical custody.•

joint custody the court must
rrang~~m1mt to
the
interests of the
presume
child(ren).s When
has
for joint
reasons for
custody, the court
denial of an award
of
"the court
sole custody is
among other factors, which parent is more
the child(ren) frequent and continuing contact
noncustodial parent. " 11
Until passage of
California was governed,
as most states
to
by a
statute
providing that custody
awarded
following order of
according to
best interpreference: (1) to either
ests of the child; (2) to
person(s)
whose home the
a wholesome and stable environchild has been living
ment; and (3) to any other person or persons deemed by the
court to be suitable and able to provide adequate and
proper care and guidance for the child. The exclusive possession of children by one parent after divorce is a venerable tradition in the Western world; however, the view of
which parent is to be
preferred custodian
changed
in response to changes
prevailing psychological theory
and in the economic division
labor. In the nineteenth
children were viewed as part of a facentury, for
ther•s property; thus fathers were preferred as exclusive legal custodians after divorce:
As to the question of the
of a father to have custody of his
infant child, in a
sense it is true. But this is not an ac•
•
•
•

ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.

at 4600.5(c}.
at § 4600.5(a).
at 4600.5(b).
at § 4600(b)(l).
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count of any absolute right but for the benefit of the infant, the
law presuming it to be for hie interest to be under the nurturance and care of his natural protector, both for maintenance
and education.•

With the Industrial Revolution and the increasing sexual division of labor, Victorian women became the idealized
protectors of children, family life and familial values:
"There is but a twilight zone between a mother's love and
the atmosphere of heaven, and all things being equal, no
child should be deprived of that maternal influence.'"'~ In
more modern times the combined influences of psychoanalytic theory, maternal deprivation research and the continued division of sex roles have perpetuated the practice of
awarding women exclusive custody of children after divorce.
Pressures to change this view of children's best interests in
divorce have their roots in at least two sources. The impetus for change comes in part from recent psychological
studies which show the detrimental effects, on both children and parents, of postdivorce parental conflict and sole
custody arrangements. These studies represent a shift in
scientific interest and emphasis from the inherent trauma
of the divorce experience to a study of external variables
which affect response and adjustment to divorce-such as
the nature of the adjudication process and the structure of
the custodial arrangement itself. Other major sources of
change are the legal profession's mounting ambivalence toward its Solomonic task of choosing between fit parents and
the practical inability of the courts to process the increasing
numbers of custody disputes.
II.

THE SHIFT IN SciENTIFIC REsEARCH

Most studies on the impact of divorce give lip service
to the idea that divorce is not experienced in the same way
by all families. Most divorce research, however, has endorsed the assumption that divorce is inherently traumatic
• United States v. Green, 26 F. C11.11. 30, 31-32 (D.R.I. 1824).
1
Tuter v. Tuter, 120 S.W.2d 203, 206 (Mo. App. 1938).
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and that an intact nuclear family is the ideal environment
in which to raise children. 8 Data gathered primarily from
clinical populations have been used to support theoretical
models which analogize the divorce process to mourning•
and to attachment and separation anxiety. HI Both of these
models focus on the psychological impact of divorce and explain behavior by comparing divorce to other stressful life
transitions.
In more recent years studies have begun to examine
critically the assumption that divorce is inherently traumatic. Many intervening variables have been suggested as
affecting the extent to which divorce is damaging, including
the organization of postdivorce custody arrangements. 11
The family interaction model suggests, for example, that
new patterns of communication and interaction between divorced parents, their children and any new family members
have an impact beyond any individual's psychological
response. 12 By pointing to the effects of the postdivorce
environment as a critical factor in the response to divorce, Gardner 13 also supports the premise that divorce
per se need not produce psychopathology. Roman 14 and
AbarbanePG describe the methodological shortcomings in
• See, e.g., Derdeyn, Child Custody Contests in Historical Perspective, 133
AM. J. PSYCH. 1369-76 (1976).
8
See generally R. GARDNER, PsYCHOTHERAPY WITH CHILDREN OF DIVORCE
(1976); F. Haja, Reconstituted Families in Family Therapy (unpublished paper
cited in A. Abarbanel, Joint Custody Families: A Case Study Approach (1977)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, California School of Professional Psychology));
R. WEISS, MARITAL SEPARATION (1975).
•• See generally H. GINOTT, BETWEEN PARENT AND CHILD (1965) and ExPLAINING DIVORCE TO CHILDREN (E. Grollman ed. 1969).
11
Trombetta & Lebbos, Co-Parenting: Everyone's Best Interest, 17 CONCILIATION CouRTs REV. 13-25 (1979).
" Broderick, Beyond the Five Conceptual Frameworks: A Decade of Development in Family Theory, 33 J. MARR. & FAM. 139 passim (1971). See also M.
RoMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT 48 passim (1979).
" See generally R. GARDNER, supra note 9.
,. M. RoMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 12, at 48-54.
•• A. Abarbanel, Joint Custody Families: A Case Stydy Approach (1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, California School of Professional Psychology), at 713.
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tently, cope

gether."11
restricted array of
married parents.21

•• E. Hetherington, M.
Emotional and Cognitive De•velc•pmtent
presented at Symposium
at
(May 17-20,
•• J. Greif, supra note 17, at 6-8.

the Social,
Divorce (paper
Priorities, Washington, D.C.)

•• /d.

•• E. Hetheringtan, M. Cox &

Cox, supra note
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•• !d. at 15.
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E. The
Noncustodial

ings pose ne'ver'tm~tel~S
custody
dian and rel,egsttUJig
This and
problems
Noncustodial
miliar
the necessity to
6

is

65 (1951) .
.. Wallerstein & Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the
Child in Early Latency, 46 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 20-32 (1976).
u Weiss, The Emotional Impact of Marital Separation, 32 J. Soc. Issul!8
135-46 (1976).
PsYCH. MONOGRAPHS

•• See, e.g.,
Marital Separation,
or DIVORCE: PuaCR!I'TIONs FOR

Well-Being During
AMERICAN WAY

(1975); R. Wsrss,

MARITAL SEPARATION

(1975); Wallace, Mazeway Disintegration:
Individual's Perception of Socio·
Cultural Disoraanization, 16 HuMAN ORGANIZATION 23-27
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loss of his child. 36
The sense of role
tions such as the schools,
cuss a child's performance
todial parent. Noncustodial nSJ·en1ts
with their children generally
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loss. The conclusion that it is not
children, but the experience
ship with them, that is eK~o-~:u:ouucmlK slmr•or1ts
Erikson, Biller and others
of such involvement oaJrenttlit2
ment. 37
One study reported
made fewer maturity o.emetncls
consistent, had
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greater authority and
•• See, e.g., Gub:rium, Marital Desolation
Life in Old Age, 36 J. MARR. & FMI!.
.. See note 18 supra .
•• ld .
.. ld.
" J. Greif, Child Absence: Fathers' Per•~ent.lons
Children Subsequent to Divorce (1977) (unJpub'lish!ld
University).
"" E. Hetherington, M.
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study notes that
combined needs of the children may
be intolerable to the emotionally unsupported solitary parent. Since the emotional requirements of children are very
likely to take the form of demands for physical attention or
personal service, the remaining parent may be subject to
physical as well as emotional exhaustion. " 39
Perhaps because it is he who usually leaves the home
and suffers the trauma of separation from his children, the
divorced father seems to undergo greater initial changes in
self-concept than the mother, although the effects appear to
last longer in the mother. 40 Mothers have reported feeling
physically unattractive and helpless; fathers complain of
not knowing who they are and of feeling rootless. Divorced
parents have also expressed the feeling that they have
failed as parents and as spouses, and that they function
poorly in social situations. In fact, "the amount of time a
parent spends with a child does directly affect his or her
competence in dealing with that child."' 1
It is a mistake to assume, of course, that these
problems are experienced by all divorcing parents. In addition, some stresses tend to be common; still others are associated with the different roles of custodial versus noncustodial parent. Finally, professionals may offer different
theories of the divorce process to explain the symptoms
they encounter. However, despite these qualifications and
the fact that most people eventually cope successfully with
many of their divorce-related problems, "the course of adjustment is often unexpectedly painful. " 42

Existing studies indicate that the following factors
seem to be particularly important in adult adjustment to
divorce: (1) The development of a satisfactory heterosexual
•• Glasser & Navarre, Structural Problems of the One-Parent Family, 21 J.
Soc. IssuES 107 (1965).
•• See note 18 supra.
•• J. Greif, supra note 17, at 9.
.. Hetherington, Cox & Cox, supra note 18, at 35.
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•• Payne & Pittard,
(1969).

115-24

224

JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW

[Vol. 19

anger toward each other. Several support systems have
been associated with more effective functioning of the custodial parent and
or her child-for example, friends,
grandparents and siblings. However, none of these seem as
salient as a continued, positive, mutually supportive relationship between the divorced couple and the continued involvement of the noncustodial parent with the child. 114 To
the extent that parental dysfunction affects children adversely, sociological studies seriously challenge also the assumption that sole custody arrangements serve the best interests of children.
III.

JuDiciAL REsPONSEs TO CHILD CusTODY ADJUDICATION

Simultaneously with the new research being conducted
on divorce, the number of custody disputes has risen dramatically-increasing the legal profession's discomfort with
"playing Solomon." In 1960 American courts decided the
custody of over 400,000 children. In 1970 the number
doubled to 870,000. 1111 While psychologists emphasize the
damage caused by parental conflict and absence, legal professionals point to conditions within the legal system which
prevent the realization of the best interests of children and
parents.
A number of legal commentators see the lack of behavioral science training among judges and attorneys as a
prime obstacle preventing the courts from making custody
rulings and recommendations appropriate to· the needs of
divorcing families. One writer suggests, for example, that
judges become familiar with Erikson's stages of child development and use that framework to decide which parent's
custody will provide healthier development of the child. 116
Professor Watson advocates the appointment of behavorial
.. Hetherington, Cox & Cox, supra note 18, at 33.
•• Gozansky, Court-Ordered Investigation in Child Custody Cases, 12 WiL·
LAMETTE L.J. 511 passim (1976).
" Batt, Child Custody Disputes: A Developmental-Psychological Approach
to Proof and Decision Making, 12 WlLLAMETTE L.J. 491 passim 0976).
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58,
176-78; Note, Lawyering
Child: Princi·
ples of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes
from Divorce,
87 YALE L.J.
passim (1978).
" Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody
Children
Divorce, 12 U.
CAL. D. L. REv. 523 passim
M. Ramey,
Stender & G. Dunn, Report of
the California Women Lawjers'
(unpublished paper)
(San Francisco 1977), at
Whose Time
Has Come, 16 CoNCILIATION CouRTS REv. 23-25 {1978}; Gaddis, Joint Custody of
Children: A Divorce Decision-Making Alternative, 16 CoNCiliATION CouRTS REV.
17-22 (1978).
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parties.
Future trends
litigation
statutes will depend also on the advice
to clients by their attorneys.
Equally important if not more so are the expertise, sensitivity and creativity of professional dispute processors within
the court system (in Conciliation Court,
example) and in
the private sector, who are being called upon more frequently to intervene in custody disputes.
continues to show that maintenance of parent-child bonds and
parental cooperation ease adjustment to divorce, these findings will support attempts to generate joint custody rulings
and nonadversarial dispute resolution. The successful implementation of a coparenting public policy depends also on
the extent to which parents themselves resist the temptation to vent their hostilities in the courtroom-a practice
which undoubtedly serves to confirm the courts' traditional
assumption that divorcing parents cannot share childrearing successfully.
Finally, implementing shared parenting and nonadversarial conflict resolution successfully between divorcing parents will depend upon the existence of adequate legislative
guidelines and support services. Given our long tradition of
custody litigation and competition for exclusive custody
awards, cooperative coparenting will not come about simply
by telling parents to "do it." In addition, child custody is an
emotionally charged area in the law and in society. Therefore we cannot simply trust that parents will remember
that it would be best if
stopped
and allowed
their children continued and equal access to both mother
and father.

V.

CHANGING THE WAY CHILD CusTODY

DETERMINED

Our
structure
must
what is
in fact in
best interests of
and adults, even if
individual parents must overcome some psychological resistance to doing so. How
law can protect children's relationships to both parents after divorce and encourage par-
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ents to come to mutual custody agreements rather than
fighting each other to gain a dubious "victory" is the subject of the following proposal.
A. Removing Child Custody from a Win or Lose, All or
Nothing Presumption

The first, most basic step to take is to change the starting point or premise for determination of child custody,
thus changing the nature and course of the process itself.
Instead of a win or lose, all or nothing presumption, there
must be a presumption of consensus, equality and the protection of parent-child bonding. The courts in effect must
say to parents, "We don't care how you feel about each
other. As long as there is no clear, convincing evidence that
either of you is abusive and unfit to be a parent, our assumption is that you are both qualified to continue as parents, albeit under different circumstances." The reader will
recall that the new California statute on joint custody
makes it an equal first choice with sole custody. Only when
both parents agree to shared custody is it presumed to be
in the child's best interests.
Presuming joint custody as a first stage in resolving a
custody dispute eliminates the necessity
proving which
parent should "have" the children; there is no battle because there is no contest and no prize to win. There is no
loyalty conflict because children do not have to choose between parents and one parent does not need to convince the
child that the other parent is less fit. Thus the kinds of
problems that exist under the present system-courtroom
litigation, friends and relatives taking
thousands of
dollars spent on attorney and expert
fees
culty in enforcing the resulting "treaty"
would be reduced substantially or avoided by this simple,
legal
presumption of equal protection of the
status of
both parties. This parallels our presumption in criminal
cases that one is innocent until proven guilty. At present,
however, custody statutes, by stating that children will be
awarded to either parent, are
must
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arrangement in cases
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agree that sole
preferable.

B.

Creating a Neutral

Mandatory Mediation Process

The next step is to develop a mechanism whereby the
delegation
may
arranged and consensus
reached on the present and future care of the children.
Again, the full authority of the law
stand behind
is best-the development of a cuswhat we know or
tody arrangement by consent of the parties, not by mandate of the state. Parents
not like each other or interact in order to share the rights
responsibilities of
parenthood. What parents
need
and after divorce
is a neutral setting
which to work out existing hostilities
and then develop the terms of their arrangement or at least
express their differences to a neutral party who can then
report to the court if necessary.
In the United States today there is almost no official
legal pressure brought to bear on
to clarify or compromise their differences. Even
courts hesitate
to recommend counseling if one parent
not agree to
such an effort. AU a parent need do to prevent compromise
it
directly to
courtroom where
is to
out the
a total
present law and custom
"victory." The elements which
in the
courtroom are
same criteria a counselor would
experiencing
use to detemine the
interests of a
divorce.
What this second change entails,
is the creation
of a neutral but mandatory llJ.C'UUll"'u'u process responsible
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to the court rather than to either party, a minimum mediation period in which issues can be resolved or compromised
and a recommendation to the court which reflects the parental agreement or suggestions of the counselor. One basic
consideration which should guide both counselor and court
is which arrangement will have the effect of increasing the
child(ren)'s chances to receive the most nurturing and involvement possible from both parents. If responsibility cannot be delegated equally, control should be delegated in
favor of the parent who is most likely to encourage and respect the child's relationship with the other parent. By contrast, under today's custom of choosing between parents,
control tends t() go to the parent who is most adamant
about excluding the other, mounts the strongest courtroom
battle and is least open to the idea of coparenting.
Whatever the parents' responses to mediationwhether they reach an agreement or not-neither parent
should be threatened with the loss of his or her child, just
as children should not have to face the loss of a parent. As a
last resort, the precise division of time and delegation of
responsibilities may need to come under the court's jurisdiction. Even when parties are highly antagonistic, the
court can still protect each parent's right to be a parent,
and each parent's obligation not to interfere in the areas
delegated to the other party. In fact, there is far less reason
and motivation to interfere if each parent's status and role
is clearly protected and equitably delegated.

C.

When Joint Custody Might Be Detrimental

There may be times when a parent believes sincerely
that joint custody is detrimental to a child or that the other
parent is unfit. In such cases parties should have the option
of bringing these issues before the court, but only after proceeding through a process of neutral investigation or
mediation.
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While traditional assumptions about child custody after divorce have
challenged by psychological research
and by pressures from within the legal
itself,
shared parenting and joint custody represent new family
patterns which require further evaluation.
studies are
required to relate differences in custodial arrangements to
differences in families' short- and long-term adjustment to
divorce, to the quality of the parent-child relationship, to
the degree of conflict between divorced parents over time
and to the functioning of the larger network of individuals-school teachers, for example-who participate in the
nurturing and education of children. Equally important are
studies of the custody adjudication system-the role of the
attorney in influencing the outcomes of custody disputes
should be examined, as well as the impact of nonadversarial
alternatives to formal litigation.
It is to be hoped that future changes our
and in
the judicial management of custody disputes will represent
constructive dialogue and creative compromise between different points of view. Public policy in areas related to family life, mental health and child development must be
guided not by uninformed public opinion or narrow self-interest, but by research which reveals the effects of existing
laws and services, and their relationship to the needs of
children and parents. Such studies, as well as contributions
from dispute processors and legal and mental health practitioners, can play a major role in public and private efforts
to ease this period of transition in American family life.
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APPENDIX'M

HASTER LIST OF PARENTING RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS*
Religion
Parents will be free to take their child to church of their choice when child
is in their care.
Educat.on
Both parents will be free to participate in the child's school activities,
including teacher conferences & extracurricular activities, & homework.
Mother will be in charge of school enrollment (choice of school/teacher).
Medical and Dental
Each parent will take charge of eaergency medical decisions when child is
in their care. Regular medical and dental care (choice of doctor/dentist
and decisions regarding long.term interventions such as allergy treatments
or orthodontia) will be the responsibility of the father. P~rents will
immediately inform. each other of emergencies. Costs will be shared accordin& to the terms ot the financial settlement.
Lessons and Cultuml EQricht;~ent
Parents
will be permitted to enroll th&
child in lessons and
activities of their choice, provided that such enrollment does not
overlap
with the time during which the child resides with the other
parent. Parent assumes cost or his/her planned acitivites.
Recreation
Both parents are free to arrange and participate in recreational activities
with their child, provided that such activities do not interfere with
activities or plans during the child's stay with the other parent. BY MUTUAL
DEC IS ION AliD AGREE!v!ENT, PARENTS MAY CHOOSE TO COOPERATE IN PROVIDING LESSONS
AND ACTIVITIES.
Life Insurance
Each parent will choose the type of insurance and insurance benefits
desired with regard to their ch1ld.(or can be spelled out in financial
settlement)
Holidays
In even-numbered years the mother will have the child on the following
holidays
; in odd numbered years, the father will have the
child.(Other more elaborate schemes can be worked out, as they typically
are in sole-custody orders)
Child Care
Each parent will be responsible for providipg child care and babysitting
when the child is in their care.
Communication with Child 9f the Other Parent
Parents will limit their telephorecalls i;o other parent's home to ......... except
in emergencies.
Add1 tional issues to be spelled out': Time
between homes; Vacation
-168-
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f.

DIFFEBRNCES BETWEEN SOLE-CUSTODY AND JOINT-CUSTODY
ORDERS
Joint Custody

Sole Custody
1. Order must be followed
to be successful

1. Order must be followed to
be successful

2. Must be close enough to
both parents• wishes to prevent
further litigation

2. Must be close enough to both
parents• wishes to prevent
further litigation

J. Would benefit from a built-

J. Would benefit from a built-

4. No order can anticipate all

4. No order can anticipate all

5. Sole custody does not require
any one, particular living
arrangement (sole custody orders
vary from family to family)

5. Joint custody does not require

one/ particular living arrangement~
Can be suited to family's ciroumstances

6. Parents mnst refrain from

6. Parents must refrain from

in plan for future conflict
resolution (e.g. mediation or
binding arbitration)

in plan for conflict resolution
(mediation; binding arbitration

the problems/changes encountered
during child's 18 years

the problems/changes encountered
during a child's life

infringing on each other's
specified ·"territory" for order
to be successful

infringing on each other's
specified "territory" for order
to be successful

7. Sole custody orders are often
brief, concentrating on scheduling
of time w. child

7• Joint custody orders require
specification of responsibilities
to be carried out by each parent

8. In a sole custody order, one

8. Netther parent

9. One way to stop a fight is to
declare one person the winner and
the other the loser, & hope the
loser ldll give up {give in).
Children are better off if their
parents stop fighting.

9. Another way to stop a fight is

has gained or
lost custody; both have maintained
their parental roles

parent has "won" custody and the
other "lost."

to declare both parents "winners"

& help them develop a workable

parenting plan, or give them one to
follow. Children benefit if
parents stop fighting and children
remain close to both parents.
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October 6, 1981

TO:

Members of the Assembly Judiciary Committee

FROM:

Lettie Young

RE:

Hearing on Joint Custody and Child Support

On October 14, 1981, the Assembly Judiciary Committee will
hold an interim hearing on the family law issues of joint
custody and child support. The hearing is scheduled to
begin at 10:00 a.m. in the Sunrise Room of the Town and
Country Hotel, 500 Hotel Circle North, in San Diego.
The purpose of this memorandum is to provide background
information on these topics.
In addition, related articles
have been enclosed in the hearing booklet.
Joint Custody of Children
In 1979, legislation which specifically authorizes California courts to order joint cus
of children was enacted [AB 1480 (Imbrecht}, Chapter 915, Statutes of 1979].
Prior statute had provided that, where custody was disputed, an award could be made to
parent according
to the best interests of the child.
Because of that law,

1

Despite the statutory direc
that cus
should be
awarded to either parent, the
of
In re
Marriage of Neal, 94 Cal.
834 (1979),held that a
trial court had jurisdiction to order joint custody on the
basis of the "necessary or proper" language
Civil Code
Section 4600.

......,"
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the most prevalent form of child custody was so
custody,
usually awarded to the mother with reasonable visitation
granted to the father.
AB 1480 stated the new public policy of assuring that minor
children have frequent and continuing contact with both
parents after the parents' separation or marriage dissolution.
It further stated that, to effect this policy, parents should be encouraged to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing. Consequently, the court, may now
award, as the first order of preference, custody to both
parents jointly £E to either parent, according to the child's
best interests [Civil Code Section 4600{b) (1)]. A rebuttable
presumption that joint custody is in the child's best interests arises when the parents have agreed to joint custody
{Civil Code Section 4600.5(a)]. Absent an agreement, either
parent may request joint custody, and the court may then
order an investigation to assist in its determination of the
award [Civil Code Section 4600.5(b)].
If joint custody is
denied in either instance, the court must state its reasons
for denying the award.
The court, moreover, in awarding
sole custody must consider, among other factors, which parent is more likely to allow frequent and continuing contact
with the noncustodial parent.
It cannot prefer one parent
as custodian because of that parent's sex.2
Consistent with the policy of joint custody, Civil Code
Section 4607 requires that disputed custody or visitation
must be mediated, even if the county has no fami
conciliation court. A family conciliation court, in addition to
mediating custody and visitation, may assist parties to formulate a plan for implementing the custody order or to resolve
arguments that arise over implementation.
Although the j
custody statute has been in effect for
only a short time, measures to revise the law have already
been proposed. AB 1706 (Kapiloff} was heard by this Committee and referred to interim study. AB 2202 (Imbrecht)
is pending
this Committee.
The major arguments articulated by proponents of AB 1706 and other persons dissatisfied with the joint custody law are
sted below.
1.

Critics of the joint custody law claim that many
judges, family law practitioners, and mental
health professionals are still predisposed toward

2 civil Code Section 4600 was amended in 1972 to delete
the provision that "other things being equal, custody should
be given to the mother if the child is of tender years."
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sole maternal custody. This preference, it is
argued, adversely affects all parties in a custody dispute. Fathers become visitors; mothers
are burdened with the sole re
ibil
of
child rearing; children, in e
, lose a parent.3
Proponents of AB 1706 claim that until joint custody is clearly made the first preference in
awarding custody, the policy of AB 1480 will not
be carried out.
2.

Current law permits an award of joint legal custody without awarding joint
ical custody.
Critics argue that the court's authority to order
joint legal custody without physical custody undercuts the aim of frequent and continuing contact
between parent and chi1n.4

3.

Under current law, a rebuttable presumption
favoring joint custody arises when the parents
agree to it. Critics believe that the burden
of proof in a custody dispute should be placed
instead on the parent who seeks sole costody, as
provided in AB 1706.

4.

If an application for joint custody is denied by
the court, reasons must be stated for denying
the award. Critics assert that in fact reasons
are not being stated where joint custody
denied.

3This argument is the thrust of The Disposable Parent:
the Case for Joint custody by M. Roman and w. Haddad (New
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1978). In contrast,
the conclusions of J. Goldstein, et al.
Beyond the Best
Interests of the Child {New York: Free Press, 1973), favor
an award of sole custody to the child's "psychological parent." According to Beyond the Best Interests of the Child,
the child's need for stability and continuity in the divorce situation can be satisfied best when a sole custody
order is final and not subject to modification. Thus, the
noncustodial parent would have no legally enforceable right
of visitation.
In recent years, several writers have challenged those conclusions.
4civil Code Section 4600.5(c) defines the term "joint
custody." AB 2282 (Imbrecht) would
1ete that definition
and replace it with definitions of "
ical cus
,"
"joint physical custody," "legal cus
" and "joint
legal custody."
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5.

Critics believe that the requirement of an
agreement between parents before joint custody
is presumed in the child's best interests is
unrealistic.
They argue that in most cases
parents should be forced to accept a joint
custody arrangement although they may resist
it initially.

At the hearing, family law experts from the bench and bar,
mental health professionals, and individuals representing
fathers' and children's rights groups will tes fy on the
ramifications of child custody awards.
In order to facilitate the discussion, witnesses have been asked to address
the following general questions:
What are the practical problems
the implementation of the current law governing joint custody?
What are the defects perceived, if any, in the
joint custody law itself?
Should joint custody be given the first order
of preference in awarding child custody?
What are the effects, psychological and other,
on children when joint custody has been awarded
in cases where the parents have not agreed to it?
Child Support
In a proceeding where the support of a minor child is at
issue, the court may order either or both parents to pay
any amount necessary for the child's support, maintenance,
and education.
The order
subject to modification or
revocation upon a proper showing of a material change in
circumstances.
[Civil Code Section 4700(a)]
Generally, the setting and enforcement of child support is
related to the parents' separation or d solution of marriage.
The court in such proceeding may order the noncustodial parent to make installment payments for support to the custodial
parent.S
When a parent is
and the custodial parent receives
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the federal
Child Support Enforcement Program locates the deserting

Scivil Code Section 4382 provides that the payment of
child support by a noncustodial parent is not affected by
the custodial parent's failure or refusal to implement the
order for custody or visitation.
-173-

-5parent, establishes the
wedlock, and es
ishes and
legal obligation to pay child
administered locally
d
Recent legislative proposals deal
orders have addressed the
ems
For example, SB 1351 (Robbins),
1980, revised the law
of past-due support.
See C
introduced, SB 1351 would have
all orders for child support.
heavily amended during
1
sla
(Sieroty) of this session would
make child support orders
failed in Committee. AB 2284
in this Committee.
It would give
calendar to cases in which the sole
support, except as specif
I
preference in cases where the i
as an issue separate from other
Discussion has also focused on
countered in the setting of
problems are, for example, the
creases in the cost-of-1
of child support that may
seeks additional child
judicial notice of the r
ularly if substantial
order and the
Some individual
of-living escalator
Addressing the
many, but not all,
child support.
Witnesses
following
all
to include
clauses?

6Aid to Families
program to provide financ
dependent children
disabled, or
some
Social Security Act created
Program and mandated that each
ment program to
i
for

of
IS

program is

in
a court to
bill
pending
trial
child

-6-

Should a statewide and/or
scale or
schedule for
ing
support
be adopted to set a minimum level of child
support?
What changes in the law are needed to collect
past-due support more expeditiously or to
provide an incentive for timely payment?

-175-

CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE--1981-82

AB 1706

-2-

of

enact as

1
2
3
4
5
6

h

1
8
9
lO
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24
25
26
27
28

person or
to
awarded
under paragraph (2) or (3) of
(b), the court
shall consider and give due weight to
nomination of
a guardian of the person of the child by a parent under
Article 1 (commencing with Section 1500) of Chapter 1
of Part 2 of Division 4 of
Code.
(b) Custody
be awarded
following order
of
to
of the child:

29
30
31

32
33

34
35
~

~

31
38

a ch11ds best

of

-17798

60

-..--

/,.

-31
The
2
3 submit ffi .i;he ~a
court.
4 custody
5
fQt
(3)
6
7 whose
8 stable

9

tat

11

12
13

14
17
18

19
21

r

24
25

32
34

38
39

78

98

80

- 1
2
3
4
5

6

7
8
9

-

11
12
13
14

15
16
17
20
21

22
24
25
26
27
28
29

o_.,'

30
31

32
33

-179-

100

r

ASSEMBLY BILL
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An act to amend Section 4600.5
to child custody.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 1706, as introduced, ...,.avu•'"'•
Under existing law, the
custody award is to both parents
according to the best
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have agreed to an award of~ custody to one parent or -.../
so agree
open court at a hearing for the purpose of
determining the custody of the a minor child & ehildFen
of the marriage or (2) the court finds that a parent is
unfit to be a warded cwitody of the child. For the purpose
ofassisting the court in making a determination whether
an award ofjoint custody is appropriate, the court may
direct that an investig:lfion be conducted pursuant to J
Section 4602.
If the court declines to enter an order awarding joint
custody pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall state
in its decision the reasons for denial of an award of joint
custody.
-fbt ~ the application of eitheF paFCnt, jeHtf
custody ffi:ft;' be a'..''<>'&rded ffi the discretion of the eeUl'f ffi
~~~the purpose of assisting the eeUl'f ffi
making a determination whetheF ftft award of jeHtf
custody is appropriate undef thts subdivision, the eettrl
ffi:ft;' diFeet fhftt ftft investigation be conducted pursuant
te the pro•lisions of Section 4~ If the eeUl'f declines ffi ..../!
eftfef' ftft ~ a\varding jetnt eustod)' pursuant ffi f.h.ffi
subdivisioH, fh.e eeUl'f sftttH: ~ ffl. ttf.l dt'eision fh.e reatJon~'
fef' deHial of tHt av.·ttrd ef jetnt custody.

w

For the purposes of this section, "joint custody" _
means an order awarding custody of the a minor child &
children to both parents and providing that physical
custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to
assure the child & children of frequent and continuing
contact with both parents; provided, however, that su-eh
the order may award joint . legal custody without
awarding joint physical custody.
(b)

w

(c) Any order for joint custody may be modified or terminated upon the petition of one or both parents or on
the court's own motion if it is shown that the best
interests of the child require modification or termination
of the order. The court shall state in its decision the
reasons for modification or termination of the joint
custody order if either parent opposes the modification or ...-/
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ASSEMBLY

Prepared by
L. Young

ELIHU M. IIARRIS,

BILL DIGEST

BILL:

SUBJECT:

AB 1706
(As am~nded

HEARING DATE: 5/13/81
81)

Child custody

OBJECTIVE:
This bill intends to (1) make jo
custody the first
preference in awarding chi
custody and (2) change the
rebuttable presumption, affecting the burden of proof,
that joint custody is in the best interests of the child.
)

.

BILL DESCRIPTION:
Under existing .law, a court may, as
first
of
preference 4 award custody of a minor child to both parents jointly or to either parent, according to the best
interests of the child. When both parents agree to joint
custody,
a
, affecting the burden of
proof, that joint custody s
the child's best interests.
Joint custody may be awarded in
discretion of the court
in other cases
request of either
This b l
ests of
custody
an award to e
ence. The
burden of proving
child's best
This bill would change
to specify instead

interchild
make
of preferhave the
not be in the
st
rebuttable presumption
joint custody is presumed to be
(CONTINUED)
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AB 17 6

b

delete the
joint

SOURCE:

Ir
SUPPORT:

s Assoc
of
ly Cone
Council of

1

1

AB 1706

2.

1

AB

7

i

589

§
§
§
§

§ 4603.
§ 4604.
§ 4605.

593

DEERING'S

the interests of the minor child. When the
court appoints counsel to represent the minoJ, counsel shall receive a reasoneble s1 'm
for compensation and expenses, the amount
of which shall be determined by the court.
Such amount shall be paid by the
in
such proportions as the court deems just.
[1976 ch 588 § 1.]
§ 4607. [Mediation] (a) Where it appears on the face of the petition or other
application for an order or modification of
an order for the custody or visitation of a
child or children that either or both such
issues are contested, as provided in Section
4600, 4600.1 or 4601, the matter shall be set
for mediation of the contested issues prior to
or concurrent with the setting of the matter
for hearing. The purpose of such mediation
proceeding shall be to reduce acrimony
which may exist between the parties and to
develop an agreement assuring the child or
children's close and continuing contact with
both parents after the marriage is dissolved.
The mediator shall use his or her best efforts
to effect a settlement of the custody or
visitation dispute.
(b) Each superior court shall make available a mediator. Such mediator may be a
member of the professional staff of a family
conciliation court, probation department, or
mental health services agency, or may be
any other person or agency designated by
the court. In order to provide mediation
services, the court shan not be required to
institute a family conciliation court. The
mediator shall meet the minimum I..IU<<~.AuJ<~.:a
tions required of a counselor of conciliation
as provided in Section 1745 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
(c) Mediation proceedings shall be held in
private and shall be confidential, and all

TITLE 5
of Children

~ .....,......t

§ 4 700. Order for child support.
§ 4701. Order for assignment of wages.
§ 4 702. Order directing payment to officer of court or
welfare recipient: Court's authority otherwise, and
and fees as county charge.
§ 4 703. Action by parent, or child by his guardian ad
to provide support, etc.
§ 4704. Amendment of child support order without termiJruu.m~
§ 4 705. Credit for payments for
of child made "'"'""""'"'•
or Railroad Retirement Act.
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3. Discouraging the use of child custody for intimidation.
The most immediately apparent feature of Cali·
fornia's new child custody law is "the meuase it
sends in advance to divorcing parents": a power-play for exclusive child custody, either for pur·
poses of intimidation or to force subservience in
negotiation, is less likely to be tolerated by the
court. Therein. the new Civil Code Section 4600
and 4600.5 is regarded as one of the most significant evolutions of California's family law since the
advent of "no fault" divorce in 1970, which elimi·
nated the airing of ·"faults" as justification for
divorce. Henceforth, the new child custody Statute
will largely dissolve the recourse to winner--take-all
custody litigation that has heretofore been substituted for the catharsis of airing "faults."

personal.
fights thus
divorce process.

shifted from
and visitation
than
the

the

on the discretion of the ,-~~--
consideration
recourse to sole parent """"''"'"''~

AJs a11
endorser of AS
Folberg of the Lew'.s & Clark '-'-'••.......
Oregon, and Executive Director of the Association
of Family Conciliation
characterized the
intent succinctly: "We too often
that one of
the most noble functions
law
to provide a
model of what
1 believe
that the
a 'preference' for
best alternative."

Preference is likely to favor joint custody, or
sole custodianship for that parent who demonstrates the most cooperation and tolerance for the
child's frequent and continuing contact with the
alternate parent. Consequently, an antagonistic
and covetous parent is likely to be denied sole
custody and may jeopardize the opportunity to
participate equally in joint custody.

The intentions and consequences of the legi$lation, as they evolved during the legislative process and as amended into Section 4600 and Sec·
tion 4600.5 of the Civil Code, are itemized below.
The itemization is not necessarily in the order of
importance to petitioners or counselors. For ease
of reference the items are in the same sequence as
the issues occur in the new Statute.
passage, resulted
these same restraints upon
the court's discretion.
sole and
joint
are
in the new
law, the court
its decision to award
sole
in
situations.

Policy Statement
Intent
The intention of the original version of AS 1480
was to establist a guide, a goal., and a preference
for divorcina parer.~s. By making sole custody less
likely to be decreed by the courts, the intent of the
original as well.as the flna' version of AB 1480 is to
caution divorcing parents whc w<:-11ld otherwise be
prone to pursuing soie parent custody for pur--

The
introduces the new
Statute
of the new law,
despite the court's """''""''"""''"' discretion to award
sole custody.

2
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••... to U~Nre
....,•• .....,,......," contact
statement con·

3
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Order of preference: To both parents jointly or to
either parent

Section l Section 4600.
any Drt;,ce~rdir-12"
where there is at issue tire custody
minor
child, the court may, during the pendency of
the proceeding or at any time
make such order for the custody of the child
during minority as may seem necessf.liY or
proper. If a child is of sufficient· age and
capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent
preference as to custody, the court shall con·
.rider IUid give due weight to the wishes of the
child in maldng an award of custody or modiftcation thllreof. Custody should be awarded
in the following order of preference, accord~
tng to the best interests of the child:
(a) To both pt11'ents Jointly pursuant to
Section 4600.. 5 or to either parent.
The new law did not spring full blown without
attention to previous phraseology. On the con~
t:raey, if there was any single phrase in the prior
Statute that spawned AB 1480's concept, it was
the long adhered-to directive which is repeated in
the new law, "Custody should be awarded in the
following order of preference."
· previous
statute pennitted no other alternatiVes than: (a)
To either parent, (b) To the penon or persons in
whose home the child has been
(c) To any
other person or persons deemed sui table.

Proponents of joint custody assumed that the
most desirable goal with the least
trauma for
child and parents would be to list
custody as
the
ahead of the other alternatives.
An
version of SB 4 77 specified "to either
parent or to both parents jointly." The word order
was reversed when adopted from SB 477 into the
rmal version of AB 1480, so that
both parents
jointly" appears prior to the alternative of "to
either parent."
issue within this
was more
debate ..' 'han whether "To both parents"
should be listed separately and unequivocally as
the first preference, or if there should be equal
consideration, within the same paragraph, of the
alternative of sole parent custody. Ultimately, the
"both parents jointly"
was

vtG~o:rc~us~,v

to

4
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In the court's

Responding to the wran&Jes and dissension that
evolved from the leverage inherent in sole parent
custody, Dr. Jose Santiago of the University of
Arizona Department of Psychiatry suggested (durin& a Phoenix, Arizona confezence on May 22,
at a time when the joint custody concept
wu still a rarity), "pve t.b.e child to t.b.e parent who
will tolerate the most the child's relationship with
the other parent." This proposal became known
colloquially as •favoring the most tolerant parent'
as a means of both rewarding and inducing cooperation.

<U'!!rft!•nnn

tion

The opportunity of giving thi$ proposal the
force of law occur:red during a f"Ulal amending
session of AB 1480, in August 1979, when Dr.
Diane Trombetta of Los Gatos, California sug·
gested this terminology in the version of AB 1480
that succeeded SB 477. This particular provision
favoring the tolerant and cooperative parent in
sole custody decisions could become one of the
most significant and influential c.b.anges in evaluating the suitability of sole custodians. As. a minimum, it may inspire more guarantees and demon·
stration of tolerance and cooperation than has.
been customary of sole custody seekers heretofore.
At a condudina amendment conference, Judge
David B. Kin& of the San Francisco Superior
Court's Domestic Law Coutt cautioned that, although important, he didn't consider the cooperation criterion u overriding. that there were also
other worthy considemtions. and that demon·
mated tolerance of t.b.e alternate parent should be
.. among other considerations" and not the sole
determinant.

'"III'"ll> and a return to

.....,!U.I..

neatnniP were often ton:1en.ted

without such a

No
parent's sex

Section I. Section 4600. In mtlidng an award
custody to etther parent, the court . . . shall
not prefer a parent as custodian bect1.Wt! of
that panmt's ~:x.
Thil
was adopted durin& an early am·
endment to SB 477 and ultimately included in its
within AB 1480.

s
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other parents residi.''li hundreds of miles apart with·
in California could avail themselves of joint custody.

nor essential to the court's granting of joint custody. The provisions were $Ugested to enable
parents to determine the manner of carrying out
(a) "the child's education," (b) "daily routine,"
(c) "association with friends," (d) "religious training," {e) "and other activ.ities." Considering the
differences of opinion that most couples ordi·
narily experience during divorce, the itemization
was sardonically characterized as a new selection of
contr()versial topics that the divorcing couple might
not have otherwise considered, and sufficiently
provocative to make joint custody asreement
virtually unattainable. If consensus on such topics
is not forthcoming, it may be prudent merely to
allow most or all of these conside.rations to be
resolved by each parent for that period of time
when the child is in the respective parent's care.

of travel
borders, is
already facilitating an exchange of children be·
tween parents that should not be denied future
petitioners of joint
l"f'.'~~''~'~'rrli!!!'ll"' of state

Section I. Section 4600. (b) (I) The court,
in its dtscrerton, may
the parents to
submit to the court a
the implemen£ation of the custody order.
The version of AB 1480 that was ultimately
passed was careful not to
that, as a condition of granting
a custody plan
must firSt be submitted to and approved by the
court.

The fact that the plan topics were elim.iriated ·
from SB 477 during its legislative processing and
were never a requirement of AB 1480 may imply
to the court that, as such, these topics are not an
influential determinant of joint custody but that
divorcin& parents are prudently advised to consider
these issues voluntarily even though they do not
influence a decision for or against joint custody.

A requi.rement of a
sidered as potentially
the goal of
joint custody for at least two reasons: First, plans
prior to order could tend to
the thwarting
of joint custody if one p]aty or the other took that
opportunity to insist on implementing provisions
that would make
unfeasible. Second,
the requirement of a
advance might redirect the court's
the pr.:~ferred puir
lie policy goal of
custody into
being an arbiter of
details - a time-consuming task that might make the court long for the
expediency of the past wherein a sole parent was
decreed custodian, the alternate parent was re·
strained to visitation, and the custodian was given
the relatively unexamined implementation of a
plan.

Out of state residence not a barrier to joint
custody. An initial version of SB 477 excluded
joint custody when one of the parents lives out of
the state and also provided for termination of joint
custody if a parent established or was likely to
establish a residence in another state. Both of those
provisions were eliminated during the amendment
process of SB 477. The reasons for their elirnina·
tion are a useful instruction to individuals adminis·
tering or adjudicating the new law.
First, the provision would have provided a perverse opportunity for a recalcitrant parent to de·
feat the implementation of joint custody merely
by leaving the state.

Thus, in the new
the court is pennitted to
discern whether joint
would be in the best
interests of the
·to so decree, and to require
a plan from the parents sut~qruel:ltlji

Second, a requirement of residence within the
state for both parents and children could defeat .·
the availability o. ;oint custody for the numerous
families living in California border communities
wherein one parent might be living a short distance
away in the bordering state. The family would be
denied the opportunity of joint custody while

On the other hand,
the fmt several
months of hearings under this new Code Section,
courts may be asking for
advance as a
means of determining how
the parents

6
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Court statement of reasom
custody.

Section
declines to

I..tter, durln1 the
sions that led to
would be suorel"SS~d.Ull

"muons for dcnill" rea:uuem,ern
cue in

dearcut
of

other

- 9

agreement
both parents were required; such a
requirement would leave the power of decision
solely within the hands of the least co1:>p~:ra1jve
parent to the
of children and
alternate
Altruism rather than antagonism is more
to "win"
for each
either to
The new Act encompasses a
principle of successful negotiation: an '"'"''"'""''"""'
for either party
propose a solution that re111ults
in both
from a les111 than ideal
situation.
Heretofore, the decree of sole custody resulted
in the appearance of a "winner" and an excluded
parent who
nurtured plans and
that fueled
court appearances. While
eliminate return engage-it is likely that most such
hearings will revolve around
modification
rather than mother round of the zer01Um game
of "exclusion" Ver!!US "access."

S(lcfton 2.

S«ctton 4600.5 (b)

post
assisttntl the court in rnu:K.Jnuc
mtnarton whether an awtUd of Joint
nn1~r~'"~~u under th~

the court to
mv·es1lg;lttlcm to detennine
resulted from

at
accommodate
such u
are excluded from the former home and
one party had
of the child's customary
quarters.
party

9
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of custody
dis:tance, kl!V.I«uvu. circumstances
unable to

Sharing physical custody, integral to 'joint custody'

Sfcrton 2. Section 4600..5 (c) For the pu,...
poses of this section, "Jotnt custody" mtums
an order award!nr custody of the minor child
or chtldnn to both panrm and providing that
physical custody shall be shand by the parents In such a way as to assure the child or
children of frequent and continuing contact
with both pannts:
During drafting. this paragraph became the socalled "definition" of joint custody that links
physical custody with the goal of the opening
policy statement: "assure the child or children
of frequent and continuing contact with both
parents." The purpose of the paragraph is primarily aimed at an understanding and consideration of the physical aspect of joint physical custody. However, the paragraph purposely does not
elaborate with constraining prerequisites such as
scrupulously equal contact or conditions of residence. Instead, the parents are encouraged to
work out personally the details of sharing physical
custody as best befits their circumstances, or
through counselors or other helpful intermediaries
who will aid the parents in traversing the antagonisms of the just-divorcing period into the
implementation of joint custody.

a
continuing contact
joint leial l¢1.1.l:i•tUIJtY

Furthermore,
joint legal cus:toowm
responsibilities and obiiu:tiorls
encounten with
but with none
physical
custodian to ·~-m-•dl

Joint 1epl custOdy for parents UM.VI'Iilable for
joint phylllk:al custody

&ctlon 2. Section 4600.5 (c) : . .. provided,
however, that such order may award joint
legal custody without awarding joint physical
custody.

delinquency

Of all the provisions of Section 4600 arid 4600.5
that may be productive of mischief, or antqoniltic interpretation or decree, the opportunity for
the court to award joint legal custody without
awarding joint physical custody could int:rigue the
most litigious of counselors and parents.
Curtailment of the opposite parent's 'access'
in joint custody to mere legal participation was
not the intenf of this wording. The opportunity
for joint legal custody was inserted in response to
the few requests of divorced parents who wished to

10
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n:::s~.u~:mJ&

Modification

mnong the
survival in a

termination

upon

Section 2.

Section 4600. .S

may be

order

or termt·

ruzted upon
of one or both parents or on the court's own motion if it is
shown that the best interests of the child re·
or termination of the
quire

order.
Of all the
provisions within AB
few are more
to
about
assuring "the best interests of the child" than
that
or termination of
joint

One parent, both parents, or the court can move
but the nn....,.,r;.,..,
consideration for
is a showing of detriment
to the
best interests. Heretofore, an ex·
eluded parent
"gunnysacked.. a :re~~erve
of
about the sole custodial
presumed violation of the child's best interests, as
ammunition
a reversal of sole cu.~>tol..l!Y
liberalization
At least in
book on
!lJid . .,...AU..I/1'
pntcticality as each
each is
to scrutinize the other par·
cm!ll·!~m1ml toward the
of weatani!1g
ter.rntttanon, the overall effect may

for

But the

interests of

Previous

Beca·1.use of the incessant
tl.on about retroacmritv

cess, an

IWC:O!IW,odi&ti<)ft

~d.

with the other
have

3

New Jersey, North
and

If a parent intends to use the new California
to achieve
decree not awarded in
another state, the
of the UCCJA are
of the "'"''~'~'"''~'"'"
On the other
the UCCJA will assist in
protecting a California decree in other UCCJA*
as the
and child
for California to retain

Using conciliation to ease the court's burden

Section 2.

4600.5

In counties

a conctll4tion court, the court or the

parties may, at any time, pW'"SU.ant to local

rules

consult with the conctli.aticm
!U.<T.U;!n" tht

to resolve rmy controversy
which hos arisen in the

lm:rJll"m~!n

facilitate access to ""''"""......,
any
"Local rules
of court~assi!ted
for

thw far.

this conciliation service can be such an important
assist to jurists, there is now a substantial opportunity for conciliation courts and counselors to
achieve a greatly increased appreciation and recog·
nition.

necessary in

achieve the same
effect.

how-

measure for
Furthennore, the "resolving of controversy" portion of paragraph (f) could shunt to the conciliation court first those requests for modification or
termination that miaht ordinarily go directly to
the hearings court. Arrangement for and success
of joint custody is a highly personal matter for the
participants. However, skeptics are likely to question the efficacy of joint custody, based on the
statistical reoccum.mce of hearings requests. The
mqnitude of those statistica may be affected substantially by how readily joint custodial parents
can utilize the conciliation courts prior to hearings.

a custodial parent

Access to records by noncustodial:-parenb

Section 2. Section 4600. .5 (g) Notwithstanding any other provision of hzw, access to
records and in{o1'1'1'14tion pertaining to a minor
child, including but not limited to medical,
dental, and school records. shall not be denied
to a parent because such panmt is not the
child's cu.stodlal parent.
The statute's concludinl Pataar~Ph reqwnng
recorcls about the child to be acOMJS.ible to non·
custodial parents was also one of the last amend·
ments proposed at a concluding amendment-drafting session. As such, the proposal represented the
reaction of noncustodial parents to that which

14
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lead the public to believe so. At the time AB 1480
wu submitted and acquired its initial endorsen I
wu not an active member o! such a group, althoulfi
u the
their support wu crucial.
1'he earliest supporters were tunons the
sionals. A number of professionals in the psychiatrlc, sociological
counseling
endorned the
numconcept of joint custody. A
ber of lawym also endom~d th.G
of joint
eu~tody. But the
of the need wu most
vivdly evident in both the ad hoc and the
groups of divorced fathetS. I was also to
intensity matched
divorced mothm
(volun®
tarlly and Involuntarily) di.d not have custody. The
divorced mother without custoily hu an intemt in
joint custody u intense u the divorard fathers
who have garnered the lion's share of publicity for
WIU'l'antinl joint cuatody.

once I
group
c:uvernu:m of their
well not be

The indignation of the ostracized parent hu the
intensity of the sel.f rishteous because a tenet of
"no fault" divorar is that a parent can be divorced
and deprived of accea to an offsprin;. Hence,
innumerable fathers' rlshts groups are populated
by law-abidinl and otherwise circumspect fathers
who have been deprived of access to their children
through imposition by the legal system of a "no
fault" divorce.

The net effect wu that law abiding fathers
whose conduct u fathers and husbands wu the~
retica.Uy not in question.
nevertheless severed
tram a normal relationship with their children in
decrees as severe as if these men had committed a
crime. The result wu acute disdain for the law u
practiced from the bench.

were

Potitidanl and propapndim seme the
inherent in ju.~tified ....,...,.,....
the danprs to a nation when its
more convenient for ~v,l'!'l"ll"l<f
serving it.
A rap from
is also
dedicated. It can also transcend ...,,,.,....u ....
and self-preservation, as was evident among fathers
who spoke threateningly.

Such was the atmosphere within which the
ameliorating proposal that became AB 1480 wu

16
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The exte:ru~ive burdem bilb processed by Calif·
omia
that the obliption of
sponsorina and
a new meuu.re is not
lightly wumed.
m!ll~s were introduced
into the
proem durinc 1979,
of which 1
the 139 days
the
As a oo:ru~equence,
the
for neuly

17
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be awarded

award

8
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to

20

u!Ui!Uuvu•.H conaidera~

ml.l.lt

r~pect

the

to have nonnal. n:wautJnlll

A

todo

dealini with adjttStment,

Mel Roman and
W'mston, New
A
read
pa:nnt and of ~u'irl~~t l'!lr~n!lcm!!t!l
Psyc::hiatry and D!J:'1e:ctc)r
is one
the nation's p10lllet':li1nl PTC''POIU!Irts

and

2435 Ocean Avenue, San Francisco,
the earliest pioneering profesPublications to be obtained directly

AB

Th~ people of the

SECTION
4600. (a) The L.e'ifillliann·!!!
policy of this state
continuing contact
se-parated or dissolved
share the rights
this policy.

E

DEFINITIONS OF CHILD CUSTODY

Divided or
Sole Custody
Joint Custody
Split Custody
Joint Legal Custody
Joint Physical Cus
Joint Physical & Legal Custody

Custody

As an aid to parents and clients, as well as
tioners, the following is intended as a layman's
terminology. Counselors may find this compilation
to clients so that all parties have a similar
ease with which many of these terms have been
conversation, but without definition, has led to
Furthermore, the lay public has been exposed to a
tations of custody. Some of the definitions have
contradictory, often because the omission or
adjectives alters or restricts the scope of custody.
as

Confusion also arises because courts, as
frequently use ~eitain terms interchangeably.

statute and
deriv•d from
rather
parents of
on an erroneous
subsequent litigation

Definition of terms is, primarily, the
case law precedent. The following definitions
such sources, but this compilation is intended
than a legal reference. However, a mutual
these terms is less likely to stimulate a legal
assumption about a form of custody or to necess
because of a reinterpretation.
Since our primary
operable plan of custody
intent of terms, we hope
a terminology with which

media,

intent is to aid the divorced
rather than a diversion
this information will be
the parties agree.

toward an
the
establishing

The parent or parents particularly interested
j
custody are
advised to consider the term in its larger conteKt, that
joint physical
and legal custody. This is the final form of custody described at the
conclusion of this compilation. The scope and
previously
described custody for.m aids in clarifying the
significance of
joint physical and legal custody.
Acknowledgment is extended to the following
, from whom
definition information has been derived, although we are refraining from
indicating specific reference to each authority
of our edited
abbreviations or elaborations of their original comments. Therefore,
readers will also benefit from the more extensive
of:
Children
H. Jay Folberg & Marva Graham, 'Joint
Follo~ing Divorce,' Univ of Calif, Davis, Law ·Review,
Summer 1979.
Functions
Robert Mnookin, 'Child Custody Adjudication:
Problems,
in the Face of Interminancy,' Law &
summer 1975.

Contracts, '

A Lindey, ' Separation Agreements and
1977

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - Source: James A. Cook, 10606 Wilkins Avenue, Los
-217-

~

-- ------- , Calif 90024.
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0

or
and

of

Joint Phye cs

Cuatod

The sharing of
and recognition of the
of joint physical custody.

establishment
to the concept

are

The allocation of significant
children to be resident exclusively
consideration of a parent or parents

ld or

Precise equality
time allocation
preoccupation of those parents desiring joint
once the principal of sharing j
has
of irreparable loss of the child or
been dispelled, the practical availability
child-rearing time can become the guideline
time.

. However,
the fear
parents has
of
residence

Hesitancy to accept participation in
may have assumed the likelihood of
frequently traceable to (a) an expectation
income by reason of retaining sole
quilt that by more frequent
parent a child may develop a distaste
if the parent prone to sole custodianship
the divorce, and (c) opportunities
that are inherent in retaining sole
known to place a high value on a
child or children and longs for
and parents will need to encourage a
greed, fear and quilt, and
a more relaxed allocation of time.

one parent who
custody is
financial
, (b) fear and
alternate
, particularly
initiator .of
harassment
parent is
an isolated
. Hence, counselors
financial
to achieve

Ten basic variations for
custodians can integrate or elaborate
availability.

which joint
and their

Variations for sharing j
(l) Freedom of movement between
(2) School year versus summer
(3) Divide Fall & Spring semesters
(4) 2-3 months versus 2-3 months,
th
(5) 1 month versus l month,
exchange
(6) 2 weeks versus 2
&
(7) l week versus l week,
(8) 3~ days ve:.sus 3~ days,
(9) Workday week versus weekends,
(10) Child remains in

&:

nights.

for a
iality and
joint physical

The meaningful sharing
relaxed relationship by
ld
impermanence of "visitation"
custody.
Financial child support
is also subject to a range of

ca
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cus

situations

.

"'

........

from. which

Among the
of child support
One_parent assumes
Each parent
to fluctuations
(3) Each parent
with the
( 4) Equal split
(a) based
(b) based
(5) Percentage
incomes of
( 6) Sharing of costs

( l)
( 2)

Joint Physic

The intent
a condition and expectation
prevail unless a parent can
equitable custody
itemize the reasons
Joint physical
itemized above for j
However, by agreement,
the provisions
and those of their
A statute,
of joint custody
less than
anticipate
physical

need

a •

to pay.

t d
establish
will
less

, respectively.
from among
preferences

EXHIBIT F
CALIFORNIA LEG ISLATURE-1981-82 REGULAR SESSION

ASSEMBLY BILL

No. 2202

Introduced by Assemblyman Imbrecht
April 27, 1981

An act to amend Section 4600.5 of the Civil Code, relating
to joint custody.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGF.sT

AB 2202, as introduced, Imbrecht. Joint custody.
Existing law provides that custody of a child should be
awarded in a specified order of preference, according to the
best interests of the child. The most preferred award is to both
. . . __, parents jointly or to either parent. There is a presumption
that joint custody, as defined, is in the best interests of a child
where the parents have agreed to an award of joint custody.
Upon the application of either parent, joint custody may be
awarded in the discretion of the court in other cases.
\.......;
This bill would delete the existing definition of joint custody
and instead define "physical custody", "joint physical
custody", "legal custody", and "joint legal custody".
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no.
State-mandated local program: no.
The people of the State of Ca.Jifornia do enact as follows:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

SECTION 1. Section 4600.5 of the Civil Code is
amended to read:
4600.5. (a) There shall be a presumption, affecting
the burden of proof, that joint custody is in the best
interests of a minor child where the parents have agreed
to an award of joint custody or so agree in open court at
a hearing for the purpose of determining the custody of
~a minor child EW el:tildren of the marriage.
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99

40

AB 2202

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

If the court
custody
in its decision
custody.
(b) Upon
custody may
other cases.
making a
custody is
may direct
to the
enter an order
subdivision,
for denial

-fet

~

~~~ ~+R-f' custody"
MH~ effile et'

physical
S:Bfe

25
26
27
28

29
30
31
32
33

34

99 60

-31 An award of}oint legal custody
2 exchange inform:Jtion r>runr>£>rt>
3 and welfare of
4 another in
5 responsibilities and
6
(d) Any order for
7 terminated upon the"'"",..'"'''"'""'
8 the court's own
9 interests of the child
10 of the order. The court
11 reasons for modification
12 custody order if either
13 termination order.
14
(e) Any order for
15 ehilaPea of a marriage
16 any other state
17 requirements set
18 modified at
19 accordance
20
(f) In counties
21 the parties may, at
22 court, consult
23 of assisting the parties to
a
24 implementation of the custody order or to
25 controversy which has arisen in
26 plan for custody.
27
(g) Notwithstanding
28 to records and
29 including but not
30 records, shaH not
31 parent is not the
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EXHIBIT G

I

I' ATTOANEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTOFlNEY (NAME ANO ADDRESS):

TELEPHONE NO.:

FOR COURT USE ONLY

'

ATTORNEY FOR (NAME)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF
STREET ADDRESS:
MAiliNG ADDRESS
CITY AND ZIP CODE:
BRANCH NAME

MARRIAGE OF
PETITIONER

RESPONDENT

r--

PETITION FOR
Dissolution of Marriage
Legal Separation
Nultlty of Marriage

CASE NUMBER:

D

c

And Declaration Under Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act

D Petitioner
0Respondent
has been a resident of this state for at least six months and of this county for at least three months immediately
preceding the filing of this Petition for Dissolution.

1. RESIDENCE (Dissolution only)

2. STATISTICAL FACTS

c. Period between marriage and separation
Years:
Months:

a. Date of marriage:
b. Date of separation:

3. DECLARATION REGARDING MINOR CHILDREN OF THIS MARRIAGE
a.
b.

D
D

There are nQ minor children.
The minor children are:
Name

Sex

Birth date

c. IF THERE ARE MINOR CHILDREN, COMPLETE EITHER (1) or (2)
(1) 0
Each child named in 3b is presently living with 0Petitioner ORespondent
at (address):

and during the last five years has lived in no state other than California and with no person other than
petitioner or respondent or both.
Petitioner has not participated in any capacity in any litigation or proceeding in any state concerning custody
of any minor child of this marriage.
Pellt1oner has no information of any pending custody proceeding or of any person not a party to this proceeding
who has physical custody or claims to have custody or visitation rights concerning any minor child ol this
marriage.
(2)

0

A completed Declaration Under Uniform Custody of Minors Act is attached.
(Continued on reverse)

The declarahon under penalty ol perJury must be signed in California. or In a atate that authorize• uae ol a declaration in place ol an alfldavtl. olherw•se
an aN•davtl '' requtred
Form Adopled by Rule 1281
Judtctal Counetl or California
AevtsedEifecttveJanuary 1.1980

PETITION
(FAMILY LAW)
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76P307A (REV. 1·801 PS 4-80
0 1
AD 1

1281

CC 4503, 5158; CRC 1215

4 DE Cl AHA TION REGARDING COMMUNITY AND QUASI-COMMUNITY

OBLIGATIONS AS PRESENTL V

KNOWN

a l
b
c.
d

5.

D

l

l
are no such assets or obligalions subject !o disposillon
} Ali such assets
obllgal!ons have been disposed o! by
such assets and obllga!1ons are listed in lhe property
All such assets and obhgations are hslad below:

Pel1tioner requests confirmation of the

as separate

and

6. Pet1t1oner requests
a.

D1ssolulion of the mamage based on
(2)

Irreconcilable differences. CC 4506(1)
mcurable
CC 4506(2)

( )
(2)

Legal separation of the parties based on
Irreconcilable differences. CC 4506(1)
mcurable
CC 4506(2)

(1)

b.

c.

void mamage based on
mcestuous mamage. CC 4400
b1gamous marriage. CC 4401

1 Pel1!1oner requests lhat !he court grant lhe relief or judgment !lln"'"'''""'n
as may
lhal
a.
b.

c
d.
e.
f

vo1oao1e marriage based on
petitioner's age at time of
CC 4425(a)

delerm•ned and ch1ld custody be """"'"'' ..ri
(spec•fy):

and other orders

I

IATTORN(YTOR(NA_M_E~)------------------~~~~~~--------------------------1
1

SUPERIOR COURT OF CAliFORNIA, COUNTY OF
S fREE T ADDRESS
MAiliNG ADDRESS
CITY ANO ZIP CODE.
BRANCH NAME

MARRIAGE OF
PETITIONER
RESPONDENT

~----------------------------------------------------------+--------------------------1
R ESPONSE
0 Dissolution or Marriage 0 And Declaration Under CASE NUMBER:
[ J REQUEST FOR
legal Separation
Uniform Child C ........,... 7
Nullity of Marriage
Jurisdiction Act
RESIDENCE (Dissolution only)
Peliltoner
Respondent
has been a res•dent of lhts state lor at least sex months and of lh1s county lor
preceding the f1hng ol lhts Petition for Dissolullon.
2. STATISTICAL FACTS

a. Date of marriage:
b. Date o! separation:

least three mon!hs Immediately

between
Years:

and separation
Months:

3 DECLARATION REGARDING MINOR CHILDREN OF THIS MARRIAGE
a. C_] There are no minor children.
b. D The minor children are:
Name
Birthdate

Sex

c. IF THERE ARE MINOA CHILDREN, COMPLETE EITHER (1) or (2)
(1)
Each chtld named in 3b is presenliy living with
at (address):

D

Respondent

and dunng the last five years has lived in no state other than Calilorrua and w1th no person other than
petitioner or respondent or both.
Respondent has not participated in any capacity in any
custody of any minor chtld or this marriage.

or proceedmg in any stale concerning

Respondent has no information of any pending custody proceeding or of any person not a party to th1s
proceeding who has physical custody or claims to have custody or v1sitahon
concernmg any minor
child of this marriage.
(2)

D

A completed Declaration Under Un1form Custody of Minors Acl is attached.
(Contmued on reverse)

1

of 11 declarafoon on ollice or an aff•dav•f

RESPONSE
(FAMILY lAW)

1/801 PS 4·80
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A0016

oth~rw•sa

CC 4355. CAC 1215

4. DECLARATION REGARDING COMMUNITY AND QUASI-COMMUNITY ASSETS AND OBLIGATIONS AS PRESENTLY

KNOWN
a. (-::-J There are no such assets or obligations subject to disposition by th~ court in thi!ll proceeding.
b. C:.J All such assets and obligations have been disposed of
written "'"''""''"''"'"'i
c.
All such assets and obligations are listed in the
d~laratlon to be filed with this response.
d.
AU such assets and obligations are listed below:

5.

0

Respondent requests confirmation of the following as separate asseta

CONFIRM TO

6.

8.

0

Respondent contends there is a reasonablE~ possibility of r~~eoncmation.

0

Respondent requests
Dissolution of the marriage based on
( 1) 0 irreconcilable differences. CC 4506(1)
(2) D incurable insanity. CC 4506(2)
b. D Legal separation of the parties based on
( 1) D irreconcilable differences. CC 4506(1)
(2)
incurable insanity. CC 4506(2)
c. 0 Nullity of void marriage based on
( 1)
incestuous marriage. CC 4400
(2) D bigamous marriage. CC 4401

d.

p

a.

0
(4)

of voidable marriage based on
respondent's age at time
of marriage. CC 4425(a)
prior existing marriage.
4425(b)
unsound mind. CC 4425(c)
fraud. CC 4425(d)
force. CC 4425(e)
incapacity.

cc

in item

9. Respondent requests that the court

make injunctive and other

orders as may be proper. and that
a.

0

b 0
c. 0
d. 0
e. 0

t.

0

Visitation rights be determined and child custody be awarded
0 Peiltioner 0Respondent OOther (specify): . . . .
Child support be awarded OPetitioner 0Respondent
Spousal support be awarded QPetitioner QRespondent
Property rights be determined.
Attorney's fees and costs be awarded 0Petitioner
Wile's former name be restored (specify): . . . . . . . . . . . .

Respondent declares under penalty of perjury that the fnr;>~n,nlnn
and that this declaration Is executed at (place): . . . . . . . . . . . . .
on (date): . . . . . . . . . .
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any attachment is true and correct
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , California,

EXHIBIT H
Please help In this vital survey

Survey

- - - . - . --- . . .

of
-

•

recent court child ·custody ·decrees
Return

Duplicate this form and also
distribute to others. We need
as many responses as possible.

to:

James A. Cook
10606 Wilkins Avenue
Los Angeles, California 90024

What are the terms of the court's decree,
as compared with the preferences sought by each party,
in child custody awards?
Our assurance to you:
We vow not to disseminate
specific identification of an individual or a
case unless you grant us permission to do so.
Answer as many questions as possible; do not
delay your response for lack of all answers,
however. Partial information will be helpful.
Your name, or
name of party(ies) involved:
Your, or their, address:
Telephone (if known}:
Case identification,
if available.
(Number or names):
Judge, or Commissioner
making the decree:
Court location or
jurisdiction:
Names of attorneys:
How many children, by sex & age:
Custody

decision~

Did you ask the court for:
Joint Physical & Legal Custody
Only Joint Physical Custody
Only Joint Legal Custody
Sole parent custody
What did the other party ask for?:
Joint Physical & Legal Custody ·
Only Joint Physical Custody
Only Joint Legal Custody
Sole parent custody
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----

-

'

Custody decision (conthuutd)'

What -did the court decree, and to whom?
Joint Physical & Legal
Joint Phys
parent
What were the special terms,
court decree?:

instructions in the

Do you

Comment.

ect to, or

Date of the decree, if known:
Did a counselor, mediator, or
If this
forwarded a

If so, whom?
was it?

Child support
What are

terms of the chi

decree?:

Potential appeal
uo you

beli~ve

Do you

the dec

ion

court?

to

Summary commen

What is

, or

Future action

resul
and

to:

James

. Cook,

re further

90024

PRELI'MINAR:!f REPOR

Survey of cuatody

fmplementatio

f Jo
4' 1981

(Please continue to
The initial responses
experience with the
ing information.
Above and beyond
the respondents are
as well as
following the recap
the responses, we are
responses.
(Information

is being held
for referral
attorneys who
custody for clients

a
parent.

Statistical recap:

In

ln

In

The

and

remarks by
.•• poignant

Therefore,
which chart
of those

Quoted remarke from r
necessarily sections
been fallinq within t~~

below are'not
co.mmentlll have

lUPPORT OF JOINT CUSTODY DECREE
From a
to do what'•

entire focus now ia

"I am jubilant, but

dollars to qet. joint

custody~~

From • mother with
it would work better in
he is wanted and loved
"Joint custody has worked
concern for welfare of daughter.

I think
knows
our case due to
are vecy

friend~hip

between ex-spouses and

From parent
I can prove my
custody.•

. ln other words,· 1f
try to gain eole

From
15 months
depertmsnt
The judge has
with my ute.

taken away

• Probation
more suited.
my children and living

SUPPORT OF SOLE CUSTOQY
(emotion-

P"rent
'lilly) bilt in
too invo lv.,d

are gettinq
resolution alter-

natives .. til

rro10
there
neqlecte
•stick•

"'"Ill

bi-annually. I wish
and buys 'toys' and
legislation, not to

Vi~ita

the intention of the leqislaof lawylllrs cooked up just to qet

ture
more

name) simply slipped into
to live with father.

the
His

what
' and therefore punished
to my daughter and
•~tiler stated anymy daughter
sharing my
dnuqhter and r both

indicated that the custody
to encourage contact and
ma~imi~e contact with both
recommended the children
clear the parents

don • t get to be
unity where the

From a d@cree: •The
exist between Petitioner
diff•r•ncea
upon "ole

real or imaqined, which
to minimize these
n~Jponeiblll

tie a .• 1'hor•-

child psychologist,

of the minor
follow him own archaic

cu@t~dy

the evidence

is~•

F:<O!O

tra<lit.l.onm
custody of

"·'

IHPROVJ::MENTS Nl::EL>l::D IN Til£ 1.1\k'
•Joint custody and single parent custody need to be separated into separate subdivisions. and
of different importance. Wh~n combined in the same subdivision it allows the eourts to perpetuate

the tradition of awarding custody to one parent (whioh is almost always the mother.) The law needs
to

~

made more specific. The vagueness of the terms allows the judge to make decisions based on

his per•onal opinion rather than on specific points of law."

"I had nothing to do with getting AB1480 passed but I feel deeply indebted to you and the hurting
fathers that wer~ instrumental in getting at least a chance of joint custody. The biggest contribution
that could be made would be to get family law out of the courts and the adversary system, at least
initially.•

"I am turned off by our legal system. This decree took 1~ years. There is no reason for the ease
with which one party can delay proceedings. We need stronger legislation directing joint legal and
physical custody, time limits for continuances, and stronger guidelines for pressuring nonworkinq
spouses to become self supporting.•
"I feel if either parent wants joint physical '

whatsoever no matter how the other parent

f~~ls."

legal custody it should be given without any question

"Children are not protecte-d Jn arEta of property rights. If a marrJagc is a contract, then I b~ltevt="

that they are intended to be 3rd party donee beneficiaries of that contract and have an interest in
property of community when divorced."
From father achieving joint custody: "The area of monetary support needs clarification. My ex gets
$1200 a month (the same as if she had sole custody.) and l 9et no financial relief when I have the kids
every weekend."

"Each parent ahould be required to earn their own income to support child during their custody
time tor any ehild over the age of 8."
PERSONAL ADVICE:
From a father losing request for joint physical and legal custody and not granted overnight
visitation: "Do everythinq you can to show what a good parent you aref and continue to do so. In the
end you will survive and be happy with your children.•
From a father seeking joint physical and legal cust ody but winding up with sole physical custody
and joint legal custody: "Be a nice guy under any circumstances.•
Parent losing sole custody fight althou9h decreed joint legal custody: "My experience says that if
the divorce proceedings become hostile adversary proceedings, first priority must go to adjusting ones
life and affairs to b~ing with your child. Don't depend on attorneys, or judges, or the state to fix it."
"Seek joint physicAl and le9al cuatody via mediation court prior to actual court hearing. Determine
actual child support costa prior to hearing and require r~ceiver of th~ae pay~nts to justify and account

for expenses. •
"Retain an attorney willing to go to the mat on this issue, and familiar with issues for joint
cuatody.•
"I am fighting for my own daughter's right to be raisod by both parents, and will not give in to
the tactica used by her mother against that goal and upheld by the local court.•

DESPAIR

•x

would very much like to have joint custody, but have been told that

I

have no chance.•

Father losing request for JC with 2-year old boy, "I wanted joint custody. My son has not stayed
overnight with me for six months now.•
From parent losing joint physical custody request: "Nothing was resolved; conditions have gotten
worse. Equal physical custody should be awarded unless not wanted or dangerous to the child."
•nave you ever tried to squeeze two weeks of missed love into 20 hours and part of that on the rolld?"
"My faith and understanding in tho legal system concer~ing divorce is at an extreme all time low.•
Joint custody requestor losing sole custody to opposite spouse: "My wife refused counseling.
wasn't even asked if I wanted counseling."

"I do not agree but how do you fight an army without guns?"

\"
Father

uked lor .................. x
boys 14,9 mother
lobther
girl 12
pays no
asked for ............................................................ x
support
Court decree ............................................ x (physical custody to father)
Father
asked for ................................ x
Mother
asked for ............................................................. x
Court decree ........................................... x

boy

s

Father
asked for .................... x
girl 5
lobther
asked for ............................................................ x
r.curt decree ......................................... , .••..... , ••..•.•.. x (to mother)

Father
asked for .................... x
Mother
asked for ............................................................ ~
Court decree ............................................................ x
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boy
(td

mother)

$150

per mo.

$150

per me.

$200
per mo.

' Father

:

asked for .................... x

U
7

' Mother
·
I
asked for ••.. ,. •.......•..•. ·"

Court decree ................... x

Father

..

asked for ........................................... x

bay 4

$250

Mother

permo.

asked for ................... :><
Court decree ............................................................ ;< (to m'ther)
Father

asked for ., ................. x

boy lZ
boy9

Mother

asked for .... ......................... ................ .•.

. ., ..... x

Court decree .................. x
Fathe't

asked for .......................................................... x

boy 8

$250

per mo.

Mother

asked for ............................................................. x
Court decree ........................................................... x (to mother)
Father

asked for .................... x

9 to mother
12 to father

M:>ther

asked for .................... x
Court decree ................... x (split)
FatheT

asked for ............................................................. x

$150 per
child.

6
3

Mother

asked for .......................................................... ..
mther)

Court decree........ .. . .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. . .. • • .. • .. ................ ..
Father

s

uked for .......................................... x

$150 per

10

M:>ther

child

per mo.

asked for......................................

. .......... ..
Court decree ........................................... ·l<
Father

asked for ................... x
llbther

Sl90

boy 41,

per mo.

asiOOc! foT ........................................................... x
Court <le<:ree................................. . .. .. .. .. . . . . .. .. . ....... x (to mother)

Father

girl 23 mo.

asked for .................... x
Mother

asked for , ......................... ., .. . •

. ........ .

Court decree ..................................... .

none

~x

.. ............. x (to mother)

Father

asl<ed for .......................................... .
M:>ther
asked

girl 9

for ................... x

Cou'!'t decree .................................... .

................... x
........................................................x (to

11 ""' $150

per mo .

. . . . . . . . l(

······················~·······~~·~·

•.•• x.
....................................... x (l'hy•ical

Fath<lr
uked for
~t>ther

uked for

................

~..........

to

. . . . . . . . ..... $..... . ....... x
~

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .l(

Court decree

........ x (to

"x (to

n

13

$105

per mo.

l'ath<lr
S37S
per mo.

to

Father

asked for................................... .... ... .. . . .

• ...... x

asked for............................ ...... .... ......

. ....... x

Moth<lr

Court deer"

.................... ..............

.. ......... x (to

ll,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . :<

\

1:1•,
$257.46

per oo.
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~il.·v

""...((.";,
1.
.,...c;;_"...If'
fa tho-r

.,.........

....,

.

~~

'

.

.,..,~%

...

{'

((..,.

(%.

.. ..

-:s-~

"'q_"?,.
.....

"t.,"~

~

%.

-::~
~

('

f

'

asked for ............................................................

#-\~

·~·

o'"1>

~... "¢

X

Mother
asked for ............................................................. x
Court decree. • . • . . . . .. . .. .. . . • . • .. • .. • • • .. . . • .. • .. .. .. • • • . . .. .... · · · · · x

~irl

9

boy '

Father
~irl 7
asked for ............................................................ x
1>0)'5
Mother
asked for ............................................................ x
(to
mother)
Court decree ................................................. · •• • .. •·· .• x
Father
asked for ................................ x
Mother
asked for ................................ x
Court decree ........................................................... x (to mother)
Father
asked for ................... x
Mother
asked for ........................................................... x
Court d~cree ................................................ - · ·. · .. · · · .. x (to mother)
Father
asked for ..................... x
Mother
asked for .................... x
Court decree ................... x

$230
per mo.

$400

per mo.

$200

per mo.

$300
p!>T

mo.

boy 4

Fnher
2 boys
asked for ................... x
Mother
asked for ............................................................. x
Court decree ............... : ................................. · ........ · .x (to mother)
Father
asked for •...••••...••.•...•• x
Mother
asked for
Court decree ••••.•.•••.•••••.••••••••. • ......... • ..... • •x

girl 9

Father
$250 pel
girl 7
asked for ............................................. x
child
boyS
Mother
per mo.
uked for ............................................................. x
(to
mother)
Court decree ......................... •· .. •• •• •••• .. •••···••• .. •·••••· · .x
Father
asked for ............................................................ x
2~ yr. old
Mother
$1SO
asked for ........................................................... x
per mo.
Court decree ................... x

Father
asked for

.................. x

Mother

boys 18, 12
airl 16

asked for ............................................................ x
Court decree ........................................... x (Physical custody to mother)

$150 per

child
perlllO

Father
asked for ............................................................ x
Mother
asked for .......................................................... x
Court decree ........................... , ............... x

girl 10
gir1 1.4

ssoo

Father
asked for ................... x

boy 31!

$50

Mother

per mo.

per wk.

asked for ............................................................ :<
Court decree ........................................................... x (to mother)
Father
asked for ................... x
Mother
asked for ................... x
Court decree ................... x
Father
asked for

girl 10
girl 2

undecid·
ed

girl 2'1

Mother

asked for ............................................................ x
Court decree ........................................................... x (to mother)

Father
asked for ............................................................ x

none

Moth~r

for ....• ~ ••.••. , .•......•... ~ •..•...... , , ..........••........•. x
Court d~cree .......................................................... x (shift to father ~·hen
mother left state with
children.)
Father
$50 p<'f
girl 8
asked for ............................................................ x
bo)• s
mo. ~"''
Mother
child
asked for ........................................................... x
ask~

Court decree ........................................................... x(to r..other)
Father
girl ll
$150 pn
asked for .................. x
bo)·s 9,5 mo •'hen
Mother

1

asked for ....................................................... ..... x

Court decru .................. x
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children

with

mother

..

· .;

~"'

.

'(~

~1.

~·.O,·

~...¢'

..

I

Father

~-~~;;'"6....

r~
~.o,...

'

".....~.

.

~

t!

,~

---...,

....~t"

·~..'t.:

(

~.....
~/

.....

\,"

:J.~..

.,A. ,.

~·.;<::
~

i

asked for
girl !0
Mother
girl S
asked for ............................................................ x ·
.
Court decree ........................................................... x (to milther)

SlSO
per 1:'.0.
per ch.

Father

asked for ............................... x
10
M:lther
asked for ............................................................. x
Court decree ........................................................... x (to mother)

Sl75 per

mo.

Father
asked for .................... x

strl s

Mother

$175

per "'"'·

asked for .................... x
Court decree •.•••••••••••••••• x (11 days a month for child with father)
Father
asked for ............................................................. x
girl 12
libther
~tirl 16
asked for ....................................................... ;,. .. x
Court decree ............................................................ x (to fllther)

no chil~
support
from ·
oother
to father

Father
uked for

girl 12
boy 4

Mother

asked for .......................... ; ................................ x
Court decree ........................................................... x (to 1110ther)

$150 per
mo. per
child

Father

. asked for ................... x

girl 6

none

Mother

asked for ............................................................ x
Court decree............................................................x (to mother)

Father
~lo~ for .................... i

boy 11
boyH

none

asked for ............................................................. x
Court decree .................. x

Father
asked for .................... x
girl 8
Mother
asked for ............................................. x
Court decree ........................... ; ............... x (Physical custody to mother)
Father

asked for ................... x
Mother
asked for ............................................................ x
Court decree ••••••••••••••••.• x (father bas childml ~0\ of tlme)
Father
asked for ................... x

S200 per

boy 5

girl l

1110.

boy 12

$150

per

child

per mo.

Mother

asked for ................... x
Court decree .................. x (Mother: S

ssoo
per mo.

~~

Sun. to S I'M !led; Father: S PM Wed. to S I'M Sun.)

Father
asked for
Mothar

boys S, 9 $600
girl 7
per mo.
asked for ............................................................ x
Court decree ............................... , ........................... x (to mother)

Father
asked for
girl Z
Mother
asked for
Court decree ........................................................... x(to mother)
Father
asked for ................... x
Mother

asked for ............................................. .
O:>urt decree .......................................... x

girl 5

•.•. x
Cl.llltody

per mo.

to mther)
girl '

Fathar

$225

asked for ........................................................... x
Mother
asked for ........................................................... x
Court decree ......................................................... • ·"
Fathar

s ,14

asked for ................... x

~

!ot>tlv:r

Sl7S

per mo.

$400
per mo.

eked J91' ................... x
Coun d€ctee ........... " ..... x
Father

asked for ................... x
Mol:har

child 29 ::o.

uked for ........................................................... x
O:>urt decree

l'at)l.er

a,sked for ........................... , ................ x

boy 11

M)~r

ul<ei! for .............................. · • ...... · • .. • .. • .. • · · .. · .... • .x
,
Court decree . .. • ... ... . . .. .. .. • ........ .... .. • ........ ... ... .. ... •
.x (to mot ..er)
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$200
per

1110.

EXHIBIT I

ASSE~ffiLY

JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Interim Hearings on Assembly Bill 1706

October 14, 1981

San Diego. CA.

STATENENT OF JOHN R. ALEXANDER,
Commissioner of the Superior Court
Of che State of California for the County of Los Angeles
October 6, 1981

Feasibility of Joint Custody:

A Case

S~udy

Comparing the

Frequency of Later Contested Court Proceedings Arising Out of
Av.•ards of Exclusive vs. Joint Custody.
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1.

BACKGF.OUND

Do awards ,>f

joi.~t

of

1 cus

1

in domestic relations cases

te a

later flareups of controversy

r children
percentage of

awards of exc

sive

custody?
If the answer is aff

counsel

, court

of joint

should be cautious in making or s

ils to consent.

custody, especially when one parent
But

ii

controver

the frequency of

in exc

custody cases is significantly less
increasing use of joint custody is

§

ive cases,
ecially

now that we have almost two
1979 Joint Custody Act:

joint

ce under the

Cal.

e § 4600 as amended,

4600.5 (added 1979).
In searching for the answer to

the undersigned began in the

ter

t of 1978 collecting

data for a first hand study of custo
Department West J (Santa
Superior

Court~

question,

cases calendared in
s

f

The study

er 30, 1980, thus

s

covering a period of about two

s,

of which were after the January 1, 1980 ef
the new legislation.

-2

les County

t n

months

ctive date of

2.

CONDUCT AND

~lliTHODOLOGY

OF CASE STUDY

For every case which, during the period of the study,
went to what was presumably a "permanent" award of custody,
usually by interlocutory judgment of dissolution of marriage,
but sometimes by post-judgment order of modification, or
further judgment upon reserved issues after entry of interlocutory judgment, an index card was set up.

Each card was marked

"E" or "J" followed by a number -- "1" indicating an a'tvard
based on agreement or stipulation of both parents, and "2"
indicating an award made without consent of at least one
parent.

Class "2" cases were of two kinds:

(a) True defaults,

in which one parent remained totally passive and failed to
participate in any way in the proceedings; and (b) contested
hearings resulting in an award of custody over the express
objection and active opposition of one party.

Thus, a typical

default dissolution with a written marital settlement agreement
providing for exclusive custody was coded and filed under the
heading "El," while an unconsented av1ard of joint c·ustody
(made by this writer in December 1978) was coded "J2-l," the
number 1 there indicating that it was the first J2 case picked
up by the study.

(The J2 cases numbered 18 out of a total of

138, as will be seen shortly.)

Similarly, when disputes appeared on the Dept.. J
contested calendar involving requested changes of custody,
schedules or conditions of visitation, or alleged wilful

2.
-240-

disobedience of judgments or

s re

sita-

tion, the cards fer those cases were co

"3"

after the letter '-"or "J," depending on
pute arose out of
custody.

F~r

d

prior award

s-

exc
.c

exam?le, if a st

custody had been

~ade

ive

L

in 1975 --

incep-

tion of the study -- and a contested

cause

for change of custody to the o

on the

calendar during the two-year per
card was coded "E3."

s

However,

was made

within the period of the study and

trover

appeared on the calendar within

s

an E3

the same case had two cards, an
referencing the other.

also

In order to avo

same case twice, adjustments were

cross

count
t

net

totals avoided duplication.
Let us suppose fur

e of the

study, the controversy in that

a

stipulated award of joint cus
new card was

and

a

in

inclusion of the same case
not result

duplication,

e

acquired a dual character.

By

80,

time the s

the index cards made a

le sl

high, representing 414

e fi

cal

have
, as

a pi

an

s
-24 -

3.

RESULTS

A.

Summary

Of the total of 414 cases studied, 276 involved awards
of exclusive custody.

Eighty-seven of those generated later

controversy serious enough to bring the case on to the contested calendar in Dept. J, resulting in a percentage of controversy or failure rate of 31.5%
In the same period, 138 joint custody awards came before
the court.

Only 22 of these flared up in later contested court

proceedings, resulting in a percentage of 15.9%.
It is therefore accurate to state that joint custody
works twice as well as exclusive custody; or one could state
that the failure rate in joint custody cases is only one-half
that of exclusive cases.
Details appear in TABLE 1, attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein.

Note that in addition to the

final totals, interim figures are given for three dates during
the pendency of the study, showing a reasonable range of variation in the percentages.

Note also that throughout the study,

about 30% of the total cases involved awards of joint custody.
Analysis of the 138 joint custody cases vABLE 1, line 5)
is shown in the breakdown appearing in TABLE 2, indicating a
raw preliminary total of 151, but after adjustment for overlap
(see P.3, supra), containing a net total of 138.

Similar data

exists for the exclusive cases, showing adjustment from a raw
preliminary total of 284 dotvn to a net total of 276, but details
are omitted in the int:erest of brevity.
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f

e

that

the joint custody r:·ercentages herein stated are unrealistically
low.
The facts :oint in the op?osite direction:
more than one-ha 1 i of the joint

a~.vards

v1ere

Although

made in or after

January 1980, the inflmv was still fairly even, as reflected
in TABLE 3:

Note particularly hm.; those comparatively rare

cases -- unconsented joint awards (J2) -- were spread out:
4 in the latter part of 1978, 8 in 1979, and 6 in the first
nine months of 1980.
This data points up a proposition that is often overlooked:

Joint custody as a decisional technique should not

be characterized by the apparent novelty which its recent
statutory recognition might imply, because joint custody
awards have been recognized by California case law since the
early 1950s, if not before.
SAN

FR1u~CISCO,

See BURGE V. CITY & COUNTY OF

41 Cal. 2d 608 (1953) and MARRIAGE OF NEAL,

92 Cal. App. 3d 834, at 839-40 (1979).

The truth seems to be

that joint custody has been badly neglected, despite its solid
legal basis.

Thus, in one sense the Joint Custody Act was

superfluous and unnecessary; but in another sense that statute
served a useful purpose by publicizing the concept and encouraging its increased use.
If one compares lines 1, 2, and 3 of TABLE 2 (joint
custody breakdown), it is readily apparent that the vast majority of joint awards resulted from the agreement of both parents
(Jl).

From this it might be argued that most, if not all, of

the 22 J3 controversies must have originated in the 18 unconsented awards (J2).

If substantially more than one-half of
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see TABLE 1,
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tory of

custody.
If
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exclusive opposition's
send in the joint custody

st team,
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A similar tabulation (details omitted in the interest

of brevity) was made as a follow up of 23 E3 controversies
which were settled by joint awards-- 14 by agreement (Jl),
and 9 by unconsented joint award (J2):
those joint awards?

Answer:

How stable were

Extremely stable; only 3 out

of 23 flared up later on the contested calendar during the
period of the study.

C,

Time Lapse Factor

Some astute readers who have followed the unconsented
atvards in TABLE 3 into their later history in TABLE 4 may
have observed that all four of the J2 awards made in 1978
reappeared on the contested calendar before September 30,
1980, but that only two of the remaining J2 awards revealed
later controversy.

If we put aside case J2-16, J3-22, in

which an appeal was filed immediately after the court made
its unconsented award in August 1980, there 'l.vas only one
other such case:

J2-3, decided in April 1979.

Do these numbers mean that so many joint custody
awards came in so late in this study that there has not yet
been time for disputes to grow into the kind of controversy
which vwuld bring them in tv court again?

If so, it might

be argued that the number of contested proceedings arising
out of joint custody awards (J3) is unrealistically low and
the smaller percentage of controversy here derived for joint
awards is not accu:rate.
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EVALUATION AND FINDINGS

It is submitted that the data tabulated and discussed
above sustain these findings:
1.

The percentage of later contested court proceed-

ings generated by joint custody
exclusive custody cases.

~wards

is only half that of

In other words, the failure rate

of exclusive custody as a decisional technique is twice as
high as that of joint custody.
2.

When we isolate unconsented awards of joint

custody (J2), the percentage of controversy, even in this
high-risk sub-sample of cases, is not significantly higher
than in exclusive custody cases as a whole.

See TABLE 4

and discussion, pp. 7-8 supra.
3.

If an uncnnsented award of joint custody were

as unworkable as its critics claim,

~ ~.

the contention

in the NEAL opinion, p. 7 supra, one would expect that the
J2 cases (a)

would have a percentage of controversy ranging

from 60 to 80% or perhaps 90%, instead of 33.3%, as shown
by data sustaining finding 2, and (b) would all reappear on
the court's contested calendar within not more than six months.
Neither of the above expectations is true.
4.

Consequently, pessimistic predictions by critics

of joint custody that its widespread use would invite squabbling parents to bury the courts under an avalanche of petty
disputes over child raising have proved to be totally unfounded.

10.
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TABLE 1:

Frequency of Controversy in Joint and Exclusive
Custody Cases.

Nay 31, Septenber
1980
30, 1980

August
31, 1979

November
30' 1979

108

161

306

414

1.

Total number of cases

2.

AHards of exclusive custody

76

118

216

276

3.

Contested proceedings
arising out of
exclusive custody awards

22

31

64

87

4.

Percentage of controversy
(line 3 + line 2)

5.

Awards of joint custody

6.

Contested proceedings
ar1s1ng out of joint
custody awards

7.

8.

0.2895

0.2627

0.2963

0.3152

32

43

90

138

5

9

15

22

Percentage of controversy
(line 6 + line 5)

0.1563

0.2093

0.1667

0.1594

Proportion of joint awards
to total (line 5 ~ line 1)

0.2963

0.2671

0.2941

0.3333

T.·'.BLE l

(F ,~ ~~::· .:, '!
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TABLE 2:

1

Breakdown of Joint Custo

Controversies

Permanent joint a'.vards based on

ement

or stipulation (J-1) -------------------------- 111

2

3

Same:

Based on court decision

consent of one or both parents (J-2)

----------

Contested cases involving con trover
out of or based on joint award

arising

4

Preliminary total (lines

5

Adjustment for overlap
--(a)

6

W:L

- - ------

) ---- ---

18

22

--- - 151

3,

Contested cases (J-3 ,
also included in 1

-1)

-- -----

7

--(b)

Same: Included in 1

-2) ---------

6

--(c)

Total adjustment ------------- ---------

13

2

Adjusted total (line 4 - 1
5
(carried back to table 1, 1

138
5

TABLE 3:

Chronological Inflow of Joint Custody Awards.

Year and
Honth

Per Ar,rccmcnt
Or Stipulation

1978

Total

(J -1)

1

J2-l
-6
-8

-18
1978 Totals:

1

4

1979
J.:m.

1

Feb.

0

Narch
April

1

0
0
0

Hay
June
July
Aug.
Sep 1:.

5

·4
7
3
3
2

Oct.

2

Nov.
Dec.

2

1979 Totals:
1980
Jan.
Feb.
Harch
April
May
June
July
Aug.

7

J2-3
-9
J2-2
0

J2-10
0
0

J2-ll
J2-4
J2-5
-12

37

8

13

0
0

11
6

J2-7

9

0

0
0

J2-14
-15
-16
-17

Sept.

ll

0

1980 Totals:

71

6

Clmbined Tota 1:

45

J2-13

5
3
9
6

5
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-
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X
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X
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X
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3

Notice of

15

peal

0

led

t

26,

4

1

RESOLUTION

EXHIBIT J

DIGEST
Custody; Court's Authority to "Grant" Joint Custody and Criteria To Be Considered
Amends CivB COde sections 4600, 4600.1, 4606.2, and e,.600 •.5 to provide for the "grant" of
custody rather than the "award" of custody, to set forth
to be
by the court
in granting custody, and to permit
court to
to
parties on its own
motion.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

* * * * * * * * * * *

RESOLUTIONS COMMITTEE REPORT
Recommend DISAPPROVE

Reasons:
Civil Code section 4600 presently provides that
awarding custody of children is to both
Consequently, courts presently have authority to award
whether the parties ask for joint custody.

priority in
of them.
regardless of

Changing terminology from "award" to "grant" may be
some psychological help to
parties involved in a custody dispute, but does not appear to be of sufficient
magnitude to require amending current law.
There is a significant body of law in
factors to be determined
in making a decision as to what is in
best interests of
in terms of
custody. (See Marriage of Carney 0
24 Ca1.3d
[!57 Cal. Rptr• .383].) This
resolution proposes amending section 4600 to set forth various criteria to be
considered by the court in awarding custody, which criteria are not binding on the
court, and the court need not make findings on each
In essence, the
resolution seeks to bring to the attention of courts various factors that may or may
not be considered by the courts in
what
best interests of
children when there is a custody dispute.
amendment
the law
any more precise ln the area of child .._..,.,,."""'
courts to give more
to the nine i terns
factors which may be even more material in a

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
SECTION/COMMITTEE REPORT
FAMILY LAW SECTION
Recommend DISAPPROVE

Reasons:
the
The section is greatly bothered
(9) are especially troublesome. The Section
Code Section 4600., is
TEXT OF RESOLUTION

RESOLVED that the Conference of Delegates
legislation be sponsored to amend Sections
4600.2 and 4600.5 of the C
1 Code and
Section 4600.5 of the Civil Code to read as

1981 CONFERENCE
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Criteria (1 ), (.5), and
dealing with Civil

2
4
5

8
9

34

49

116
117
118
119

120
121
122.

123'

124
125
126
127
128
129 .

130
131
132
133
134
135

136
138
139

140
141
142

143
144
145

146
147
148
149

150
151
152
153
154
155

156
157
158

159
160

161
162
163
164
165
166

167
168
169

170
171
172
173

Oi!'li!!IE!'f.'T

58
60
61
62
63
64
65

.. ~
\

67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
11

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

92
94
95
96
97
98
99
0
l
102
3
4
5

106
107

112
3
114

ion

an

174
175
176
177
178 .purpose of assi
a
179 •hether an-awapd ~grant of joint
is appropriate under
180 this subd
, the court
an investiga181 tion be conducted pursuant to
prov
Section
182 4602. If
court
to enter an order ewe~d~e9
183 granting j
pursuant to this subdivision, the
184 court shall state in ts decision the reasons for denial
185 of en-award a
of oint custody.
186 (c) For the-purposes
this section, •j
187 means an order
granting
of the minor child or
188 children to both parents and provid
physical
189 custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as
190 to assure the child or children of f
and continuing
191 contact with both parents; provided,
, that such
192 order may ewePd grant joint legal custody without ewa~e~n~
193 granting joint physical custody.
194 (d) Any order for joint custody may be modified or ter195 minated upon the petition of one or both parents or on
196 the court's own
if it
shown that the best
197 interests of the child require
or termina198 tion of the order. The court shall state in its decision
199 the reasons for mod ication or terminat
of the joint
200 custody order if either parent opposes the modification
201 or termination order.
202 {e) Any order for the custody of the minor child or
203 children of a marriage entered by a court
th
state or
204 any other state may, subject to the jurisd
re205 quirements set forth in Sections 5152
5163, be
206
207

208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218

219

modified at
to an order of
custody in
accordance wi
the provisions of
section.
(f) In counties having a conciliation court, the court or
the par es
, at
rsuant to
rules of
court, consul
tion court for the purpose of assist
parties to
ate a
for
implementation
cus
order
to
controversy which
plan for cus
(g) Notwithstand
ion of law, access to
records and i
to a minor child,
including but not
, dental, and school
records, shall not
because
parent is not
t.
(Proposed new
stricken)
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STA'l'I:M!NT OP UASONS
1.
Presently the tera ~best
and its meaning is defined
advoc:atEHI aocil that of the tr
is needed. Attorneys will be
effectively in custody matters
guides judges in arriving at their
uniformity and predictability
neys who may not be acquainted
enc:es and track record of each
disadvantaged. Judges will
9
reviewed without resorting to total
section does not, however 1
t the
the criteria as he sees f
or to
2.
The custody provisions
custody of children should be "
the children. Semantics and word
lives of parties/clients as well as
leaves a subjective or mental
connotes a more neutral decision
used by courts and lawyers and the
for the •non-prevailing• parent can
on the manner in which parents and
order.
3.
Civil Code Section 4600
fusion among attorneys and
of joint custody. Within our own
whether joint cus
may be ra
pursuant to the under ing mandate
in "the child's best
ts";
issue of "j
eus
e
amendment clarifies
is matter
issue of joint
the
finds joint cus
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4.
Two ver
of Sect
has resulted, particularly s
several of the code books. Al
should control, specific act
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EXHIBIT K

Amn. J. OrthopHclliul . .HI3i. Julv 19/'1/

DIVORCE AND PARENTING
THE EXPERIENCE OF CHILDREN
IN A JOINT-CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT:
A Report of a Study
Susan Steinman, D.S.W.
Director, Joint Custody Study Project, Jewish Family and Children's Services. San Francisco

The psychological experience of 32 children living in a joint-custody arrangement with their parents is examined. This report is part of a larger
study, begun in 1978, of 24 families in which parents have shared childrearing responsibilities and physical custody of their children following
marital separation. Findings .mgge$1 that joint custody is not a simple
solution, and that the reaction of children is hiKhly indil'idual. The need for
further study is emphasized.

the last several years, joint
D uring
custody of children has emerged as
one of the m(\jor changes in family law
concepts and is currently a controversial issue among legal and mental health
professionals. The increased attention
to joint custody is related to several
m(\jor social trends. First, the changing
status of men and women in society and
within the family. stimulated by the
women's movement, has meant that
more women are pursuing careers while
men are assuming what was traditionally considered a .. mothering'' role

with their children. This trend has
affected custody decisions within the
courts, as well as experimentation with
alternative postdivorce living arrangements. Secondly, the spiraling divorce rate has produced a rapidly increasing population of divorced parents
and children. Current statistics show
that, since 1973, one million children
under the age of 18 each year newly
experience the disruption of their family
due to divorce. 2 Divorce is considered
to be a major life stress. 1 The impact of
divorce on children is gaining particular

Submilled to the Joum11i in Julr 19RIJ. Re 1earcl1 "'" 1 .\1/fJfJOr/ed h1· The Stitt Fmnci.1co Fmmdation. a/
/·om ill' ami Children'' .\enke1. San Frmwi11·o. and cr11ponwred ht· Culifi)l'nia Women l.tllt'-

.ft·~t·i,/1

ren.
0002-94321811030403-12$00.75

'c.·1981 American Orthopsychiatric Assocration, Inc.
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recognition. Further, the dissemination
of research findings on the effects
divorce on children has underscored
postdivorce family
key factor in the children's
from the divorce trauma.
most vulnerable are those
whose relationship with their father
disrupted following the divorce.
additional stress on these children
continued conflict between their
ents. 7 These findings, combined
other social factors, have led
movement to challenge the traditional
court practice of awarding
the mother and limited visitation to the
father, as well as to challenge the
adversary approach to
tody and visitation conflicts. This
created a favorable social climate
consideration of joint
ternative.
JOINT CUSTODY LITERATURE

While joint custody has become
increasingly popular
versial concept, and several
enacted legislation
tion, we still know very little
it works in actual
chological effects upon the
available literature has been
personal and professional
rather than on systematic
While these writings have
subject of joint CUStody for nrr\tP<O<:
and public
need to look at this
passionately, and to assess
ence of the children. In a
divorced fathers, selected
venience sample in New York
was found that fathers
tody

is

study
families in
The parsatisfied
children
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eluded:/) parent's personal history: 2)
METHOD
The families in this study were re- the predivorce marital and parent-child
cruited by personal referral and by ad- relationships; 3) factors in the divorce
vertisements in local newspapers. In decision and events and duration of the
selecting the sample from among the divorcing period; 4) the divorce experiparents who responded, the following ence for the children-including chilthree criteria were used to define joint dren's involvement in marital conflict,
custody: I) that the parents share au- communication to the children about the
thority and responsibility for making parents' separation, and the child's redecisions about the children;2) that the sponses; 5) the decision and arrangeparents view themselves as equally sig- ment of joint custody; 6) description of
nificant to the children and joint Iy re- the joint-custody arrangement: 7) adsponsible for their physical, emotional, vantages and disadvantages of joint
intellectual, and moral development: custody for parents; 8) parent's evaluaand 3) that the children live in two tion of advantages and disadvantages
for children: and 9) parent's perception
homes.
For inclusion in the study, the di- of child's adjustment.
Two semistructured clinical intervision of time the child spends with each
parent had to fall between 50/50 and views were conducted with each child,
67/33. (A division of time was specified using a combination of discussion and
for the purpose of assessing the chil- play with miniature house toys and famdren's experience of living a significant ily dolls to assess the child's feelings,
period in each parental home. However, attitudes, and modes of coping with liva broader view of joint custody- ing in two homes and with the divorce.
defined by the attitudes and behavior of All children completed a Family Drawthe parents-is recommended.) The ing, providing a projective measure of
parents also had to have been separated their feelings about themselves in relaand living in ajoint-custody situation for tion to their family. The children were
also administered the Coopersmith
a minimum of six months.
Interviews
Each parent and child was inter- Self-Esteem Inventory.
viewed by one of two clinicians* with were conducted with teachers to assess
specific training and experience in work the children's adjustment and gather imwith children. All members of the fam- pressions about the specific impact of
ily were interviewed separately in order joint custody in the school setting. Most
to assure the freest expression of their of the parent and child interviews were
individual viewpoints. The same clin- conducted at home. This allowed the
ician interviewed all members of the interviewer an additional view of the
two home environments, and an opfamily.
Two individual clinical, semistruc- portunity for informal observation oft he
tured interviews were conducted with child's sense of each home and relationeach mother and father. Information ship with each parent. The interview
gathered in the parent interviews in- data were supplemented by information
• Joyce Lindenbaum. M.S.W. or the author.
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from a specially developed
naire, self-administered by the
which tapped into information
coparenting arrangements, the relationship between the
parent-child relationship.
SUBJECTS

The 24 families and their 32
resided throughout five counties in
greater San Francisco
Area.
cause the main concern of the
to explore the psychological
of joint custody, the sample
limited to legally divorced
Seventeen of the .. ex-couples" were
vorced at the time ofthe interviews, four
were separated, and three had never
married. Two-thirds of the
been separated and maintained
custody arrangement for four years or
more, the range being two to nine years.
The average length of
eight years, with a range of two
teen years. The average number of
dren was 1.33, with a range
three. The parents ranged in age
to 50, most being in their mid
thirties. Economically.
erately comfortable but not
Their incomes ranged from
$40,000 annually, with the average
about $16,000. All parents were
except one who was black.
highly educated group;
had not attended or finished
31 of the 48 parents had either
degree or some
A.
the point of
had remarried and
living w;th a
Significantly, these parents
the general
cnts in that
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were characterized by the capacity to
tolerate differences in e'ach other. In
most cases, the differences in childrearing values and behavior were not
ml\ior. Where tension and residual anger
remained in the relationships, the anger
was muted. For these couples, the hostility during the marriage and divorce
had been relatively controlled. Rather
than making the children a battleground
for the marital or divorce-engendered
conflict, joint custody for these parents
seemed to be an affirmation of the positive aspect of their marriage. Most had
shared parenting during the marriage to
a great extent; the children had been a
source of mutual gratification and only
rarely of conflict.
Interestingly, many of these couples
had lengthy separations. Eighteen of the
21 legally married couples remained
separated for two to four years without a
final divorce, during which time they
established an extrcijudicial jointcustody arrangement. For some, this
period served as a transition phase in the
emotional divorce process: the coparenting helped to mute their sense of
loss and disruption, and allowed them
gradually to reorganize their lives.
The educational level of the men and
women in the sample was similar. All
but one of the women were currently
working, and most had been during the
marriage. Thus, the mother's motivation
for joint custody included their desire
for relief from full-time child-rearing responsibilities. Most had developed a
role other than that of parent as a source
of self-esteem. This was an important
factor in their ability to relinquish the
full-time parent role. Most of the fathers
had some flexibility in their jobs. which
allowed them to assume daily childrearing responsibilities. Most fathers

had been actively involved with their
children during the marriage, and had
made parenting a priorit~ in their lives.
The

Arran}(ement.~

The children's fischedules and arrangements for living in two houses
were worked out in various ways by
their parents. In half of the families, the
children alternated homes frequently
with a split-week schedule. A typical
example of such an arrangement is that
of Judy, age eight, whose parents lived
three miles apart in Oakland:
On Saturday, Judy was picked up by her father at
her mother's house and stayed with her father until
the following Tuesday morning when she went to
school. Tuesday afternoon. Judy was picked up at
her after-~chool day care program by her mother,
with whom she remained until the following
Saturday. Like most of the other children in the
study, Judy allended the same school and day care
program. regardless of which parent she was
staying with.

Twenty-five per cent of the families
arranged a week-to-week schedule:
Ten-year·old Steven lived one week in San Francisco with his father. and one week in Marin
County with his mother. He attended school in
Marin County.just a few blocks from his mother's
home. Both parents had agreed that he should
attend school in Marin because it was a better
'chool 'ystem. Steven·~ father. who worked full
time in San Francisco, drove him to school each
morning of "his week" and picked him up in the
evening after work. He also drove Steven to
weekend soccer league activities. in which Steven
was very involved.

The remaining families had different arrangements,
including
alternating
homes every day, every two weeks, and
every three months: in one family, the
children lived a year with each parent.
Most of the parents lived within five
miles of one another. but some Jived in
different counties, which required a
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major drive or bus trip. The
who
had a year-to-year schedule lived 120
miles apart-in a suburban
town
and a rural Northern California community.

Finances

provised arrangements for
penses. The typical system was
each parent assumed
day-to-day costs of food,
entertainment when the child was with
them, while sharing
penses. In several cases where
enfs income was higher, that
took on more of the extra expenses
care.
as private school tuition or
One set of parents pooled their income
and divided it evenly between
Another pair maintained a
checking account into which
posited equal sums of money
for special expenses such
lessons, gifb, etc Tax dedm:tion'>
alternated yearly, and the
had medical coverage
ment would cover the child'
care.
Overall, the arrangements
cooperative and
mothers felt they had the best
worlds in being able to pursue
and be a part-time parent The
very much valued their
maintain an active involvement
their children. Thu~
generally satisfying
these parents. It
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relationship with each parent, separate
in their minds, and did not feel they
confused one parent with the other.
(Several, however, did complain that
they called their Mom .. Dad" and vice
versa when they switched houses; they
found this frustrating and confusing.)
Most were able to distinguish between
their parents' personalities, behavior,
and values, and seemed to accept the
differences. While the children sometimes wished for changes in one or both
parental homes, most appeared able to
adapt to each household with a minimum of conflict and confusion:
Patty, age nine, who switched homes every day,
exemplifies this adaptation to minor differences
between parents. Patty thought her Mom was
stricter than her Dad, and said." At my Dad's,l get
my way a little better ... If I'm ~ick I get a little
more attention ... I kind of change my attitude of
where I can get to ... My Dad's more into health
food and wheat germ stuff. My Dad will only get
me chocolate drink with Tiger's Milk which I don't
really want ... but the differences aren't really big
things."

The differences in child-rearing styles
and values were not major in most
families. Equally as important, the parents were clear about their differences
and able to tolerate them. But where the
parents were in conflict over childrearing values or had major philosophical differences that involved the children, the children were greatly troubled
by it. Abo, where several of the children
were aware of differences in emotional
well-being or financial security between
their parents, they worried about the
parent who was alone or less materially
secure and wished for that parent to
have what the other parent had.
Loyalty

Loyalty conflicts are a major concern
in assessing the psychological well-

beingofchildrenofdivorce. Overall, the
children in this group were not torn by
crippling loyalty conflicts often seen in
children whose parents are fighting over
them or about them. This is an extremely important component of the
joint or cooperative parenting approach
-whether or not the children live
in two houses. The children in this
study, whose parents supported their
having a positive relationship with the
other parent, generally felt free to love
and be with both parents.
However, the idea that loyalty conflicts are nonexistent for joint-custody
children was not borne out by this study.
The conflicts do not disappear. Rather,
in the absence of overt conflict, some
children take it upon themselves, and go
to great lengths, to be fair. Loyalty concerns for about one-third of these children manifested themselves in a
"hyper-loyalty." These children were
hyper-alert to their parents' feelings and
concerned about being fair to both. This
worry about maintaining equality is illustrated by the case of Steven:
Ten-year-old Steven, who lived alternate weeko;
with each parent since the marital separation at
age four, was especially sen~itive to the emotional
up~ and downs his parents have had with the divorce. He was acutely aware of their effort' and
personal o;acrifice' in maintaining the jointcu,tody arrangement for him. Becau'e of this.
Steven felt it wa' hh re,pon,ihility to divide him'elfevenly between them. When he wa' 'ick or on
vacation. and 'pent more than the regular oneweek period with one parent, he was religiou'
about arranging compen~ation of time in hi'
'chedule for the parent he felt had been "shortchanged." Thi~ responsibility was comtricting and
emotionally burdensome for him.
Patty, age nine, who ~witched home' every day,
had similar concerns about being even-handed and
loyal to both her parent'i. But she wa; more conscious of this concern with equality and less burdened by it than was Steven. This in~ightful young
lady described her problem, "I'm always really
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equal about things. When I was
think if I kissed my Mom I
Dad and i slill have !hal
much. Now I feel like if .
to my Mom when my Dad is
exact same thing with him.
and he ;,n·l there. I'll go
house."
While Pauy's concem about
around evenly was partly due !o
she was important and wanted
sometimes posed problem for
that children of divorced
sides and say who is belter.
things ... it worries you a lot
something. I don't think fd have that
parents weren't divorced."
the joint-custody situation "'"",.,,,.<1
issue. "II may not work out,"
you've only got seven days for
there should be eight days a week-it
even. I could have three days
three days with the other parent,
days could divide-it would

As these
characteristic of
children is their
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Geot.:mphical Oislance

he experienced it p'ychololtlically. was of gre111
to him. When Roy Wti' usked whul he
would say to another hoy whose parents were
getting a divorce. he advised, "Tell him that his
mother and father might live close together and
then he could go and live with the other person and
get to see them. That never happened to me." In
reality Roy did gel to see both parents, but rather
than feeling that he had access to both--as the
adults would hope--Roy experienced a lack of
understanding and control over his life.
~on.;crn

The geographical distance between
the parents' homes may be a practical
issue in determining the feasibility of
joint custody. Distance is also a psychological factor from the children's
point of view. Not only did the distance
between homes affect their daily lives in
different ways, it had different psychological meaning to the children in this
Another eight-year-old boy, who openly missed
study. What an adult might consider to his mother and preferred living at her house, worbe geographical proximity may be expe- ried that the distance between his parents'
rienced very differently by a particular homes-particularly access to his mother'swould become problematic as the price of gasoline
child.
Many of the children who knew the rose.
geography well, had confidence in their
There was a third group of children for
ability to negotiate the distance between whom the geographical distance was a
homes, and had a sense that their par- stress, but who were able to master it:
ents were accessible, considered the
For 11-year-old Jim. the geographical distance
travel between homes a routine part of wa\ not a source of insecurity but rather an incontheir lives:
venience. which he resented but was quite able to
Nine-year-old Henry lived one week with his
mother and one week with his father, often
traveling by bicycle the two miles from school to
each parent's home. When asked about the location of his homes, he volunteered that his mother·~
house "was just a few blocks away" and proceeded
confidently to instruct the interviewer as to the
address and precise directions to his other home.
He evidenced a sense of freedom and access in the
arrangement. When Henry is at his mother's and
misses his father. he said, "I would just call him
and start talking because he's easy to get a hold of'
and the same with his mother.

In contrast to the children who, like
Henry, were confident about traveling
between homes, there were several who
found negotiating the distance a frightening experience:
Nine-year-old Roy, whme parenh lived two miles
apart, -.pent three days a week at hi' mother·, and
the remaining day' with hi\ father. taking the bu~
from school to each home. This child, who did not
have a clear sense of his schedule or the location of
his parents' homes. worried about his personal
,afety and was frightened of getting lost or going to
the wrong house. The distance between home,, a-;

manage. Jim took several buses from Berkeley to
San Francisco on Friday afternoons to be with hi\
father until Monday morning. He continually
complained that his parents' hou,es were "so far
apart." But unlike Roy, Jim felt he had some
choice and that the gratifications outweighed the
inconvenience. Jim explained, "I pay the price of
going across the Bay but it's well worth it 'cause I
see both my Mom and my Dad."
Jim ardently wished his father would move closer
to his mother·~ house where his school and friends
were. He wanted to spend time with his father but
felt the disruption in his social life. and resented
the long bus trips. A generally mature and realistic
11-year-old. Jim allowed himself a fantasy re-,olution to his problem. When asked about hi-, three
wi'>hcs, he admitled that he wanted to he able to
fly--then he would he able to fly ucrt'" the Hay
and stop in at his Dmf s house every day after
".:hool.
For ten-year-old Hobbie. the 120 miles between
his parent•,' homes created a mqjor disruption in
his life. Bobbie ha-. lived one year with ht~ mother
and one year with hi;, father since the separation at
age 5\12. When both parents lived in the ;,ame
neighborhood. he wa;, able to ride a bike over to
the other parent'' house to have dinner or just
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try, Bobbie says, "h won't be
2112 hour drive .. it makes a
the houses are so far npar! "
hb schedule, the
of

attempt to avoid the feelings of
ness at leaving the school, friends,
hood where he'd lived for most of
to live with his mother for the year.
ically discussed his scheduie,"We!l,
year we switch off
ifs not really
you make friends in one
switch over to the other one, as
reallystable.lt'skindofhardto
a year and then come back-everybody

School and

CUSTODY
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divorce and did not indicate that they
felt responsible for it.

Reconciliation Fantasies
Four out of five of these children
wanted their parents to live together,
and wished for their family to be reunited. They did not think that their parents would in fact reconcile, yet the wish
for the family to be together remained an
important emotional issue:
Annie, age eight, demonstrated thi~ ability to appraise the family situation realistically while at the
same time maintaining the wish that everyone be
together. Annie switched houses every two weeks
and had been injoint custody since age three. Both
of her parents were living with other partners.
When asked if children could make their parents
get back together, Annie asserted, .. Hardly ever!"
She then proceeded to describe a joint-custody
situation that would magically turn into a reconciliation. She envisioned a child who would switch
houses with increasing frequency, going "one
week-one week, then two days-two days, then one
day-one day, then no days and the parents would
be together because they'd see their son or
daughter wanted that."

mine ... I'd like to know what it's like with parents who are together. . 'cause I didn't know it.!
was two years old. I always wonder what ifs like
living with your mother and your father and maybe
a sister or brother-a real sister or brother-and
now I cannot have an official sister or brother."

While these children were impressive
in their ability to appraise realistically
the problems in their parents' relationship, and most had achieved an ageappropriate understanding of their parents' divorce, the wish for reconciliation
remained underground. Joint custody
provides children an opportunity to witness ongoing cooperation between their
parents on their behalf. While giving
them a sense of their continuing importance in their parents' lives, it may
also keep alive the wish for the reunited
family.
CONCLUSIONS

Although the topic of joint custody
has generated a great deal of recent
interest among legal and mental health
MichaeL was nearly five when his parents sepa- professionals, much of the available
rated. When interviewed at age seven. he under- information-both pro and con-has
stood that his parents divorced because" Mom and been based on opinion and personal or
Dad were in a lot of arguments." His mother had professional values. This report is the
remarried and his father had lived with a new
partner for a significant period of time. He first of a study that attempts to take a
doubted his parents would get back together, but more dispassionate look at the problems
when asked what he didn't like about living in two of joint custody, and to help take the
houses, Michael shared his wish that everyone arguments out of the abstract. A sublive together in one big house-that father and hi~ sequent paper will focus in greater depth
live-in partner would move to his mother's hou~e
(the original family's home). Michael ~olved the on the parents, explore the issue of reproblem of his mother's remarriage and father's marriage and joint custody, and contain
new relationship by proposing that father and his a follow-up report on the families_
new partner move to mother's downstairs, which
The present findings indicate that, in
had been converted into a rental unit.
general,· the parents who chose joint
Nine-year-old Patty was among the children who custody found the arrangement satisused their capacities to understand and adapt well factory despite some difficulties; they
to the divorce. She was very cognizant of the
felt it to be congruent with their value
realities of her parents' relationship, but acknowledged her wish to "check out'" life in her original system, life-style, and relationship with
family. ··My crazy great-aunt think~ my parent~ their children. Their children's experiwill get married again. I don't but if, a wish of ence of joint custody was more mixed.
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the child:
evaluated

self-esteem.
However,
children felt
mands and

enced by this group. it was
arrangement did not
have added to their burden.
The

them in the proenvironment suited
of each child.
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Abstract of the Dissertation
EMOTIONAL ADJUS'fMENT OF BOYS IN SOLE CUSTODY AND JOINT

--

CUSTODY DIVORCES COMPARED WITH ADJUSTfi!ENT OF
BOYS IN HAPPY AND UNHAPPY MARRIAGES

Presented to the Faculty of the
CALIFORNIA

GR~DUATE

INSTITUTE

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology
by
Everett Quentin Pojman
July 1981
Leo Weisbender, PhD, Dissertation Chairman
Introduction
Recently, joint custody of children has been tried by some
divorcing parents as an alternative to the traditional sole
custody.

Theorists have conflicting opinions in terms of

sharing custody.

Some theorists believe

tha~

sole custody

is the only healthy approach to child rearing following a
divorce, whereas other theorists believe that joint custody
is preferred.

This research was an attempt to compare the

emotional adjustment of boys in these two groups.

Two other

groups were used as controls to determine how these boys of
divorce differed from boys living in families where marriages
remained intact.

These groups were happily married and un-

happily married.

The questions explored were:
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parents report an unhappy

l

s
s

hypotheses were:
1.

Boys of happy marriages
emotional adjustments than

tter

2.

happy marriages wi
1 adjustments

tter

s of unhappy marria
ional adjustments

3
4

poorer

Boys of joint custody wi
emotional adjustments than

r

Review of the literature
The literature revealed that
ch

n generally go through a

adaptation

continue long after

may

resu

that often

a

1

lvement
to

ren

cilitate

so
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s been ac
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s

5

13.
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matched on demographic variables.

Three diffe

tools were used to assess the boys:

measurement(

the Lou

Checklist (parents' rating), the Inferred Se

Scale

(teachers' rating), and the California Test of Pers
(child's rating).

The results of the rating

computed and each group was compared by a one

ty

s were
analys

variance.
Findings
Results supported the hypothesis that boys of happily married
parents were significantly better adjusted on the
Test of Personality and the Louisville Behavior Che

t,

respectively, than were boys of sole custody (J2.< .Ol)(J2.< .01),
and boys of unhappily married parents (J2. < • 01) ( < •

)•

How-

ever, no significant difference was reported
Self-Concept Scale.

Boys of happily married

o

demonstrated significantly better adjustment on
Adjustment part of the California Test of Personality (
and on 4 of 12 subtests within the same test when c
boys of joint custody.

.01),

to

No significant differences were reported

on the other two instruments.

It was demonstrated that

joint custody were significantly better emotionally

of
sted

than boys of sole custody and the unhappily married group on
both the Louisville Behavior Checklist (Q< .01)
Self-Concept Scale (J2.< .01).

rred

There were no significant differences

on any total test or subtest between boys of s

cu

and

boys of unhappily married parents.
Conclusions
Hypothesis 1 was partially accepted while
-275-

ses 2, J,

and 4, were fully confirmed.

The results

that boys of joint custody are

th

indicate

tter

of sole

'•

custody and boys of parents who are unhappily

The re-

search also demonstrated that sole custody d

has no more

adverse emotional effects on a child
the parents are unhappily married.

a home where
Converse

, the results

support the possibility that a si

cou

improve with a

change from an unhappy marital situat

to a jo

custodial

divorce situation.
Recommendations
While the findings confirm the advantages

jo

thereby supporting the theorists who
is a

jo

ferred approach to child rear

these results can be

areas to see
of the country.

other geographic

ne

ed to other parts

A randomized sample would

f

Longitudinal studies following the course
arrangements would also be helpful.
s as adults?

In this study,

were filled out by mothers.

custody

a divorce,

more research is needed on similar subje

out

custody,

var

custodial

wou

se

n

of

s

What

n

filled

rating scales and marital

s?

is change

the results?

\'Jould the marital groups

ristics?

Only through

will these questions be answered.
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EXHIBIT M

May ll,

1981

Elihu H. Harris
Ch<1irman
Assembly Committee on Judiciary
11th <1nd "L" BuilcHng, Room 820
Sacramento, California 95814
Dear Assemblyman Harris:
I am writing to express the strongest pass
opposition
to AB 1706 currently schedulc~d for hearing before your Committee
on \'Jednc~sday, May 13, 1981.
I h.1ve been the Domestic
ntions
Judge for the San Francisco P>upe1ior Court for more than four
years.
In th<1t capacity and on behalf of the CaliFornia Judges
Association, I testified on behalf of legislation amending Civil
Code Section 4600 to provide joint custody as an equal alternative to sole custody, and I :~trongly support
t concept.
However, I am strongly opposed to AB 1706 whi
that there be joint custody unlc·~s one of the parent
to be unfit to have custody.
This concept tota
primary concept of the best jnteLest of
on
looks to whether or not a pa.·ent is unfit.
A parent can be a
fit parent, but this does not medn that joint cus
would be
successful for the child or the Darents.
I
fact, unles
the
parent is a 900d candidate for joint cus
,
wil be a disas t:er for the child c:v(~n thongh i he parent is a fit paront.
s s for
As a practical matter, we have had almost no
joint custody in Si:ln Francisco, since Civil Code Sect
4600
was amended effective J<1nuary l, 1980. A
st all of
custody. <1rrangements
ch we have arranged since
t
c<1ses in which our court counselors recommended to
that they try joint custody.
This shows two
shows that in many places in the state there is no great interest
from any large number of parents to have joint cus
Secondly, it shows that joint custody can only work in circumstances
where the parents <1re good c.1ndirl<1tes for joint cus
and such
an arranqcment would be benericirtl to the child.
T\T3 1.706 tot-c:dly i<JilOH's fh,, b0st interest of the child :1nd
! hat l:h(~rc
joint en~;! ody unless the col r
finds one
of the parents to be unfit.
This will promote chi
custody
JrJand<~tes

be
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Elilu1 M. Hdcris
i·L y ll
1981

Two

lit yat
, where one paren
to he: unfit and, in effect 1
ch California eliminated
vorce.

1s

parent
di-

I urge your Conuni ttee to dn
t out of Committe<'.

not pa s

s

Vc

DBK/jrs
cc:

Charles Imbrecht, Vice
Howard Berman
Gary Hart
Walter M. Ingalls
lliam Leonard
lister McAlister
(; n Moorhead
Richard Robinson
Dave Stirl
Larry Stirl
Art Torres
l'v1Zlx ne Waters
Ph 11
D. Wyman
Rub n
z, Consultant

rman
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Honorable Elihu Harris
Chairperson, Assembly Judiciary
State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Assemblyman Harris:

.~~

·, · r ·-~ t t • 1 ~1.

, · t,

r~''·
f !t·!

•,',),

I'{

'I'

"'I .
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1 1{'
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I am writing to express my strong oppos ion to Assembly
Bill 1706, which you and members of the Assembly Judie
Committee are presently consider
Let me say at the outset that I have been
since
1970 in a study of the effects of d
on children .
My work has been done largely in California but has been
published widely in professional
lega journals,
and in a book entitled
How Children
and Parents Cope with
,
ished in May,
1980. The work which my colleagues
have pursued has
been nationally and internationally
zed as the major
body of knowledge that exists
the e feet of
divorce on children.
I was also a member of the Family
Law Advisory Commission to the Senate
Administration of Justice, as well as a
Commission on Law and Mental Health of the State Bar of
California.
I speak, therefore, on the basi of many years
of work and a very special cornrnittment to children and
parents in divorcing families.
My concerns are the following:
There is no research
evidence anywhere that joint cu
is
better arrangement for all children in divorc
own
work, which has indeed stressed
of continuity with both parents, has been
this
presumption of joint custody.
I want to say unequivocally that this is an unwarranted concl
from my work.
Joint custody is a complex arrangement within post-divorce
families which requires very special and
extraordinary cooperation and committment from
It is,
in my view, a viable option which should be made available
to persons who bring this committment and
to their
parenting.
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Assemblyman Elihu Harris
May 7, 1981
page 3

I have one other con
I would l
to note
again an issue which
consideration of
in custody del
mud slinging contests
into the courts.
I am
at defaming the other
interests of the child
ship in the post

tion
relation-

For all these reasons, I would
Committee not to pass AB 1706.
personally, but
wou
able to testi
that I can in
in any other
the Judiciary
Thank you very much.
Yours Tru

Wa
Executive
JW/mg
cc: Ms. Lette
Consultant to
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597
bor Code

DEERING'S
compensa·

§ 4703

DEERING'S CIVIL

litem, may bring an action in the superior
court against the errant parent for the support, maintenance, or education of the child.
[1969 ch 1608 § &.} Cal Jur 3d Family Law
§§ 306, 31 J; Witkin Procedure
pp 2358,
2372; Witkin Summary (8th ed) pp 1015,
4639, 4653.

§ 4704. [Amendment of child support or·
der without terminating support at age of
majority.] (a) Any order issued prior to
March 4, 1972, providing for support for a
child may be amended or modified by the
court having jurisdiction to increase or decrease the amount of such award without
terminating such award at the age of majority based on 18 years of age.
(b) This section does not constitute a
change in, but is declaratory of, the existing
law. [1974 ch 81 § 1.] Cal Jur Jd Family
Law §327.

598

§ 4705, [Credit for payments for support
of child made pursuant to the Social Secu·
rity Act or Railroad Retirement Act.] In
any case in which the court has ordered a
noncustodial parent to pay for the support,
maintenance, and education of a child, payments for the support of such child made by
the federal government pursuant to the Social Security Act or Railroad Retirement
Act because of the retirement or disability of
the noncustodial parent and transmitted to
the custodial parent each month shall be
credited toward the amount ordered by the
court to be paid for that month by the
noncustodial parent for support of the child
unless the payments made by the federal
government were taken into consideration by
the court in determining the amount of
support to be paid by the noncustodial parent [1979 ch 69 § 1.]

TITLE 6
Property Rights of the Parties
Court's equal division of community and quasi-community roperty, and award of
particular asset or additional award or offset:
1gnment of "community
property personal injury damages."
urisdiction of spouse's community and quasi-comm 1ty real property by virtue of
service of summons.
§ 4800.6. Not e by attorney of community property liabil~ .
§ 4801. Circu tances considered in marking supp " order: Findings with respect to
c umstances: Modification or revoc Ion of order: Termination of liability.
§ 480L5. Presump ·
of decreased need and m ·fic.ation of support payment of party
coha
ting with person of op tte sex.
usa! support order.tf>y assignment of wages.
§ 4801.6. Enforcement of
§ 4801.7. Payment of spousa upport to cou~ officer.
§ 4802. Contract altering s
ses' legaytelations: Restriction to property or to support
on)'harriage's dissolution: Consideration.
during separat
§ 4803. "Quasi-community propert "· ersonal property constituting.
§ 4804. Same: Exclusion from "sep a property."
§ 4805. Enforcement of decree, j)tdgmen or order: Order in resorting to kinds of property
of spouse(s). /
out of separate property of other party:
§ 4806. Withholding of allowance to one pa
When pe~ted.
§ 4807. Court's discretiop: as to proportions of pro
y subjected to child support.
§ 4809. Service of noti¢' prerequisite to validity of su
uent order: Service on attorney.
§ 4810. Revision of lfoperty disposition, on appeal.
§ 4811. Severabilit of agreement's provisions from other ovisions as to property and/or
s port: Orders for child support or for
port of either party, and
odific.ation or revocation 'thereof: Time statute e
§ 4812. Orde for support of spouse on discharge in bankruptcy.
§ 4813. Ju · diction over property of spouse when service by publication.
§ 480
[Court's equal division of communi
and quasi-community property, and

award of particular asset or additional
a1vard or offset: Assignment of "community
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EXHIBIT P

lOS ANGElES COUNTY SUPERIOR
FAMILY lAW DEPARTMENT
GUIDELINES FOR INITIAl ORDER TO SHOW
The schedule set forth below represents a consensus of suggested
amounts which counsel may care to use in
and in consultation
with clients on temporary support matters.
figures and text are not
binding upon the court or the parties.

SPOUSAL AND CHILD SUPPORT
The following support schedule is based
total net monthly income
after the usual standard mandatory deductions.
NET
MONTHLY
INCOME

SPOUSE

$ 400

$100

$ 8U

500

150
200
250

100

250

225
225
250
275
300
325
350
400

600

700
800
900
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000

AlONE

ONE CHILD ALONE
(MORE THAN ONE, NOT
OVER AMOUNT IN COLUMN

300
325
400

460
530
600
650

e·

1

$100
150
250
350
375
400
450
500
560
640
720
800

150
175

SPOUSE
AND 3 OR
MORE

SPOUSE
AND
2 CHiLDREN

CHilDREN

$100

$100

150
250
350

150
250
350

400

400

425
475

900

450
500
600
700
800
900
1000

45%

50%

550

630
720
8!0

Above

2000

33VJ

40%

Tn order that employment not be discouraged, if
petitioning spouse
is employed, approximately one-half
that spouse's net earnings will be
deducted from the indicated spousal support and will be
in
setting child support. Other benefits or compensation from whatever source
will be considered. Child care costs for the
parent will be
deducted from gross income in calculating the custodial
·s net
earnings.
Car, furniture, credit union payments,
similar payments and financial requirements
tion ar:d may affec£ the: schedule, as will the

estate taxes, and other
be taken into con-;idera?.sset~ m~ct !;"'!_:,!!ities.

*Support amounts per child
Dated: January 28, 1981

child may be less.
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RELATIONS RULES FOR SACRAMENTO
COUNTY SFPERIOR COURT
fective
0)

ORDER

exceed amount in
Column 6

Child

Children

Spouse -Th...,..
or
Children

$50-$ 75
50- 75
50- 75
75- 100
75- !00
15- 100
125
!00· 125
100- !50
!00· 150
!25- )75
!25- 175
250
250

$100

* 125

100

$ 100
125

!50
250
300
375

!50
250

Monthly

125
150
250
30()

350
375
425

475
550
650
700
775
!!75

EX PARTE
GUAGE
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425
475
&25

550
650

725
800

775

1,00()

1,!00
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IXI'>Nnrth

'i4}.C,;,ji

S:mta Ana, CA.

October

, 198

ASSEMBLY COMMITTE ON JUDICIARY
Hon. Elihu M.&arris, Chairman
1127 11th Street
Room 820
Sacramento, CA
11
He:

:·

AB 1706

Dear Committe Members;
I would like to enter into the record the fol
remarks and observations in
tion to the extemporaneous remarks I was honored to
be allowed to make at the hearing yest
on the above referenced
bill. Let me
ace these remarks by stat
that I am an attorney,
practicing prim~ri y in the field of family law, mostly in Orange
County, but also in the surrounding counties of Los Angeles,
Riverside, San Bernardino and San Diego. These remarks are based
on my own experience, as well as my observations in court, and
conversations with litigants involved in cust
matters, other
attorneys, and court and Conciliation Court personnel.

•

To begin with, I bnlieve that Mr. Stirl
's concern, as
apparent "Ba kaniz.ation" or the California court , as wel
Chairman's concern, as t
the pracitce of the courts in i
g,
or at least
l
to
lement the law as i
now stands, is based
V9ry much on reality. These concerns are well
It seems
that each
sets it's own standards for the
ementation or
nonlementation of the custody law.
In fact, each branch court
of counties such as Los Angeles, which has several, has it's own
procedures
standards, usually set either by the presiding judge
or the commiss
handl
most OSCs in Fami
Law departments.
This is how the situation appears to the fami
law Practitioners
in those court . The on
constant in these courts seems to be
a reluctance, or an
refusal, to
joint custody except
in those rare cases wherein Loth
ies agree to such an order,
usually at the
of the Conciliation Court. As you are aware,
the courts have
had the power to do just that, and, in this
respect, AB 1408, now CC 4600 et seq., has had no impact.
In some
extreme cases, the pres
judicial officer has even refused to
award joint cust
when both parties, and their at
, have
joined in such a request. ~his is admittedly a rare situation, and
has
J.y once, to my certain knowl
, when Commissioner
Jules Barnet , now retired, who then presided over the OSC department
in the
Beach branch court of Los An
es, refused to a 1 low a
joint cust
because he did not "believe in joint custody".
Let me hast
to add that this order was overturned on
-1-
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at it

out an
confli
t

s in
, in any case
e, the order
, who refuses
) knows that,
ies' separation, she
decree.
of the

through
It

disservice
nothing
The
the

are in

In
with

the
law.

such
of
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Page three
such denial of meaningful relationships with a parent, on the children.
I believe there is no argument that such denial is harmful. The
Legislature has already determined that frequent and continuing
contact with both parents is in the best interests of children.
The corollary then, is that denial of such contacts is detrimental
to ~uch best interests. Therefore, we must look for a way to
increase the contacts, as by joint physical custody arrangements,
and, if necessary, such arrangements being imposed by the courts,
rather than left to the wishful hope of agreement by angry, vengeful
non-cooperative parents.
Please note that I am speaking of joint physical custody arrangements,
wherein both parents share in responsibility, as well as the right,
of actual custody of the children. For many years, awards of something called joint legal custody have been made by the courts, as
a cosmetic cover-up of the fact that the parent without physical
custody has no meaningful access to the children, nor any possibility
of influencing their behavior, or, in fact, any real hope of a family
relafionship. Joint legal custody without physical custody is a
cruel hoax, perpetrated on one of the parents and on the children.
Tho concept should be eliminated from our statutes, and tho only
joint custody should be physical, tho only meaningful arrangement.
As to whatever rights parents may think joint legal custody gives
them, they are an illusion.
Usually, these are the rights guaranteed
to any non-custodial parent under the provisions of CC 4600.5 (g).
In an arrangement whereby children see one parent only four days
per month, there can be no real decision sharing.
I believe that orders for real joint physical custody would decrease,
not increase, further litigation.
It is my experience and observation
that most custody modification attempts and contempt cases arise out
of unsatisfactory sole custody orders. This contention is clearly
supported by Commissioner Alexander's reasearch.
And, of course,
Commissioner Alexander is uniqtwly qualtfied to speak to this issue,
as he is the only judicial officer of whom I have knowledge that has
consistently, for years, made joint custody orders.
Generally, a
parent who has been deprived of a meaningful relationship with his
children will, sometimes many times, seek to increase his time with
them, leading to battles for expanded visitation, changed sole custody,
attempted joint custody, contempt actions for denial of visitation,
attempts to pressure the custodial parent by withholding support
payments, and so on ad nauseum.
Simple logic would indicate that
a mean~ngful joint custody order would eliminate much of this
wrangling.
What then, would be the solution to these problems? In my opinion,
a valuable first step would be the adoption of the Kapiloff bill,
with some revisions, and one more change. The most important
revision I see is the one Mr. Kapiloff has already promised, the
deletion of the unfitness phrase. Note that virtually all of the
opposition to the bill focussed on this issue. At present, the issue
of parental fitness is the central one in most custody fights, which
usually involve sole custody battles.
I would recommend borrowing
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the language of CC 4601, the visitation statute, and, in
ace of
the phrase concerning fitness, substitute the wording, "unless it
is shown that such an order would be detrimental to the best interests
of the child". This statement, combined with the other exception,
unless the parties agree to another
, would prevent
this type of order from being imposed in
ate cases.
There
would then be two circumstances where joint
not be
awarded, first, where the parents didn't want it, and second, where
the court determined, based on evi
it shouldn't be vrdered.
The second changer would make in the
law would be to make
it mandatory that a party or parties
joint custody
would submit a plan for the implementation
such an order, rather
than discretionary on the court. The court would, of course, be
free to reject the plan and substitute one of it's own, if it felt
it would be more appropriate in the
case.
I would certainly
retain the language in the present law that an order for joint custody
might be modified or terminated if it is shown that the best interests
of the children require it.
See CC 4600.5 d).
I woul absolutely
eliminate ~he language in CC 4600.5 (c)
that the court
could order joint legal custody without
joint
ical
custody, for reasons outlined at len
above.
May I say here, parenthetically, that the elimination of the facade
present
of joint
would make Assemb
b 11, A.B. 2202 unnecessary.
I great
admire Mr. Imbrecht for his
attempts to protect children of divorce an insure
to
divorcing
, but in this case, I believe
efforts are misdirected.
Now, as to the
icality of
on
non-consent
parents:
First, may I
lawsuits,
the resu t is an order that one, somet
not
like, and sometimes violent1y disagree wi
However, I have never
s
n
court fail to send a convicted cr
to
inement because
he didn'
agree with the order, nor to t
aren that he would
not have to pay support because he didn't agree with the order. As I
stated yesterday, the court has the power to enforce it'
orders, both
by the contempt power, and by tak
cus
from
non-cooperative parent and giving sole custody to the other. This would
certain
be an incentive to
agree with pr.
Trombetta's statement that most
, and would
with the orders of the court.
In summary then, I believe that AB 1706 is necessary to ensure the
best interests of children of
p
s, that
the le
fiction of joint le
should
be eliminated, and that joint
bo made
ical and enforceable.
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Once again, I thank this committee for the opportunity to present
my views, and again would like to take the opportunity to express
my admiration for the professional ~nJ intelligent conduct of the
hearing in San Diego, and for the searching and cogent questions
and comments of the members of the committee.
Sincerely,

ALLEN R. McMAHON,

Attorney at Law

ARM:hs
cc: Assemblyman Lawrence Kapiloff
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RESPOND TO:

325 SO. MELROSE DRIVE
ISTA, CA ll%083
7!16•66:!11

MURRAY

liU.. OOM

DIRECTOR

JUOGI! OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

October 15

1981
Assemblyman Elihu M. Harris, Chai
California Legislature Ass
Committee on Judiciary
1127 11th St., Room 820
Sacramento, Ca. 95814
Dear Assemblyman Harris and Hon.

t

Thank you for the opportuni
I had yesterday
speak
before your Committee on Assembly B lls 1706
Having
heard the input from so many knowl
e yesterday,
I am even more strongly convinced that
ve y we 1
intentioned, Assembly Bill 1706 should
Shared parental responsibilit es
dissolved is extremely important for the we
Our mediation efforts in Conciliation Courts
state in concert with the efforts of
this
red parenting is working ve y
a j
, I was somewhat offended
the
that j
s were not ordering sha
l) routinely because of their
go nto this court and ot r cour
studied in my position as presiden
Chapter of the International Associa
Cour
, I can attest to
fact tha
evaluated
court staff and
this manner
the best interes s

marriage is
e of
ldren.
oughout this
s to promote
am not
heard

As
Bill 1706 would promote
the benefits of joint cus
ins
we have now bui t toward shared c s

s to disprove
r t
efforts

29

California Legislature Assembly
Committee on Judiciary
October 15, 1981
Page 2
Please consider the necessity of keeping these cases
out of the courtroom, something which we have accomplished
in the past few years, and consider that the passage of 1706
will only bring such cases back into the battlefield again.
Very truly yours,

~~
MB: im
cc:
Hon.
Hon.
Hon.
Hon.
Hon.
Hon.
Hon.
Hon.
Hon.
Hon.
Hon.
Hon.
Hon.
Hon.
Hon.
Hon.

Charles Imbrecht
Howard Berman
Gary Hart
Walter Ingalls
William Leonard
Alister McAlister
Jean Moorhead
Richard Robinson
DAve Stirling
Larry Stirling
Art Torres
Maxine Waters
Phillip Wyman
Donald King, Judge
Michael I. Greer, Judge
William L. Todd, Jr., Judge
Mr. Hugh I1cisaac

- 2 -
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Frederic W. Ilfeld
PSYCHIATRY

Alhambra Psychotherapy Center
718 ALHAMBRA BOULEVARD
SACRAMENTO, CA 95816
(916)441-1925

AMembf.umcm E£ihu H~
ChaAAinan., AM embly JucUuMy Camm...{;t;te.e.
S.ta;te. Capilal Bu.ilcUng
Sa.cJLame.nta, Ca.£. 95814
Ve.alt AJ.J.oemblyman

21

981

H~.

In my Oe.tabett 14 te..oti.monCJ be.fio!1..e. the.
e.vwu.gh :time. to .ope.ak about that paf1...t.,Lan. ofi
CouJI-t to aWMd j ain,t le.ga.£ cu.J.Jtady wilhout
I w.i..;.,h :the. 6oilawing .otateme.nt to be adde.d

AM embR.y
A.• B. 1106

a.waJuiing
:to the.

1 did nat have.
option {)011.. a
c.u.J.J:tody. Can.oe.que.n,tly,
o11..al :te..o:tima n.y.

I .6uppott:t 11..emaving .the. di.otinc;tion be;twee.n
and joi.nt .t'egat c_u.otody
a.o ptwvide.d in A.B. 1706 6of1.. .oe.vettal fl..eMan.J.J.
mu own cLi.vuc.a.t ob.oe.11..vation.o a.o we..U
a.o fi!1..om o.theM' te..oti.mony, I 6ind that :the. CaUf1..:t i-6 clAcumven:tl.ng wha.t i-6 c.on.oide.11..ed by
mo.o:t paJu?. n:t..o :the mo.o:t: impof1...tant p11..ovi.oion o6 "joint c.u.J.Jtody" (e.. g. fi!1..e.quent and c.ontinuJ.ng
c.on:tae.t with bo:th pMent.oJ by g11..awng "joint le.gal c.u.o:tody." Su.c.h a.n aWMd .ouggu.t6
tha;t .the.lte. i-6 a joint c.u.o:tody .oilua.:tion, whe.11..e.a.o
6ac..t :thi.o i-6 no:t M, be.c.au.oe. :the.f1..e.
i-6 no:t built in;to :thi-6 aMang eme.nt 6f1..e.que.nt c.on;tac..t be;twe.e.n c.hil..d and both patte.nt.o.
(Pa.tte.nthetic.aUy, I might me.ntion .tha;t p.oyc.hologic.al fl..e.OeMch hall demon.o:tf1..ate.d c.onvinc.ingly
:that il 1.6 p!1..e.we..ty :thi,.o 6f1..e.que.n:t and c.ontinuing c.on:tac..t with bo:th pa.tte.nt.o :that i-6 M
emotionally be.ne.6-{.Ua.£ :to :the. c.hil.d.J Fuf1..:thettmotte.,
legal cu.otody without jo-Lnt
phy.oic..a.t c.u.o:tOdy i-6 fiaittly me.aninglu.o be.c.au.oe. mMt
afi{)e.c..ting :the. he.a.t:th,
e.duc.atio n, and we.lfia.tte o 6 the. c.hil..d a.tte. made. by
(Oft patte.nt.o) wilh whom :the.
chitd tte,.oidu on a day-:to-dalj ba.oi-6. The pa.tte.nt
phy,oic..al
i-6 (a.tte)
the one. Cc.) with de. 6ado le.ga.£ c..u.otody.
so many othe!! w. Ltrt<?..Of..>e.-6 be {\aile.
rcht' '-' bi.fl',
A.B. ZZOZ,
wottf.d ai.oo Rl.ke. to add my :thought.o
c.onc.Mn6. Thi,.o
bill de.fihlu j oin;t "le.gal" and "phy.oic.al" c.u.otody. I
no
:the de.6iniUon.o give.n by A.B. ZZOZ (aUhough I .oe.e. no tte.Mon. to .oe.patta.:te_ :the. c.onc..e..p:t.6 'o6 phy.oi_c.al
and legal c.u6tody 6ott tteMon.o given in the. above. pa.ttag11..aph).
1
obje..c..t f.:J:tf1..e.nuou.oly
to a loophole. :that :thi-6 bill pttavidu, .oinc.e. il aUowo fiatt
CoU!1..t
go on a.waJuiing
joint le.gal c.u.o:tady without ade.qua.:te. phy.oic.a.t
wilh
Be.c.au.oe. :the. bill
11..epe.ate.d.ty u.ou the. phlla..oe.. "joint c.u.otody" without
phyJ.Jic.al, le.gal,
OIL bo:th, a CoUf1..:t c..ou.td te.c.hnic.aUy .oa.:tMfiy :the.
wlihout giving
a fl..e.Mon fiatt no:t a.wa.ttdin.g joint phy.oic.a.t
.
:tu:timony on Oc;tobelt 14,
j udg eo in. many di.o:tf1..iw a.tte. a.wa.ttdin.g 6e.w c.a.o u a
Thi-6 bill
would 6uf1..:the.f1.. e.nc.oMag e. .o uc.h pttac.tic..e., .oinc.e. :the.
le.ga.£ cu.otody,
the11..e.by avoicUng the. majott pWtpo.oe.. o{l oWt joint
and c.oi'itinuing c..on:tac..t)
wdhout ha.ving :to .o:ta.:te. :the. tte,a.oon.o 6ott de.nia.£ a
cu.o:tady.
we. mu6:t
maki.ng a di.o:tin.c..tion be;twee.n
I .o:ttwngly Wtge.
that the. Imbfte.c.ht bill. be modifiie.d .oo M to u.oe.
and lega.£
ew!>tod1J 11 in.o teiUl a 6 "Joint c.u.o:tody" in R1.ne.o 4
e. 2 tit line.o 1,
2,3,4,5,6,8,9,12,14. Such a c.hange. would tte.move.
"joi_nt
and
c.u.otody .taw.

In
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ITEM D
Law Offices

SCHAPIRO AND THORN, INC.
1242 Market Street, Fifth Floor'
San Francisco, California 94102

Suzie S. Thorn
Susan L Keel
Pamela E. Pierson

(415) 431-5772

October 23, 1981

California Legislature Assembly
Committee On Judiciary
1127 - 11th Street, Room 820
Sacramento, CA 95814
Attn:

Elihu M. Harris, Chairman

Dear Mr. Chairman:
I am writing to urge passage of AB 2202 and
ection of AB 1706.
have been the chairperson of the State Bar Family Law Section
Standing Committee on Custody and Visitation (North) for 1980-81.
I am currently a member of the Family Law Section Executive
Comrni ·t tee .
I

In my role as chairperson of Custody and Visitation, I have become
very familiar with the legislation which is presently pending in
the Assembly.
In my role as a fmily law lawyer, I have been
involved in a large number of custody and visitation disputes.
My reactions to AB 2202 and AB 1706 stem from those two experiences.
My interpretation of AB 2202 is that it emphasizes the role of
mediation and encourages the spirit of cooperation and compromise
between parents in resolving the issues surrounding the custody
of their children.
It goes very far in defining the possible
awards of custody a cour~ might make which is very useful to
the parents, the attorneys and the courts in that it lets them
all understand the terminology of custody orders. A major
source of concern that many parents have is what it means when
they agree or are subject to orders for "joint custody" or
"physical custody" or "legal custody".
Up until now, there has
been nothing that provided any assistance in explaining the terms.
AB 1706, however, would encourage litigation.

It would put the
issue of fitness back into custody disputes.
By making joint
custody the preferred award and placing the burden of proof on
the objecting parent to prove that joint custody is not in the
best interests of the child, the bill forces the objecting parent
into court to present evidence of the bad qualities of the other
parent.
In my experience, such hearings turn into "mud slinging"
matches and can have long-term deleterious effects on the entire
family.
Consider the problems that would have to be dealt with
in a family where such a hearing took place and the trial judge
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found that the objecting parent had not met his or her burden of
proof and then made an award of joint custody. By that point,
neither parent would be speaking to the other--a fact which would
make joint custody nearly impossible.
It is my experience in representing clients on custody matters
that most parents are very concerned about the welfare of their
children--more concerned than they are about going to court to
tell the judge what an awful parent or person their spouse is.
They respond well and eagerly to counseling and mediation. They
want an opportunity to talk to the counselors and are willing
to change their position if they are shown that it will benefit
the child. AB 2202 encourages such behavior. AB 170~ however,
provides no such encouragement. Because of the presumption .in
favor of joint custody, the parent who wants the joint custody has
no reason to modify his or her position--it ·will be awarded by the
court unless he or she is shown to be unfit (which is usually very
unlikely) •
Another point which cannot be overemphasized is that joint custody
can work only if the parents are willing to cooperate and have
respect for one another's parenting skills. They do not have
to like each other or even like the way in which the other acts
as a parent, but they do have to be able to communicate. AB 2202
facilitates that process, AB 1706 inter
with it.
I strongly recommend that AB 2202 be passed and signed into law.

PEP;'cam
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ITEM E

TESTIMONY
By James A. Cook
REGARDING CHILD SUPPORT LEGISLATION 8 REFORMS
For Assembly Judiciary Committee
October 14, 1981
San Diego, California

Based on a survey of support-paying parents and observations of
support collection, following is a summary of the issues discussed on the
ensuing pages:

*

The support obligation upon the paying parent is lengthy (in
terms of years) because of the extreme youth of California's
children of divorce.

*

Support-paying parents are encumbered with an obligation for a
substantially longer number of years than they were permitted
to enjoy the at-home companionship of the children now being
supported in-absentia.

*

The dollar size of those obligations is unusually large, overwhelming to many, and an unremunerative burden that bears almost
no relationship to the costs of raising a child under 18 years of
age.

*

Overwhelmingly, the excluded, non-custodial, support-paying
parent did not desire divorce, did not initiate divorce, and
sought rectification following service of divorce summons.

*

In the vast majority of cases, the custodial parent is not contributing financially to the support of the child although the
custodial parents enjoy separate sources of income.

*

Rigid support legislation tends to have an "aura" of punishment,
to the potentially remunerative advantage of custodial parents
who were able to "leave the marriage" because of the convenience
of "no fault" divorce.

*

Because of the likely sex of most support paying parents, child
support legislation tends to put the sexes in opposition.

*

Child support levying or collection proposals are
cated on a persecution complex ("somebody else is
my plight and somebody else should be paying me")
constructiVe and cooperative rectification of the
generating income.

*

Contrary to a state policy of protection of the family and
support of domestic tranquility, child support enforcement legisl.ation tends to make divorce more attractive and secure than conventional, nuclear family marriage.
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sometimes prediresponsible for
rather than a
problems of

page 2 ...
* CPI index is an innacurate baror.eter f i fla ion an~ riSing livi
costs because of its major influence: monthly mortgage interest
rates.

* Arbitrary dollar-amount decree

exceed or do
on rm with
the authoritative "Cost of Ra sin a Child" surve s f the U.S.
Department of Agriculture.

* While support paying parents are subject to cant
t cita ion,
there is no contempt or obligation upon the recipient to vouch
for, or account for the expenditure of child support funds
they receive.
*Joint custody encourages support felxibili
t leads to,
resolution of the individual problems encountere by each parent.

*

Visitation enforcement; the
of child support.

id pro quo of pr

t, full payment

* Overcoming the purposeful obscuring of a child's residence
location as a means of fru5trat
e
r -p
ng parent.
* The necessity of in-kind-services or qu d p o quo
rationalize the dollar amounts of
ild s
o t

o t to

*

Loan application erosion which punishes t
s
o t p i
divorced parent but does not affect t
convent onal nuclear
family parent.

*

Subterfuge tax-deduction and capitalization of
monies by recipient parents and the neces
deductions to the parent _paying support.

rt
ough"

With the exception of the following, s
solely with
the age of California children at the time o
ing
observations, recommendations, and suggested
ts were
derived for the comprehensive intervie~ and
sti
70
ild support
paying divorced parents geographically widespre
t
t California
and representative of a wide range of dif rent conomic circumstances.
EXTREME YOUTH TYPIFIES CALIFORNIA CHILDREN AT
LENGTHY DEPRIVATION OF CHILDREN FROM NO~-CUSTODI

PARENTS.
chil en of divorce,
s, ndicated that ~ of
a s of age. And, ~ of
they Kere 3~ years

A statistical survey o over 10,000 Cali
approximately equally divided between
s and
those children had been subjected to divorce
those young children encountered divorce by t
of a~e.

crt-paying
The net effect is that children and non-custodial s
cia ob igation
parents are separated from each other, but with a
they enjoyed
upon the paying parent, for a period of t
longer
each others' companionship within a nuclear home.
DIVORCE, THE COSTLIEST EXPENDITURE OF ~~RRIAGE.
EXAMPLES: OBLIGATIONS OF
ILD SUPPORT-PAYING
Divorce has become the single largest e
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(Unlike the equity in the other purchases of marriage,
debts of
divorce must be paid in full with seldc~ any
ui
or investment resulting.)
Following is a sample extracted f~om our
36 examples of
individual child support-paying non-custod al parents with an obligation
to av $1,636,283 of which thev had aid thus far, a little over 26%
( 432,760). This expenditure does not :ncl
tto
nor
spousal support, both of which frequen:ly mar t
child
support expenditure.
This obligation is until the chile is 18 years of

e.

Hence, these obligations do not i~cl
college e
ation costs,
which most of these support-paying non-custodial parents will be unable
to assume.
The obligation levied upon each of
se
ents exceeded the
reputed costs of childhood and adolescence as averaged
om actual
expenditures.
Total
obligation

Pa:.d

~onthly

th·..J.s far

~ate

$182,100
87,800
74,250
72,050
64,200
63,000
62,400
55,000
53,000
52,500
49,475
49,400
48,800
48,500
47,500
47,500
44,650
44 325
41,000
34,580
34,500
33,600
33,200
32,200
30,600
33,000
28,253
28,000
27,900
27,600
21,200
20,000
19,900
18,500

4 4 lCO

590
400
675
550
2 0
3 0

17,800
14,000

I

32,800

4,050
9,350
9, ocu
2 9 4 00
33,600
30,0CO
1

Nr. o
1dren
2
3
2

40

1

75

3

13,0CO
7,5CO

160

7,2CO
23,400

47
0

25

4,8CO

40

2

3,900

35
300

2
2

250
200

l

300
00
150
82

l
2

45,0CO
11,2:0
9,650
1,350
1l,OC0
3EO
12,0CO
9,6CJ
l8,8CJ
17,8CO
19, 8CJ
8 0: J
' 0: )
16,0:)
13,5:)
2' 4:)
112:)
I

1 0
2

9~ )
14 ,0:)

100

5 I: J

00
200
0

I

.6 0 c J
1

THE CONSCIENTIOUS ARE PUNISHED.
SUPPORT DECREES DON T CORRELATE WITH DIVORCE DESIRE.
1

76% of support-paying, non-custodial parents did not initiate nor
want divorce.
Over 72% preferred to preserve the marriage at the time and a
divorce was initiated.

er

Decisively, non-custodial (and no~ support-p i ) parents did
not, and do not, want to break-up their families
ing t
years of
their offspring's childhood. Most excluded parents are
unwilling
victims of divorce now saddled with the humiliation of absentee supportproviding despite their willingness to preserve t
marriage.
There is no correlation between the des re
r divorce and the
obligation of child support and/or the evidence of
e excluded parent's
preference to reta
a close relationship with t
chil

WHO PAYS?
85% of all excluded and divorced non-custodi
parents are paying
all the child support, by decree, without obligation by
custodial
parent to contribute to child support.

UNTAPPED INCOME BY CUSTODIAL PARENTS
or contri ting)
85% of the custodial (but non-support p
ich child support
parents are known to have a separate income
the existence
could be contributed.
(Of 61 cases examined, 52 r ort
of other income by the custodial, non-support paying parent.)
one is an
Of such costodial parents not sharing in chil
three
attorney, another is a "professional", one is known
additional incomes, and another has earned over t
e times as much
personal income as the support-paying parent is earni
11% of those surveyed have arrangements wherein
e custodial
parent does contribute a portion to the total
ld support income.

RIGID SUPPORT DECREES ARE UNRESPONSIVE TO ECONOMIC

I TIES

38% of the child support-paying non-custodial parents have had
income losses or reversals, job changes, or economic level reductions
since the date of the support decree.
62% have not had an erosion of income since the support decree.
·On-going support decrees do not reflect the economic realities of
1/3 of the support-paying parents who, upon suf ring an economic loss,
are wary of or cannot afford the expenditures of seeking a modification
which is uncertain in its achievement despite the costs of appealing.

DECREES AT A PEAK OF EARNING POWER FAIL TO COMPENSATE FOR
SUBSEQUENT FLUCTUATIONS
The method and rigidity with which California
crt decrees are
determined subtly induces the parent plotting divorce, and who
-305-
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antic ates being successfully declared
the probable support recipient, to strateg
that economic moment
t
victim-par t
t ir li 1 earning power.

reby
divorce 11 at
pe
of

s,
ile a divorce-cant
attorney not to work and
reby
support
the evaluation of the court,
i
is also
to select the moment for legal
coincide
th a presumed peak in earnin parent
will be paying child suppo t.

an
warrant
parent
vorce to
sed-of

h strategic plotting of divorc
fluctuating income. When and if
s sequently falls

MAKING DIVORCE MORE APPEALING
DI
OF
CONSCIENTIOUS
"No
lt" divorce
ilitates
to obtain a
vorce .. the divorce
demonstrating
necessi
d of conduct, n
re is no
t
ir
ly can
parent fa
family

To overl
enforced
f "no f
lu at
ligation to
ing o
nt i

the assurance of
secure
to
The rec
the
t

eretof e, reservation of
state.
ublic policy of
d
child support tends to
ortunism more
certain a ects of
conventional
preservation o
I

NAPPROPRI

INDI

The major failing of
measuri
lati
and c
rma
heavily weig
current
age
e est rate
utiliz
current
erest rate
custodia parent is un 1 ly to
each month, and the incidence of var
custodial parents is extremely rare.
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ARBITRARY DOLLAR-AMOUNT DECREES
COST-OF-CHILD-RAISING SURVEYS

EXCEED=~G

OFFICIAL

Heretofore, child support dollar amoun:s decreed in California have
varied widely and in disregard of the ~ighly detailed ''Cost of Raising
A Child" survey which is published and updated by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Agricultural Research Ser~ice, Consumer and Food Economics
Research Division.
The Department of Agriculture sur~ey is so detailed and so sensitive
to influential variables that it consi~ers the dollar cost differences:
1. Geographically
Western region, North Central, South Northeast
2. By age of child
Individual years from 1 through 17 years
3. By residence area
Urban; farm; rural non-farm
4. Within cost brackets
Moderate cost, economy, low cost
5. Numbers within a family
Up to 5 children
6. Estimated expenditures for:
Food (at home and away from home)
Clothing
Housing
Medical care
Education
Transportation
Other (personal care, recreation, reading
and other expenditures)
7. Cost-of-living and inflation allowances
As a general rule, child support dollar amounts decreed by California courts are higher than the actual, probable, expenditure as
evaluated by the survey. Thus, in California, child support "income"
is recognized as a means of "making a li\·ing" from possession of sole
custody (albeit the dollar residue is modest, but achieved without the
necessity of courtesy toward, justifying of, or "reporting" to the parent
paying child support dollars.)
Furthermore, child support dollar amounts, at present, are responsive
to litigation that is remunerative to attorneys, as well.
Clients who are recipients of child support are encouraged to
increase the child support dollar amount estimate, which is non-taxreportable and is received and spent without tax liability.
·Clients are also encouraged to "pad" itemizations of projected
child support expenses, based on previous experience, with no requirement
to justify in the future the veracity of those estimates.
Hence, the method of determining child support le\·els in California
encourages subterfuge.
AMENDMENT PROPOSAL
Henceforth, child support dollar leYels in child support decrees
will be in con~ormity with, and correspond to, the dollar amounts
-307-
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determined in the U.S. Department
,JOINT CUSTODY ENCOURAGES

icul

s

a Child".

s

FLEX I

California's new joint
participation in
ing
tion that
ously led to
snatching.

joint
and frustrald-

There are at least six
assumption of child support
1. Percentage sharing of

different incomes of
2. Equal split between
3.
4.

5.
6.

rati

(a) based on pre
(b) based on actual
Each parent assumes
resident with
c
sharing of costs bas
to pay.
Each parent alternates
response to
tuat
parent's income.
One parent assumes all

PAYMENT

NO ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EXPENDI
OBLIGATION; CONTEMPT-FREE FOR

Child
conjectured

costs in
each

flexible,
ility and needs.

rat
in Joint Custo
settlement of child

At resent,
is no
verify
child
rt p
contributes to abuse. The
support, particular
determ
ion of
contempt intimidation

is

ort-recip
to
of accountability
rent paying
sm for the
the
s

t dollar figures are
a custodial
at

The decree-amount does not re
ld, many of whom become partial or c
with
years when
ld
t is

tical amounts
s of a growing
concurrent
be

Almost universal
a
the custodial parent s
rernunerat
work until
AMENDMENT
The parent
is rec ient of
a verifiable monthly account
of
as an accounting of all
rece
chi
children.
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VISITATION ENFORCEMENT
Enforceable visitation is a counterpart and the quid pro quo to
prompt, full payment of child support.
If the legislature enacts punitive child support payment legislation
without assurance of enforceable child visitation, the affected public
will certainly assume that the policy of this legislature is approval of
financial extortion at the expense of and in disregard of family contact
and companionship.

AMENDMENT PROPOSAL
Visitation will occur regularly. frequently and continuing as a
pre-requisite to payment of child support. A failure to provide
visitation for a noncustodial parent will serve as an automatic bar to
payment of child support, and vice versa.

OVERCOMING THE PURPOSEFUL OBSCURING OF A CHILD'S RESIDENCE LOCATION
Child support-paying fathers, including those now delinquent, are
known to have been required to make oayment to post office boxes, to
drop-off points, to court clerks, and to third parties for the purpose
of obstructing from the support-paying parent the physical location of the
child and of thwarting any ability of the child support-paying person to
participate in "visitation."

AMENDMENT PROPOSAL
Child support payments will be made to address locations where the
child or children are physically resident. Physical residence address
will be made known to a child support-paying parent as a prerequisite
of child support payment.

SUPPORT DECREES DETERMINE SOLELY DOLLAR EQUIVALENTS WITH NO QUID PRO QUO
FOR THE SUBSTITUTION OF IN-KIND SERVICES OR SUPPORT
Invariably, although support decrees award to the recipient parent
th e total monies presumably necessary for the support of a child, almost
every divorce situation results in the support-paying parent also imposedupon and obligated to provide the child with additional clothing, housing,
food, entertainment, supplemental medical aid and other costs above and
beyond the dollar amount decreed. This obligation is often voluntary but
it also becomes essential during times of visitation, vacation, or
emergency with no "credit" accruing to the support-paying parent.
Furthermore, support-paying parents, whose occupation or work may have
inherent financial advantages that could reduce the actual dollar level
(such as the wholesale recuctions inherent in being a grover, a clothier,
"in transportation", sporting goods, bookstore operator, educator, etc), are
nevertheless obligated to pay dollar amounts predicated on full 'retail'
expenditures presumably to be incurred by the recipient.
Consequently, there needs to be 'credit' or logical, rational, and
convenient services or support 'in kind' as proposed in the following
amendment.
-309-
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AMENDMENT PROPOSAL
A support-paying parent may deduct, in dollar equivalent, that part
given directly to the child, or for the
ld, or to
d parties in
payment for services rendered to the child.
LOAN APPLICATION EROSION
Parents within convenitional nuclear families, who are not divorced,
assume their child support payments with no jeopardy of loan application
status. (A divorced parent paying child support must list support payments
as~.an income loss. A conventional parent who is applying for a loan is not
required to list such deductions from income on loan
lications.)
Therefore, an offsetting amendment is requi
AMENDMENT PROPOSAL
It shall no longer be required to deduct from income the payment of
child support for purposes of satisfying loan applications.
SUBTERFUGE TAX-DEDUCTION AND CAPITALIZATION OF CHILD SUPPORT MONIES
BY RECIPIENT PARENTS
At present, the child support-paying parent receives no tax deduction
or credit (beyond a minimum standard deduction) for t
end-use of child
support payments. Conversely, however,
recipient arent can shunt that
income into payments which do not minimize or je ar ze the recipient
parent's tax advantage and increases the e
t o income solely for
the recipient parent and not necessarily to
child's financial benefit.
For instance, under the guise of a cost that
s a support
decree, the recipient parent can shunt such money though: housing payments
which are primarily tax deductible interest,
lies or purchases that
can be typified as "medical", transportation
certain circumstances
where transit is by a mode the custodial parent is tax-deducting by reason
of their form of business, etc.
In the case of the housing "shunting", for instance,that portion of
child support which provides hous
, when used to make housing payments
that are primarily interest, results in an
tax
ion of that
interest to the advantage of the recip-ient
ile increasing the
no assured or equival~nt
parent's equity and potential capital ga ,
benefit to the child whose support is being
, tax-deducted,
and capitalized with no equivalent "pass throug ' tax advantage to the
support-paying parent.
The present system can provide a three-way "win" for the recipient:
(2) The
money can be used by the recipient to pay
est on purchases, and
the interest is tax-deductible by the recip
. (3)
recipient can put
the money into equity and income producing purchases f eventual profit
to the recipient without advantage to child or payee.
(1) The money is received without a tax obli ation to report it.

AMENDMENT PROPOSAL
All income tax credits and

tions r
-310-
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support=paying parent to a recipient will "pass through" to the benefit
of the parent ·paying child support. The child support-paying parent will
receive tax deductible credit for monies paid, including interest on
housing and other purchases.

-311-

ITEM F

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
SUITE 2020 CHAMBER BUILDING
110 WEST "C. STREET
SAN DIEGO. CALIFORNIA 92101

SHAIN B. HAUG

(714). 239-2396

DUNCAN S. WERTH II
MARCIA L. NOLAN

October 26, 1981

CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE
Assembly Committee on Judiciary
1127 11th Street, Room 820
Sacramento, California 95814
Attention:
Re:

Lettie Young, Counsel

Interim Hearings on Assembly Bill 1706; 2202

Dear .r.1s. Young:
Enclosed please find my
Testimony as to
the above-entitled Hearings of October 14, 1981 held in
San Diego, California.
Your allowing me to testi
on
most mportant
subject is appreciated.
I only wish there was time to say
all that needs to be said, both as to "cus
" and support
obligations.
(or may not)
cuss ion
1980.

For your additional information,
be of value, I have enclosed a
given at the American Bar Associ
in

Please feel free to contact me if I can be of any
further assistance whatsoever.
'I'hank-you for your continued he

and
yours,

/

/

Harcia L. Nolan
HAUG, WER'I'H
NOLAN
MLN/jen
encls.

Chair,
FAMILY LAW SECTION of the
Bar Association
San
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ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Interim Hearings on Assembly Bill 1706; 2202
· October 14, 19 81

San Diego, CA.

Subsequent Testimony of:
MARCIAL. NOLAN, Attorney at Law
Chair
FAMILY LAW SECTION
of
SAN DIEGO COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION
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My appearance and testimony at these Interim Hearings
is very definitively in two separate capacities;

as a

private attorney and expressing my own personal concerns and
ideology, and (2)

I speak generally on behalf of the Family Law

Section of the San Diego County Bar Association.

As Chait of the

Family Law Section, I must advise that the Section as well as the
Board of Directors of the County Bar Association and members of
the Legislation Sub-Committee on Family Law are opposed to AB-1706
as presently proposed.

The thrust of the concerns being the

requirement of a finding of "unfitness" of one parent in order to
preclude the Court from ordering "joint-custody."

Additionally,

i t is our general position that it would be inappropriate to
delete the present provision "that the order may award jointlegal custody without awarding joint-physical custody.

11

Further,

we generally oppose the presumption that joint-custody is in the
best interests of the minor child unless by prior agreement of the
parents or the finding of unfitness.

All

of the reasons and

ramifications of these particular items have been

cussed at

length by prior witnesses before this Committee and there is no
need to repeat same.

I would like to address most of my remarks

to the Committee from a more personal level.

I have been a

practising attorney in San Diego County for approximately eight
years with primary emphasis in the fields of domestic, juvenile
and criminal law.

Within the last two years my emphasis has been

more and more in the family law area with particular thrust
-1-
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towards child custody and visitation matters.

I have been an

ardent activist and responsible for promoting the concept and
implementation of continued co-parenting since approximately
1975.

I am one of the very few attorneys

this County who has

been approved by our Courts to represent children in custody
and visitation matters when necessary.

In that capacity I have

represented between and twenty and thirty children.
of my retained clients happen to be men.

The majority

For the last three and

one half years I have been married to a "non-custodial" father
who lives with a great deal of emotional pain over the separation
from his two daughters.

Although his former wife lives within

the San Diego area, she has made her home at least ten miles from
our home which is a substantial distance for children who are
now aged ten and twelve.

At the time of my husband's

11

divorce 11

he was never advised by his attorney regarding joint-custody or
shared parenting.

In fact, he was told that as a

litary

officer a challenge to his wife's request for custody was both
expensive and fruitless.

This was approximately five years ago

and fortunately this kind of situation is probably very different
today, but - so much of it depends on the attorney's representing
the clients.
Additionally, I might add that my husband and I have been
foster parents of a sixteen year old child whom I represented
in a juvenile matter who also came from a broken home.
In regard to some of the issues raised in the Committee's
correspondence,

my remarks regarding support issues should be

considered in light of my substantial experience in representing
-2-315-

criminal and civil defendants/respondents
criminal failure to provide,

or

the

District Attorney's Family

t three

years I have probably represented some
My

first

comment would

and

testimony should be discussing
homes.

The parents invoked their own

when they had their children and when
The children had absolutely nothing to say
however, after these children 1 s

and

rear-

ranged without their consent, it is

cuss and

recognize the children's rights to
fection;

people with whom they have deve
all of such people, including
AB-l706 as presently written cannot

more

than add acrimony and allow
statement

in our Courts allegedly over
and marked as Exhibit "A" is a

of a newspaper

on October 13, 19

in the San Diego

commentary which is detrimental to all

appearing

s

of
about

their children and which further serves

relationship

and

responding

between attorneys and their
to the article and Mr. Grider,
if I wanted to become wealthy

would

urge you to vote for this bill as

Every

parent who has

for

or

the time, is a potential client
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%

me

$

0

per hour in all of my cases whether or not I am in or out of
Court.

Frankly, it takes me more time to mediate and be

creative in devising a custody agreement that meets the needs
of a.particular family than it does to ask a busy, overworked
Judge.· to make that decision for me and my client.
Regarding Mr. Grider's comments that attorneys and Judges
undermine the Court counselors - my experience tells me otherwise.
While many attorneys did not initally like the use of Court
counselors (I suspect mostly because it was not their own idea)
they now are overwhelmingly happy to have these counselors
available both in the Court and in the Family Counselling Services
section of the Superior Court.
packs!

It takes the monkey off of our

It gives a second powerful person to tell our hurting and

obstinate clients that tr·.ey must continue to share the parenting
responsibilities.

The Lt.igation and airing of dirty linen is

s.ubstantially reduced at least in a Courtroom environment.

There

are extremely few lawyers in domestic practice who want or like
custody litigation.

If we, as lawyers, as Mr. Grider calls it,

"lobby" the mediator in the Court hallway to change their jointcustody agreement, it is most often for one of two reasons:
.1.

Because we as the attorney have spent far more
hours in learning about the particular case and
its uniqueness than the half-hour or less that
the Court counselors can possibly do.

or

2.

Our client is feeling forced into a quickly
negotiated no:solution that they are uncomfortable
-4-
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with.
Believe me, no experienced

1

1 you that

he or she earns their money in a Courtroom;

quite

the contrary.
It is essential to the ''best

"

our children

that the policymak.ers :and enforcers of our State be dedicated to
the principal philosophy that post-divorced parents need to
continue in their parenting roles on a maximum level.
Clearly, this cannot be accomplished in the same form
and manner as existed during the time the parents and children
resided together in the same household.

Once the parents have

split, the children cannot sleep under both roofs at the same
time.
temporarily

Parents suffering the painful and

neurotic (or worse) traumas of t'divorce" all too frequently find
the children to be the most available and viable weapon to injure
the perceived

agg:rieVC~r.

The system

which

themselves must not tolerate these abuses
consistent in its philosophical demands
to share the parenting roles in a
means legislators, Judges, lawyers,

parents find
It must be firm and
parents continue
manner.

This

professionals

and social peers.
A philosophical presumption that
parenting is in the best interests of the
The 1979 enactment of Civil Code
Section 4600.5 (AB-1480) was a
-5-
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shared
is mandatory.
4600 and Civil Code

courts and litigants.

Unfortunately and expectantly there are

flaws which need correction in order to implement the
spirit and intent of that legislation.

Mr. Kapiloff's AB-1706

and Mr. Imbrecht's AB-2202 each attempt to improve upon the
original statute.

Unfortunately, neither bill encompasses all

the necessary changes nor eliminates the ambiguities.
A.

No one seems to have noticed the obvious
impropriety of the continued use of the term
"award" in discussing custody and

visitation~

The word itself - award - is promotive of a
win/lose philosophy.

in property.

It implies ownership as

The far preferrable and less

offensive term is ''grant."
This may appear trivial, but the substitution
of the word "grant" vs. "award" more clearly
expresses the spirit intended in the statute.
The continued use of the term "award" is, in a
legislative discussion of human lives, indeed
dichotomous with a concept of shared parenting.
B,

It is imperative that "joint-custody" be
statutorily defined if we are to statutorily
demand that parents accept and abide by Court
orders that grant same.

C.

We must expand our definitions beyond legal
and physical custody to include the more
definitive terms of "divided custody" and
"split custody."
-6-
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1.

Joint-legal custody is a

aring

major decision ...making functions and

ties

without a sharing of physical res
2.

Joint-physical custody is a

physical residences thus a sharing of
as well as: major decisions e

the lives

of the children.

3.

Divided-custody is a situation in which a

child lives with each parent for an
time period with reciprocal "vis
privileges1 i.e. it is a "sole-custody" transfer
for periods of time between
4.

which siblings

Split-custody is a situation

are residing separately with

f

parents

and there is mutual visitation
D.

"Custodyu arrangements,

leges.
parents' intentions

and a plan for its implementation
mandatorily provided to the Court.
I

suspect that

of

and

frustration expressed
lation is

is imputed to the presently
in reality less a product of

of the litigants

interpretation and more a
and their attorney's failure to
provide a viable plan whi

meets the

ly
of the
of

entire family.
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a shared custodial arrangement should be
required to provide his/her philosophical and
practical ideology and implementation of
such request to the Court.
E.

The Court must have some objective
guideline in the framing of its orders.

As it

presently exists, joint-legal and joint-physical
custody is totally subjective and abstract.
Its individual interpretation is known only to
the particular individual propounding same.
AB-l706, in its present form, invites litigation and
acrimony by suggesting that less than equal time is less than
legal and presumptively not in a child's best interests.
this equality to be defined?
a week; a month; a year?

How is

Should it be equal hours in a day;

Do we count sleeping time, school time,

time away from the parents?

What about the child's right to

spend time with his peers or more importantly with himself alone?
Equality as measured time cannot be th.e central issue..

The closer

to adulthood the more the child should be encouraged to wean
him/herself from the parental f.old.

Quality of time is the

essence of continued parenting.
The only method to provide essentially equal time is
to require the separated parents to live within the same
neighborhood to insure the children of their primary rights to
retain their peer groups, uninterrupted education and extracur:ri.cular activities.

Without this imposition upon the parents
-8-
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it is impos.sible to share equal
disrupting the child's life.

the

Such may

parent with equal time, but most

de
would be

and destructive to the child.
F.

The presently existing law

s

as to

the Judiciary's authority to
agreement which

an
one

Neruther Mr. Kapiloff's

presently

pending bill speaks to

has

been open to various
Judges.

The ambiguity

I

believe that a Judge
into such "sole..-cus

be

presented to him and
on its own motion where a
G.

Responsibility

sts.

s a

all of our statutory
have made their
decision to divide the
to assume and perhaps
responsibilities.
or indeed begin to
help with homework,
pay for the orthodontia

ttle

league games, do

noses.

Children

the
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and activities regardless of which parent's
home they sleep in.

They should not be precluded

from their normal activities because they are at
the "out 1' parent's home.
H.

Conciliation Court, also known as the Family
Counselling Services of the Superior Court, needs
more funds for more staff to provide increased time
with clients mediating and negotiating co-parenting
arrangements which meets the needs of the newly
altered family and especially the children.

In

the alternative, we need to devise a program to
train attorneys and/or mental health professionals
in the theory and ability to act as independent
mediators in custody and visitation difficulties.
Mediati.on of a good viable and longterm agreement
J

often takes much longer than a few hours and often
needs to be reviewed on several occasions and
altered until it "fits" a particular family.
I.

We need to discontinue the obnoxious and
offensive use of the words "custody" and "visitiation."
We need to talk of continued parenting, co-parenting,
shared parenting, change in primary parenting
responsibilities.

No one likes to be a non

anything - particularly a "non .... custodial parent.''
But it is impossible to invoke the Wisdom of Solomon
without cutting the baby in half.
-lO-
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AB-1706 in its
Mr. Griber states, "
parents to
arrangements," but
each parent 50% of the
parent is proven unfi
some other

in

the child's best
My husband, who

of

his to be a ful
will not subject them to the

furcated life which

such legislation would
should he or
statute as suggested.
J.

Criteria for the
constitutes the best
be

the

our Courts in

r

attorneys to be aware of
on a more

used

form bas

guidelines is set
This Committe and
must understand that
ment
interests of the

must be worked
-1

- 2

t

"B.

II

a considerable period

family bas
of time and

counse
it must also be

zed that economics

do indeed play an extreme, if not overwhelming,
role

in~some

parents' request for co-parenting.
who are

There are many

opposed to
because of their

any shared

and there are

fear of loss of income and

many fathers who are not particularly interested
in assuming the responsibi

the children

but wish to have an impetus for a lower support
order.

The Court and

counselors

making

their determinations regarding the custody orders
must be

to

rret the real

parties in order to determine
interests of their children.
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• .Divorce American-style and 'Ule
>.. aystem that provides for it,.· 1;u;
· 'GeOrge Grider sees it, is "rigged''
against
fatberb_ood and tbe
'' healthy
of <:hlldren from
:·'·&plit homes.
That is why Grider and others will
li ticket tbe San Diego Superior Courts
. "downtown this morning at IUO to
. '4raw public attention to their viewt> ·
..We want the public to know bow ·
' the present lega I system promotes
•-·battles iri the courtroom, rather than
~~eeking a peaceful solution between,
·caring parents," Grider said yester·
iJ.ay at II news conference called a'
group be beads called Fathers Aid. I(
' has about 15 members working fm:
~ .increased fathers' rights in custody'
· •cases.
•.:
Grider asserts that
·fecti

'

.

a chnical psych?lto Fathers ..Atd.
may not .be
mothers "- have more ef. fective skills in raising children,,;Irid
. that
cannot adjust to li~g
homes alternately. , l1..v .
a San Diego a'tfortiey in
....,,tt,,.. who propQ$ed
she will be among protestif · at the hearing tomorrow. Dr.
ld A. Silver of Los
"'-"''~''""'"• m-esu1e1n of Father's Rights
and 'the author ·ota
Fathers," al$<>
wm
the measure at tbe bear-·
proponent will · b~
James Cook of Los Angeles, prestof the Joint Custody Association
· ·oL

the bill who, ..-re
Hicks sai4, !in-

of

reores4~nUttiV~ilS of the callforc
~10Ct1U.1Cfll, the Calif9~ia
Association,
state branch
Organizatioq· for

Women and family ,law Presi.~g
Mills of Los Angel~. •

"'1·
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EXHIBIT

'~A'"

cour
, in its
ring on this

54600.1
In any pr
ing u
r T tle
(comrnenci
wi
Section
4400) or Title 3 (comme cing with Section 4500) where ,
there are
nor
il
in any action
for exclus ve cust
3, a petition for a
temporary cult
ta ement required
by Section 5158 may
initial filing
of the pet tion or
d t any time
thereafter. If
to or reached an
understanding on
custody of their
children, a copy
fidavit as to
their understandi
tition or
action. As pr
t
si e fter su
iling, the
court shall, e
ional circumstances, enter an
order awat'«H
a
st
in accordance
with the agreemen
n accordance with
any stipulation
a ence of an agreement, understandi
or s i
court may, if
jurisdiction is approp iate,
ex parte order,
set a hearing date within 20
s and issue an order to
show cause on the
If
responding
party does not
in
e t
set, the
temporary order
,
nding
the termination
S4600.2

Any ~rder awa i
cust
e
who
is receiving or n
nion
court s likely to
receive, assistance
to the Burton-Miller Act
(Chapter 2 (commenci
with Section 11200) of Fart 3 of
Division 9 of the Wel are a
Institutions Code) for the
maintenance
child
all include an order pursuant
to Section 4700 or 4702 direct
noncustodial parent
to pay any amount necess
for
t of the child,
to the extent of
ability to

I

JOLJ'l' "CuSTODY" -

CREATIVE. PARl:.:N'riNG l:'OS'l'-DIVORCE

l:1arcia L. Nolan-i·1alsack
rionolulu, hawaii
August.
I .

1980

Ii:·V.1.'RODUCTORY STATE}'lENT

When I first started practicing in the area of
domestic law, I was aware of only l,::·-· kind of custody and
visitation order.
Hy knowledge was gll~aned from reviewiny
uozens of court orders found in my mentor's files.
Virtually all of them used ti12 following language.
"Care, Custody and Control of the mino'r
child(ren) of the parties shall be awarde~
to the Petitioner (Respondent) mother, herein,
with rights of reasonable visitation awarded
to the Respondent (Petitioner) father."
Some orcers were expanded.
i.e., "Said rights of reasonable visitation shall include:

1. Visitation with the minor children
every other weekend beg innirg at o: 1) 0 p.m. on
Friday until 6:00 p.m. on Sunday.
2. The Resp0nJent (Petitioner) father
shall exercise his visitation on 'Cl1t: followi•1g
enumerated holidays;
a.
b.
c.

, etc.

3.
Respondent (Petitioner) father shall
have the right to visitation with the minor
children for 2 weeks each sun~~r, provided he
sive Petitioner (Respondent} mother a minimum of
30 cays notice uf i1i3 intent: t.o exercise saLt•O:." ...

:1:; curiosity as t·..) ,;L" ..;uch br· . it.' ir. ;,;._~me 'v'<.::rsus
intricate detail in others '"a~.:; met with p_l:~r·)nl. .:illtJ toleranco.
"Bec"'US0 'w'hen people get divo.tceu, tht::
c.' .• n I t
c:Jl.'c!t:.' on anjt:lil11:)
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and the less d1ey agree the more explicit you have to be
regarding visitation. If you don't spell out every detail
of visitation, yo~'ll get phone calls every aay wanting
you to tell them who should have the kids and co complain
about the father not being tnere on time.~
Armed with that profound understanding of domest~c
in tranquility, I joinecl tne other "fellows" and preparea all
settlement agreements according to that standard.
In fact,
it never really occurred to me to query my clie.ro.ts as to
which parent would "have the kids" ana which parent' WJUld
"visit".
Fortunately for myself, my client:, and especially
for the children of the clients, in 197S I had the wisdom
to attena a seminar sponsored by d10 Association of Family
Conciliation Courts. A presenter on the subject of custody
was a pediatrician who shared with the audience his bwn
aivorce experience. He was intelligent, warm, articulate
and concerned. One co1nrnen t he made had enormous imJ?act on
me ana was t.ne catalyst in n:y exploration. of joint custody
as an alternative .

... "I might not have been a good husband, and
maybe I made a lot of mistakes, but I was a good facher and
shared a deep relationship with my children. When we got
divorced I suddenly found out that I wasn't a father anymore
-- I was a NON-custodial parent with controlled rights to
visit.
All I could hear and feel were NON- ... parent,
•IJOi~- ... person.
Nobody_ likes to be a NON."

II.

JOINT CUSTOCY DEFINED

A. Joint Custody is a term, ambiguous at best,
the particular meaning of which is generally known only to
the user.
B. Joint Custody is: A philosophy of a continuation
of the ~ual parenting role upon alteration of the family
structure ("divorce") which best meets the needs of all the
.raernbers of that particular and unique family.l
hJoint Custodv of Children:
Conciliation Courts Review/
Vol. 16, lfl/June 1978. J:,t pa'::le 18;
'·,li1il~ some practioners
feel joint custody necEssarily inplies alLernating ~G;s~cal
custody,
there is no f~xeci definition of whac joint custody
must include.
In fact, one of the praccical advantages of
joint custody is that the term represents a philosophy of tr~st
and cooperation wherein the nonexclusive rights of the par~ies
can be negotiated to fit the precise circumstances of a
particular case.''
L.

Stepnen M. Gaddis,

h. Decision !·laking Al!:ernative",

-2-
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l. Joint custody can best be defined in terms of
what it is not.
a.
It is not a decree of ownership of the
children to a particula~ parent.
b.
It is not isolation of the
the "non-custodial'' parent.
c.

chi~dren

from

It is not inflexible.

d.
It is not a divorce between the
and the children.

p~rents

e.
It is not a choice or determination of
fitness of parenting.
f.
It is not a "win/ lose·· situation or
decision.
g.
It definitely is not boilerplate language
progranuned on a floppy disk.
~.

Good legal definitions and their essen~e are
found in Miller's article "Joint Custody~.~
a.
"Joint ' l~gal ' custodv ... consists
exclusively of the shared deci sion-raaking
function ... "
"Joint 'physical' custody ... has the
additional component of shared residence ....
Thus ... minor as well as major decisions are
made by Loth f)arents ... "

b.

c.
d'Divided' custodv is a situation ~here
each parent·l~ves w1th the child for a part of
the year with reciprocal visitation ~riviley~s;
divided custody ~nvolves none of the JOint
ciecision-making of custody."
d.

"'Split' custod_y is ... a sole custodv
w1th---oi-otl1ers and sisters divlded;
edch parent is yiven complete, full-time custody
of at. least one child.''
a~rangement

III.

vJHAT

IS Ii.IJ A WORD?.

A. Speech is the primary mode of communication
between humans.
As lawyers earn thc::ir living by words \ "r,1outhpieces") all humans cornr.mnica te ide: as throuyn words.
"2 •
David J. i·liller, ''Joint Custodv", Fani1y Law
Juarterly, Vol. XIII, Nov. 3, Fall ~9;9, pa~~ 3GO, 361 partial1;
~uoting A. Lindey, 1.
Separation A0reements ana Antenupti~l
Contracts, 1-i-60, 1-i-61 (..c.9//).

-3-
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B. Marital settlement agreements and Orders of
the Court can inculcate iaeas and influence behavior through
select~on of words.
C.
Suggestions for implanting philosopy of continued
dual parenting through use of words.

IV.

•

WHY

II

1.

Shared parenting ~Joint Custody

2.

Primary residential care

3.

Primary residential parent ~ Custodial Parent

4.

Change in residential care -Visitation

5.

Grant, i.e; '·The Court grants" =Award,
as in 11 The Court awards"

6.

"The parents agree'· = "rfhe parties agree"
(never Petitioner and Respondent or
Plaintiff anu Defendant)

7.

The minor child shall have the right to
"visit'' = The mother/father shall nave
the right to "visit".

8.

The right of a parent to "visit" s.hould
also include the responsibili!Z to' visit
and to promote "visitation".

=

?hysicel Custody

SHARED p ,';RENTING .•

A.
~he reasons not to employ joint custocy or shared
parenting have been espoused by courts, lawyers, and parents
as ~ell as some mental health professionals for many, many years.
There is no necessity to discourse on the reasons for sole
custody as such "reasons" have been a part of our social
idealogy for a long time.
i.e., (if the parents can't agree
during their marriage, how could they be expected to agree after
a divorce?)
B. Query?:
How many divorces has any lawyer nancled
wherein the significant grie~ance has been the other parent's
detrimental effect on the children?
C.

Advantages

1.
Farents who are fully involved with the
negotiation of their own "custody" arrar.gemencs can bette!'
resolve later disputes.
-4-331-

2.
Recognition of parents' mutual rights
to continued parenting encourages cooperation, discourages
power plays and neutralizes the power of the cus&oaial parent.
" ... one must distinguish between the concepts of aut.hori ty,
responsibility and power. Authority and responsibility
aescribe the legitiwacy and nature of one person's parental
decision-making, while power describes the manner in wnich
i t can be enforced to the detriment of the other parent.
Power tends to be e~clusive and to leave those persons without it in a position of being taken advantage of-,
always desirous of acquiring it for themselves to use in
retaliation. Therefore, it fosters continued resentment:
and litiqation in an attempt to wrestle the power back to
the perscn who has 'lost' it in a prior proceeaing."3
3.
Reinforces, fc•r the children, their belief
that both parents love and care for them.
4. Alleviates the pain of the children 'from
feeling they must "choose'' a parent - less diviaed loyal t
5. I1inimizes the child's distortion
and negative) of the absent parent.
6.
custodial" horne.
vmite" children.
tion.4

(p~sitive

Children are not guests in the "non"disneyland daddys" and :;snow
Goldstein and Freud make a similar observa-

We. a.vol.cl

7. A continued (sometimeF-1 ne\v) shared burden
of chila-rearing and caring.
8.
Less opportunity for children to '·play" ,
i.e., manipulate parents.
9.
Reduces stereotyping and enlaryes the
child's perceptions.
10.

11.
;_Jr ix.1ary i_Jaren t.
3.

Alleviates guilt of all family mPmbe'rs.
Provides continued support system for

See supra Note 1.

~.
J. Goldstein, A. Freud and A. Solnit, Bevcnd
tl1e Bes'.: Interest.::; of the Child, 33, (1973).
Althoush
drawing an opposite conclusion reyarain~ access and visitation,t~~
"a 'visiting' or 'visited' t?arent has l~ttle chance to serve
as a true object of love, trust, ana iaentification sinc,~ this
role is 0ased on his being available on an uninterru;_Jtea aay&o-day basis."
-::>-
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a.
It is often overlooked that a major strength
of a ttvo parent home is the presence of two adult members who
aid in decision-makins, responsibility, relief during illness,
e~c.
There is a sharing of the burden. ~ot only aoes the sole
custodial parent fulfill all family functions, but there is no
relief from the burden.
12. More opp0rtunity to continue in extended family
relationships, e.g., granaparents, other relatives, family
friends, etc.

v.

HOW TO HBLP Trli.:

CLIE:~'L'

A. Begin dealing with concept and philosophy of
shared parenting at the initial stages of the proceedings.
1. Try to <.letermine the clients' "hidden ayenda"
when meeting.
Sometimes resolviny the
"real" issue resolves tne custody issue.

2. Often directing focus on the matter of
"custody/visitation" alone before the other issues of,divorce
helps to keep the issues from becoming muddied.
3. Focus dialogue on the children's needs and
rights rather than the other parent's rights.
4. Discuss the responsibility of each parent
within the role of parenting.
5. Explain the advantages of a shared pare~ting
relationship, applying the adva~tages to the particular
client's needs and lifestyie.'
6. Ask the client to assume the role of the
"non-custodial" parent. Have him/her write down his
feelings in that role; what rights and responsibilities
he/she would desire; how he/she would want those desires
ir:1p lemen ted.
7. Ask the client to assume the role of the
chilJ(ren) and have him/her write down his feelings about
sharing i1is parents, how he woula want to implement continuec.:
involvement with each parent.
8. Explain honestly to the client the emotional
and economic expense of ''full-fledged" custody litigation.
9. Provide the client with support in his/her
decision not to seek "sole custody". Give client literature,
articles.

-6-333-

10.
Strongly encourage the clients' participation
in a Conciliation Court conference or other available counseling service designed to mediate and explore alternatives to
litigation as well as work through the an9er and "emotional
divorce".
a.
"If the parties no longer hate or repuciiat.2
each other as people, if they have learned (even if only unoer
pressure of losing their child othen,rise) to accept difference
as simply 'different' (rather than as intolerable and awful),
i t becomes less important with whom the child is 'placed'.
He or she will under normal ci~cumstances vis~t baci and forth
a~icably (or at least relatively freely}.
The child can draw
from bo':h parental worlds, from two varying models.
'l'hus,
the chances of his or her becoming ri9idly fixed are less
likely.
The single parent die-stamp of one set of values,
attitudes and beliefs is uniquely Amer~can, but not a cultural
value we need to take in or preserve.~~

VI.

SU!-INA':CION

Literature and studies on the impact of divorce upon
cnildl-en and families are becollling more prevalent.
See, e.g., vvallerstein and Kelly, "Divorce Counselin~:
A Community Service for Families in the I1idst of LJi vorce" ,
47 A.mer.J. Orthopsychiat. 4(1977); Hetherington, Cox, and Cox,
"Divorced Fathers", 25r Fam. Coordinator 417 (197(,) .' One
very valuable reference source for persons interested in
reviewing other studies and statistics can be found in an
article entitled "Children of Divorce, A Review or the
?sycholog ical Literature'· , Deborah A. Luepni tz, "Law anc
Human Behavior", Vol 2, No. 2, (1978), Plenum Press, ·New York.
'l'o date, there has been li tt:_e research on tht: e ~ l·ects
of "joint custody" upon chilaren ana families, prllllaril} oecause
the widespread functional concept is still in its infanCJ'.
lfowever, more and more state legislators are beginning to at
least mention the theory in revised statutes and to rec9gnize
the validity of continued dual parenting after divorce. 0
Perhaps the most significant statute being California's

Virginia Anne Church, "A Rational
Child Custod?",

J~fproacn

to

G. Oreaon Statute, Section 2 ORS
... "whenever- tne court grants a ciecree o an annu :nen
C:.issolution of marriage or of se?aration, i t has tJOHer furtiJ>21~
to aecree as follO\vS:
(a) F'or tne future care anu cus tO(•.:· c.;
minor children of the marriage by one party or jointly as i t
may deem just and proper." ...
-7-334-

amendment to the Civil Code relat!ng to chila custody which
became effective January 1, 1980. 1
It is this author's observation both in the
representation of parents of both sexes and substantial
experience in the representation of minor cnildren in ~ustodJ
~isputes, that ~joint custody/shared parenting" does work and
it works with parents who can't get along.
Causing parents-to think about the concepts of shared parenting and their
• children's needs often is the catalyst towards ending the open
hostility -warfare.
Frequently it has increased the father's
participation in the chila-re~ring process, ~he lack of
·.Nhich c~:n be a major grievance :::;f tn0 mother.
I have seen raa:~y
desponcient and withdrawn children sigh with relief and smile
brightly with '!:he question answered - "You me.an I can keep
both my parents?"
Undoubtedly, the major stumbling block in achievinc;
viable shared parenting ayreements, isattorneys and other
"credible" professionals who are not f ar,ti liar wi tn the conce;_Jts
and are afraia of change from the "normal"; and unfortunately,
all too often, those professionals \vho are too lazy to use tlle
creative eneryies required to produce an ayreement which is
tailorea to that one. unique family and its individual needs.

•

The only answer is to continue to softly, but
diligently, teach and '-~r1t'rus·t our clients, the courts and
opposing counsel in the many alternatives open to divorcing
parents which does not also create a divorce from the haple3s
children.
I have supplied our courts with innumerable articles
on ''joint custody/shared parenting" with sig~ificant results.
Pet-haps more iLlportantly, in terms of conf 1 i ct resol u t:ion, 1
have submitted these sante treatises to "unc1l ightec.i" opposing
couns~l, advising that I hive su~plied the same to my client,
accompanied by tne request that their clients be given an
opportunity to read these same articles.
'l'he results llave
been delightfully amazing and I spend almost no time in custody
trials .
"Yes, Mary, you can keep both of your parents! n·

7.

California Civil Code Section 4GOO, 4600.S; (1919).
-6-

-335-

APPENDIX A

DOHESTIC LA\-J AllD Ic!OTIO!.J DEPAR'lHL'l'l'

PP£LCDE TO ORDEH TO ShO'./ CAuSE P.tlD i•10TIOI'>l CALEHDAR

The people in this courtroom today are here because
you have made a present decision to terminate your mqrriage.
Most of you have minor children
are go
to be affect~d
by the decisions made here
I am sure you are aware that it is usually the
children who are most vulner3ble to the pains of this decision
ana the ones who usually have the least power to control those
decisions. This Court can and will make certain orders that
will affect your lives at the present time and usually those
oraers are offensive to everyone in one way or another.
Concerning cus
ana visitation, it is this
Court's ppinion that the parents are the best aLle persons
to make the appropriate decisions regarding these issues.
This Court strongly encourages parents to meet with each other
and to work out and determine for themselves what is in the best
interests of their children. Listen to your attorneys, who have
substantial experience in handling these matters ahd seek
counseling through tne services of the Conciliation Court
counselor (or other serv ce) in order to reacn a mutually
acceptable agreemen in the best nteres of you chi'aren.
In this light the Court offers to you the, followinq
thoughts for your considera~ion.
Shared cus
is any method that permits the
chi loren to grmv up knowi
and i t racting with each ~:;arent
in an every day situation, whether that co,[les by split t
the time on a f
fif
basis each week or by transferring
the care to the lternate parent for several years, or
alternative in between. The overal
esult is tne same the youngsters have a con nu
for a real stic,
noroal relationsh p witn each parent.
ddition, it allows
each parent to know ti1at nt;;; an
ne s
h
tile opportuni
to 2ass on to the cnildren the
own un
ness, skills,
thoughts, and values.
Remerr~er - It is not necessary to
as S?Ouses, or even be frienc:is, to still
parents.

each otller
each ther as

In a shared cus
arrangement:. there is more flexibility available to arrange within each amily,
custoay/
visic:.ation" which meets tl1e neec:is of the fami
as new
-1-
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organized subsequent to the parents' separation.
This Court hopes that you will carefully cons1aer
the varied options and alternatives open to you as parents
that shared parenting can offer and that in conside~ing the
rigllts and needs of your children, as well as your 6wn riynts
and responsibilities to continue parenting, you will discuss
these ideas carefully with your attorney and each other.*

*HON. JAHES A. HALKUS
Supervising Judge, Domestic Law & Motion
Superior Court of California
Conciliation Court Judge
San Diego, California
HARCIA L. NOLAJ.'J-NALSACK, Attorney
San Diego, California
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